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This thesis comprises three essays that investigate the effects of human capital, financial 
markets, and the banking system development on bank deposits, deposit funding, retail, and 
time deposits proportions. The first two essays are country level studies, whereas the third is at 
bank level. The data related to first essay has been obtained from the World Bank and the 
World Health Organisation (WHO). For the second and third essays, bank level data is from 
Bankscope and macroeconomic variables data are from the World Bank.  
The first essay investigates the effects of human capital development on bank deposits, 
employing 2SLS method in a cross-country setup. Human capital development includes the 
development of the healthcare system and education level. I use two dependent variables: 
deposits to GDP ratio and value of total deposits. Results show a positive relationship between 
human capital development and bank deposits. However, the impact of healthcare system on 
total deposits is higher than the bank deposits to GDP ratio, suggesting that an improvement in 
the healthcare system increases households’ income and a proportion of that increased income 
goes into the banking system. The impact of education is higher in high financially included 
countries than in less financially included countries.  
The second essay examines the effects of financial markets development on bank 
deposits, using instrumental variables methods. Empirical results suggest that investors in 
developed and developing economies use financial markets differently. In highly financially 
integrated economies, the financial markets and banking system complement each other, 
whereas in fragmented markets they compete.   
The third essay explores the effects of competition on bank deposit funding and 
composition. Interest cost has been used to measure deposit competition and the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI3) at deposits and loans levels to measure market structure. The results 
show that increased deposit competition encourages banks to increase the proportion of less 
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costly funds, causing a reduction in deposit funding. In contrast, high interest rates attract retail 
depositors, especially for time deposits, thereby increasing the proportion of retail deposits. 
However, this finding varies according to the financial development level of the countries. 
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A stable and resilient banking system is the backbone of the economy. It increases trust 
among stakeholders of the banking system by efficiently and effectively managing the flow of 
funds from lenders to borrowers. The stability of the banks mainly depends on managing 
lending activities and funding structure. Management of lending activities involves assessing 
and funding viable projects, whereas funding structure includes maintaining a balanced 
combination of equity capital, deposits, and wholesale funding (Sinkey, 1992). The discussion 
of lending activities is out of the scope of this thesis, which is limited to discussion of bank 
funding composition, particularly through bank deposits.  
A higher proportion of retail deposits in banks’ funding makes the banking system more 
resilient (Huang & Ratnovski, 2009). Banks generally have a mix of retail deposits and non-
deposit funding. After the deregulation of interest rates and development of other financial 
products, deposit products became costly for banks (Hubbard, 2007). Therefore, their focus 
shifted to wholesale funding. The relaxation in liquidity constraints and highly liquid wholesale 
markets enabled an acceleration of banks’ lending activities. They lent money for longer terms 
and funded this from short-term sources, believing that they could get funds from wholesale 
markets whenever they needed them. However, wholesale funding is sensitive to interest rates 
and noise (rumours) which makes the banking system fragile (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 
2010; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). In 2007, as the real estate market started showing turbulence, 
investors in wholesale markets started withdrawing funds, leading to a liquidity crunch in 
wholesale markets (Dagher & Kazimov, 2015; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). The high level of 
wholesale funding created liquidity risk, which was one of the primary factors behind the global 
financial crisis (GFC) between 2007 and 2009 (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; King, 
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2013). To mitigate the effects of a liquidity crisis, authorities across the globe took several 
steps, including deposit guarantees and bailout packages1.  
Figure 1 Banks funding structure 
 
Source: IMF working paper Bank Debt in Europe: “Are Funding Models Broken” by Le Lesle (2012). 
The GFC has returned the focus of the banking industry to its core business, accepting 
deposits and lending to entrepreneurs and/or borrowers (Berger & Bouwman, 2013). The 
regulators have highlighted the importance of retail deposits for the stability of the banking 
system in Basel-III (BCBS, 2010a). This creates a need to identify the factors that attract/ 
affects bank deposits such as deposit rates and bank stability (Craig & Dinger, 2013; 
Mondschean & Opiela, 1999), service quality (Egan, Hortaçsu, & Matvos, 2017), accessibility 
of banks (Célerier & Matray, 2019). Apart from banking factors, other socioeconomic factors 
such as education, health, income, and financial markets also affect bank deposits (Evans, 
 
1 The US government formed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to purchase the equity and warrants in 
distressed banks. Federal reserve made an emergency action plan for liquidity infusion in the financial system 
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Green, & Murinde, 2002; Shih, Chang, & Lin, 2010). In banking literature, bank deposits have 
been used as explanatory variables such as for bank stability (Khan, Scheule, & Wu, 2017; 
Vazquez & Federico, 2015), cost efficiency (Tortosa-Ausina, 2002), and profitability 
(Akhavein, Berger, & Humphrey, 1997; Maudos, Pastor, Pérez, & Quesada, 2002), although 
literature studying the determinants of bank deposits are relatively scarce. I have identified 
three factors, two at the country level and one at the firm level, which affect bank deposits i.e. 
human capital, financial markets development, and deposit competition within the banking 
system. This thesis aims to investigate the impact of human capital and financial market 
development on bank deposits, deposit funding2, and its composition3. It also investigates how 
competition within the banking system influences bank deposit funding and composition.  
1.1. A historical and current perspective on the role of bank deposits for the 
liquidity management in the banking system 
During 1940s and 1950s, the high economic activity in the western world increased the 
flow of funds to the banking system. Thus, banks had ample transaction and non-transaction 
deposits4 that they deployed into different projects (Seltzer, 1940). These projects were 
assessed on the grounds of national interest and profitability by the government authorities in 
the United States (Sinkey, 1992). However, during 1960s, due to tax cuts and increased 
economic activities in the country, banks started facing shortage of funds (Canto, Joines, & 
Laffer, 1981). Problems were exacerbated by the restrictions on bank activities under the 
Federal Reserve regulations which ended up promoting the development of Eurocurrency 
markets (McKinnon, 1977; Schenk, 1998).  
 
2 Deposit funding includes deposit and short-term funding to total assets ratio. 
3 Deposit composition includes the retail and time deposit proportions. Retail deposit proportion consists customer 
deposits to total deposits and short-term funding ratio and time deposit proportion consists customer time deposit 
to total customer deposits.  
4 The total deposit to total assets was around 90 percent during 1940-50s (see Figure 2).  
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Similarly, in United Kingdom, the increase in economic activities incentivized the 
government to abolish the long-standing Capital Issues Committee and other official control 
measures on raising funds during 1970s (Goodhart, Hofmann, & Segoviano, 2004; Kaminsky 
& Schmukler, 2008; Reid, 1982). This allowed non-banking financial companies and 
industrialists to obtain funds through open market. This also increased the activities of banks5 
outside the purview of the Bank of England and foreign banks during 1960s and contributed to 
the emergence of the Euromarkets (Schooner & Taylor, 1998). The surplus holders and savers, 
then, had a range of options from wholesale market funds to Eurobond to invest their fund with 
new borrowers for a better yield than in traditional deposit products, which created shortage of 
funds in the United Kingdom banking system (Goldberg & Saunders, 1980; Reid, 1982; 
Schenk, 1998; Schooner & Taylor, 1998). Such shortages of funds motivated banks to 
undertake liability management.  
Citibank, then First National Bank of New York, started issuing negotiable certificate 
of deposits (NCDs), federal funds, and commercial paper to finance the loan demand in 1961 
in the United States banking system (OCC, n.d.). Similarly, the use of wholesale market, 
special deposits, and liquidity requirement relaxations allowed United Kingdom banks to 
finance their lending demand (Davies, Richardson, Katinaite, & Manning, 2010; Reid, 1982). 
This started the era of wholesale banking and asset-liabilities management (ALM) in the 
banking system (Sinkey, 1992; Theilman, 1970). One of the main aims of ALM in the banking 
system was to increase profitability, which could be achieved by balance-sheet growth through 
credit expansion and increasing the bid-ask spread by decreasing the cost of funding and 
lending at higher interest rates (Sinkey, 1992). Hence, banks increased the proportion of 
 
5 The banks which were outside the purview of the Bank of England were known as secondary banks.  
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wholesale funding and lent more to increase their balance sheets. This was supported by the 
deregulation of the banking system in 1970s.  
The deregulation of interest rate ceilings and bank branching during 1970s increased 
competition in the banking system. Depositors became rate sensitive and started looking for 
high yield investment products, which increased the use of borrowed funds in the banking 
system. As shown in Figure 2, in the United States, the deposit to total assets was 92 percent 
in 1950 but went down to 65 percent in 2007. In the aftermath of Russian Debt Crisis (1998) 
and Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98), the United States became an attractive destination for 
foreign investment. Innovative financial products such as mortgage backed securities (MBS), 
credit default swaps (CDS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) allowed foreign 
investors to invest in the United States real estate market (Bernanke, 2005; Krugman, 2009). 
The foreign flow of funds (Du & Rousse, 2018), low policy rates (Cukierman, 2013), off 
balance activities (Karim, Liadze, Barrell, & Davis, 2013), and intense bank competition 
increased banks’ lending activities in the United States (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Le Lesle, 2012). To fund this high lending demand, banks relied on wholesale markets. The 
high liquidity and cost effectiveness made the wholesale market popular among banks. As a 
result, the proportion of wholesale funding increased to 18.4 percent in year 2008, compared 
with around 5 percent during 1970s (Koch, MacDonald, Edwards, & Duran, 2014). The similar 
trend was observed in the European banks, where loan to deposit ratio (LDR) went up to 140 
percent in 2006 and banks used wholesale funding to fill this funding gap6 (Le Lesle, 2012). 
The proportion of wholesale funding also varies according to the size of the banks. In 2007, 
the ten largest banks of the United States had almost 47 percent of managed liabilities 
 
6 Funding gap is the difference between customer loan and customer deposits (Le Lesle, 2012). 
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(wholesale funding) as source of funds, compared to 23 percent wholesale funding used by 
banks ranked less than 1000 (Koch et al., 2014).  
Figure 2 Bank deposit funding (%) in the United States7 
 
The liquid wholesale market made banks believe that they could get funds as and when 
they need. Hence, required reserves became less important for banks. During 1950s, the British 
banks used to maintain 30 percent liquid assets (treasury bills and short-dated securities) of 
their total assets. By the time of the GFC, according to Goodhart (2008), banks were carrying 
0.5 percent cash assets and around 1 percent of traditional liquid assets in total liabilities8. Gray 
(2011) conducted a survey of the central banks and found that around 80 percent of central 
banks had substantially weakened their reserve requirements. This boosted economic activity 
and lending demand, which further created bubbles in the market (Cabral, 2013).  
The problems were intensified by the extensive flow of foreign funds into the United 
States banking system, after the Asian (1997-98) and Russian financial crisis (1998). Foreign 
funds assisted in decreasing the policy rate, which increased the lending activity of banks. To 
fund the lending demand, the United States banks have utilised new financial products such as 
mortgage backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (Bernanke, 
 
7 Bank deposit funding= Total deposit / Total Assets*100 
8 A few countries’ central banks still maintain high liquid reserve ratios, which are mainly used for monetary 
policy and macro prudential policy. India still maintain 19.5 percent statutory liquidity ratio in the form of 
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2005; Krugman, 2009). These products allow banks to sell their mortgage loans to investment 
company such as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Thereafter, these loans were 
structured and rated9 according to their risk characteristics (known as MBS and CDO) that 
eventually sold to the broader financial markets. This allowed banks to increase their lending 
activities by putting these loans in off-balance sheet categories and managing their regulatory 
capital requirements (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). Although the objective of such structured 
products was to pass on the default risks to large investors, the commercial banks started 
investing in these products10 for regulatory management (Acharya, Schnabl, & Suarez, 2013). 
Thus, the risk was transferring from one bank to another, that created a systemic risk.  
The high usage of wholesale funding (Huang & Ratnovski, 2011), obsolete reserve 
requirements (Cabral, 2013), poor quality loans (Ghosh, 2015), and high off-balance sheet 
activities (Karim et al., 2013) contributed to a liquidity crunch in the market (Brunnermeier, 
2009). Foreign and other investors started withdrawing funds from wholesale markets. The 
banks started finding difficulties in rolling over their short-term liabilities in wholesale markets 
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). Major banks such as Lehman Brothers, Bear 
Stearns, IndyMac, Northern Rock, and Washington Mutual failed due to this liquidity crunch 
causing a systemic crisis (Kotz, 2009), which is known as the global financial crisis (GFC) 
2007-09. In 2009, major countries such as Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, Eurozone, and 
Mexico among others showed decline in their GDP. Moreover, some developing countries’ 
GDP growth rate also declined during 2009 (Nier & Merrouche, 2010).  
 
9 Although rating agencies, Moody’ Investor Service, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings were involved in 
rating the securitized products viz. MBS and CDO, they had biased opinion that real estate market will go up. 
Hence, they provided high ratings even the quality of the products were poor (Crotty, 2009; He, Qian, & Strahan, 
2011). 
10 The demarcation between the activities of commercial banks and investment banks, which was implemented 
through Glass-Steagall Act, were abolished in 1999. This allowed commercial banks to invest in the structured 
products, MBS and CDO (Krugman, 2009). 
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This aftermath has attracted the attention of the regulators and policy makers to the 
importance of liquidity in the banking system (BCBS, 2010a). Basel-I and II were mainly 
focused on credit risk and capital adequacy norms (Heid, 2007). However, during GFC, even 
though banks located in better regulatory quality and transparent countries had enough capital, 
they still got trapped in liquidity crunches and failed (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Mare, 2018). 
As a result of this, the Basel committee has introduced two liquidity management norms, the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)11. 
The objective of the proposed liquidity measurement norms is to strengthen the 
resilience of the banking system to both short-term and long-term liquidity stresses. For the 
short term LCR, the Basel committee proposed that banks maintain unencumbered high-quality 
liquid assets (HQLA)12 to cover the net cash outflow13 for 30 days in the stressed time period. 
The cash outflow consists a certain percentage of run-off factors for deposits and wholesale 
funding while calculating the LCR14. Although among all external liabilities retail deposits15 
are considered the most stable sources of funding, it is still divided into two parts i.e. stable 
deposits16 and less-stable deposits17 to assign varying run-off factors according to their 
stability. Stable deposits attract between 3 percent and 5 percent run-off factors and less stable 
deposits attract 10 percent and higher run-off factors. Retail deposits are also divided based on 
the characteristics (features) of deposit products such as transaction deposits and time 
 
11 Basel committee has also includes other monitoring tools such as reporting and managing the contractual 
maturity mismatch and concentration of funding, among other metrics such as estimation of the availability of 
unencumbered assets, LCR by significant currency and market-related monitoring tools11(BCBS, 2010b, 2013). 
12 The HQLA are assets which are available in cash form or can be converted in cash easily and immediately 
without a significant loss by selling in the market or repo (BCBS, 2013- https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf).  
13 Total net cash outflows over for the 30 calendar days = Total expected cash outflows – Min (total expected cash 
inflows; 75% of total expected cash outflows). The cash inflow and outflow should include expected interested 
payments during this period.  
14 Run off factor for retail deposits- 3%, 5%, and 10% depending on the depositors’ profile and deposit products. 
 Wholesale funding- 5%, 10, 25% 40% and 100% depending on the customers’ profile. For more details 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf)  
15 Retail deposits are the deposits which are deposited by households (individual).  
16 Stable deposits are the insured deposits and the deposits made by the depositors, who have some established 
relationship such as loan against deposits and salary accounts.  
17 Less stable deposits are the deposits which are not considered stable deposits.  
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deposits18. However, time deposits attract 0 percent run-off factor, if they have a maturity more 
than 30 days. 
To maintain long-term resilience from liquidity stress, Basel committee has proposed 
the NSFR, in which banks should maintain 100 percent or more stable funding for a year to 
cover the total required stable funding. The Basel committee has considered household deposits 
more stable than any other type of deposits or funding. Thus, it has assigned higher weights19 
to household deposits (contractual and non-contractual) for NSFR (BCBS, 2014).  
In addition to the LCR and NSFR, banks are also asked to report the contractual 
maturity mismatch20 and concentration of funding21 as a part of liquidity monitoring tools 
(Pohl, 2017). These measures help banks focusing on attracting deposits and making the 
banking system resilient (BCBS, 2010b). The impact of the Basel norms started appearing in 
the banking system, as shown in Figure 2 where deposit funding in the United States increased 
to 77 percent in year 2018 from 66 percent in year 2008.  
It is evident that through the Basel standards, regulatory authorities are encouraging 
banks to increase not only the proportion of retail deposits but also the proportion of time 
deposits in their portfolio to make the banks more stable. To achieve this aim, it is also 
important for banks to identify the factors that affect bank deposits. Considering the importance 
of bank deposits for financial stability, this thesis highlights the role of three key factors viz. 
the development of the human capital, the development of the financial markets, and 
competition within the banking system that affect bank deposits, bank deposit funding and 
 
18 The time deposits which attracts significant penalty on early withdrawal and made by the retail and small 
business owners are only attracts 0 percent run-off factor.  
19 Weights are based on the stability of funds. More stable funds will have higher weights. 
20 Contractual maturity mismatch is a gap between the long-term illiquid assets and the short-term and liquid 
liabilities (Pohl, 2017).  
21 Concentration of funding refers banks’ funding structure (Pohl, 2017).  
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composition. A brief overview and the contribution of the three essays are discussed in the 
following section.       
1.2. Overview of the thesis and contribution 
This thesis aims to examine four key questions in three separate essays regarding the 
determinants of bank deposits, bank deposit funding, and composition in a cross-country set 
up. The first essay focuses on the effects of human capital development on the usage of the 
banking system in terms of bank deposits. The second and third essays investigate the impact 
of financial markets development and deposit competition on bank deposit funding and 
composition.  
The first essay investigates the impact of human capital development on the banking 
system. Human capital development includes the development of healthcare system and 
education in the country (Todaro & Smith, 2010). In this essay, it is assumed that an effective 
and accessible healthcare system increases life expectancy22, which changes the motivation for 
savings such as retirement, bequest, and travel. Changes in people’s financial situation and 
motivations change financial decision-making and their usage of banks and other financial 
systems. Good health also allows households to reap the benefits of education for a longer term. 
Moreover, most studies claim that education is one of the important determinants of using the 
formal financial system (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012; Zins & Weill, 2016). It is intuitive 
that even though the use of the banking system is not difficult, a basic level of education is 
required to manage bank accounts. Thus, good health and at least a primary education are basic 
requirements for a household to use the banking system. The first interaction between 
 
22 A better health system can prevent death from diseases either by providing a better medical treatment on time 
or by providing preventive measures to the diseases (Preston & Ho, 2009).  
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households and banks happens through the transaction accounts. Hence, this study focuses on 
the impact of human capital development on bank deposits.  
H1: Human capital development increases bank deposits.  
Panel data for 70 countries covering the period 2005 to 2015 has been used to examine 
the impact of human capital development on bank deposits. Since a two-way relationship 
between human capital development and economic development has been identified, it is 
inferred that there is a two-way relationship between human capital and financial development. 
To address this reverse causality, 2SLS and system GMM have been implemented. Results 
confirm that government expenditure on the healthcare system has a positive impact on bank 
deposits in low and middle-income countries. The coefficient for government expenditure on 
healthcare systems is greater than those for public and private compulsory contributions to 
healthcare systems primarily in low and middle-income countries. The public and private 
compulsory contribution to healthcare requires contributions from households, which reduces 
their disposable income, thereby reducing their deposits in banks. Moreover, the improvement 
in the healthcare system affects bank deposits in countries with high financial inclusion more 
than in countries with less financial inclusion. The development of financial markets also 
affects people’s investment behavior. The dataset has been divided into bank-based and 
market-based economies, with a higher impact of the healthcare system in market-based 
economies than in bank-based ones.  
The relationship between education and usage of the banking system has been 
investigated in terms of obtaining loans, accessibility of the financial system, and savings 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2013; Xiao, 1996). The relationship between education and bank 
deposits has had limited attention from researchers. The positive relationship between 
education and bank deposits show that education helps individuals in using the banking system, 
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thereby increasing bank deposits, but mainly in high-income countries and bank-driven 
economies. The results do not show a statistically significant relationship between education 
and bank deposits in countries with lower financial inclusion23. A significant positive 
relationship between education and bank deposits in countries with high financial inclusion 
suggests gaining the benefits of education in terms of bank deposits, it is required to provide 
an access to the financial system to households. 
Once human capital is developed, it accelerates economic growth. This growth then 
leads to the development of other financial systems such as equity, derivative, bond, money 
markets, and insurance. The development of financial markets affects households’ use of the 
banking system. This changing behavior of households compels banks to use other sources of 
funds, which ultimately impacts on bank deposit funding and composition. Thus, the second 
essay focuses on the impact of financial markets development on bank deposit funding and 
composition. The financial market development variables include measures for development 
such as accessibility, efficiency, and depth of financial markets. The general perception is that 
if financial markets grow, the usage of the banking system decreases, hence, both compete. In 
the financial system architecture literature, the relationship between these two systems has been 
investigated from banks’ lending perspective (Song & Thakor, 2010). The second essay 
examines this relationship from the lens of banks’ deposit funding profile. The relationship is 
examined separately in highly-financially developed economies, less-financially developed 
economies, and in high and in lower and upper middle-income countries.  
  
 
23 The selected countries which have higher percentage of account holders above the age of 15 than the mean 
value of percentage of account holders above the age of 15 of the datasets in the year 2014.  
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Figure 3 Factors impacting bank deposits  
 
H2: The development of financial markets negatively affects banks’ deposit funding 
and composition24.  
To examine the impact of financial market development on bank deposit funding and 
composition, panel fixed effects and 2SLS methods have been employed. The instrumental 
variable method (2SLS) has been used to address the reverse causality issue between financial 
markets development and bank deposits. The study uses panel data for 88 countries covering 
the period 2004-2014. This study departs from the traditional measurement tools of financial 
market development such as stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, stock-turnover ratio, 
stock turnover value, market capitalization value, and the number of listed domestic companies 
(Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2009) and employs financial market indices constructed by 
Svirydzenka (2016). She has constructed financial markets indices, covering various factors 
such as efficiency, depth, and accessibility of financial markets. Moreover, she has created 
three financial markets’ sub-indices based on depth, efficiency and accessibility.  
The results confirm that the financial markets, in general, work as a competitor to 
banking systems in all countries. However, the positive relationship between the financial 
 
24 Bank deposit funding consists of total deposits over total assets. The negative impact of financial market 
development on bank deposit funding implies that the rate of growth of bank deposits will be less than for total 
assets which will decrease the proportion of bank deposit funding. The bank deposit composition consists of the 
proportion of retail deposits to total deposits and proportion of customer time deposits to total customer deposits. 
The negative relationship between financial market development and bank deposit composition suggests that the 
rate of growth of retail deposits and customer time deposit will be less than for total deposits and total customer 
















markets index and bank deposit funding and composition in high financially developed 
economies suggest a co-evolution and complementary relationship. On the other hand, in less 
financially developed economies, the relationship between financial markets and the banking 
system is negative. These results are consistent with the findings of Song and Thakor (2010) 
who found that in a fragmented market, the banking and financial markets compete, but in 
financially integrated and developed markets, they complement each other25 .  
This study contributes to the financial system architecture literature, which has attracted 
limited attention from researchers (Allen & Carletti, 2010; Boot & Thakor, 1997; Song & 
Thakor, 2010). It is also related to the financial integration, financial system, and economic 
growth literature (Fratzscher, 2002; Friedrich, Schnabel, & Zettelmeyer, 2013; Korajczyk, 
1996). This study thus provides insights into the financial structure of countries based on their 
financially development level. 
The development of financial markets takes away banks’ monopoly in the financial 
system. Financial market development not only increases the competition between financial 
markets and the banking system, but it also enforces competition within the banking system. 
There is an extensive literature available on banking competition and concentration and their 
effects on factors such as stability, profitability, efficiency, and economic growth (Beck, De 
Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Berger et al., 2009; Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Carletti & Hartmann, 
2002; Craig & Dinger, 2013). However, studies on the effects of deposit competition on bank 
deposit funding and composition are relatively uncommon.  
Once banks face competition from external factors (financial markets), competition 
within the banking system also increases. Competition among banks increases banks’ lending 
 
25 Song and Thakor (2010) argue that the development of capital market allows banks to acquire capital at a low 
cost. This capital can be used to finance the riskier loans it also allows banks to meet their higher capital 
requirements. Thus, both complement each other.  
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activities. To fund their lending activities, banks compete for deposits and other sources of 
funds through offering higher yields and better services. This deposit competition changes bank 
deposit funding and composition. Moreover, in highly concentrated markets, banks attract 
more deposits due to stronger brand image and trust factors. In highly concentrated markets, 
generally only a few banks operate. They are crucial for the economy; hence, households save 
money in the top banks under the assumption of their being too big to fail, which make them 
believe that these banks are stable26. Although big banks get deposits from households, they 
opt for lower cost sources of funding to increase their profitability. Therefore, it is expected 
that bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions decrease in highly concentrated 
markets. 
H3:  Bank deposit competition increases the proportion of bank deposit funding, retail and 
time deposit proportions. 
H4:  A higher market concentration in the banking system reduces the bank deposit funding, 
retail and time deposit proportion. 
To investigate the impact of deposit competition on bank deposit funding and 
composition, bank level data has been collected for 193 countries from the Bankscope. 
However, due to limited data availability, this study uses panel data for 75 countries only. 
These represent developed and developing economies covering the period 2005-2014. There 
are various approaches to measuring market power and competition such as the Lerner index, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, concentration ratio, and Boone indicators (Aghion, Bloom, 
Blundell, Griffith, & Howitt, 2005; Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, & Haubrich, 2004; Bikker 
& Haaf, 2002; Spierdijka & Zaourasa, 2018). Craig and Dinger (2013) used the deposit rate 
offered by banks to measure deposit competition. However, due to limited availability of data, 
 
26 See, for example, Iyer, Lærkholm Jensen, Johannesen, and Sheridan (2019). 
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the interest cost of average interest-bearing liabilities has been used as a proxy for deposit 
competition. HHI at deposit and loan levels have also been employed to identify the effect of 
market structure on bank deposit funding and composition.  
The results show a negative relationship between bank deposit funding and deposit 
competition in two datasets- all countries and less financially developed countries. On the other 
hand, the relationship between deposit competition and bank deposit funding is insignificant in 
highly financially developed economies. In less financially developed economies, deposit 
competition assists banks in attracting retail deposits, whereas in higher financially developed 
economies, banks use other sources of funding as competition for deposits becomes more 
intense. This negative relationship between deposit competition and bank deposits is consistent 
with use of the interest cost of retail deposits as a proxy for retail deposit competition for both 
highly and less financially developed economies. The results show that in highly concentrated 
markets, banks use other sources of funding to reduce their costs and improve profitability.   
This study contributes to the literature on bank deposit competition and bridges the gap 
between banking market structure and bank deposits competition by investigating the effects 
of market concentration on bank deposit funding and composition. In the financial world, this 
study will assist banks in using the interest rate effectively. This can aid banks in complying 
with the Basel-III liquidity norms of LCR and NSFR. Bank regulators can formulate regulatory 
policies to maintain robust bank deposit composition, enhancing banking system stability. This 
creates synergies for banking system regulators and the competition control authority in 
monitoring a country’s banking market structure. 
1.3. Outline of the thesis  
The reminder of the thesis is constructed as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 show the 
research details, including the reviews of prior research and answers to the four hypothesis 
questions, respectively. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the findings and a conclusion. 
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2. Effects of human capital development on bank deposits 
2.1. Introduction 
The pandemic (COVID-19) has made us realize that how important is to have a good 
healthcare system, income (savings), and education level in a country to combat any uncertain 
events (Ahmed, Ahmed, Pissarides, & Stiglitz, 2020). Italy even though, it is among the top-
ranked countries in terms of healthcare facilities, still failed in providing healthcare facilities 
to its citizens (Pearson & Triglione, 2020; Tandon, Murray, Lauer, & Evans, 2000). Similarly, 
India is struggling in providing healthcare facilities to people due to its poor healthcare system. 
This problem has intensified due to low literacy rate in the country27.  Therefore, governments 
around the globe are realizing that they need to work on the development of human capital. 
Better education, health, and income improves the quality of lifestyle and productivity, which 
eventually determines the economic growth (Jimenez, Nguyen, & Patrinos, 2012). This also 
determines their saving behavior and use of the financial system (Lusardi, 2008). This essay 
aims to study the impact of human capital development on the banking system especially on 
bank deposits. I employ healthcare expenditure and education index to measure the human 
capital development in the country.  
Health expenditure is one of the biggest causes of bankruptcy in the United States. It is 
estimated that around 530,000 families file for bankruptcy every year in the United States due 
to heavy medical expenditures (Konish, 2019). According to Miller, Hu, Kaestner, Mazumder, 
and Wong (2019) nearly 20 percent of the population reported medical debt in their credit 
report in the United States. These medical expenditures arise due to sudden health shocks in 
the family, and in most cases households are not prepared financially for such events (Fisher 
& Montalto, 2011). The intensity of health shocks is severe when the main breadwinner falls 
 
27 The Indian government is finding difficulty in reaching out to people to inform them about the pandemic due 
to the country’s low literacy rate. 
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sick (Naraya, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte, 2000; Sun & Yao, 2010), causing 
loss of income and savings to households. To combat health shocks and uncertain medical 
expenditures, households save money in good times (Deaton, 1989; Jappelli, Pistaferri, & 
Weber, 2007), which is called precautionary savings. Precautionary savings depend on the 
income level of the household. A high-income earner can save relatively more than a middle-
income earner. However, households with lower income may not have enough funds to even 
meet regular expenditure, making it difficult for such people to save for rainy days.  
To address these issues faced by lower income households, in particular, many 
countries offer government sponsored healthcare system or promote public and/or private 
health insurance schemes. These measures assist households to cover uncertain medical 
expenditures. Households are also then able to reduce the proportion of precautionary savings, 
thus allowing for consumption, and savings for retirement and/or lifestyle. A better and 
accessible healthcare system increases life expectancy, which further changes the motivation, 
as savings for retirement may become a priority (Preston & Ho, 2009). Changes in households’ 
financial situation and motivations effect financial decision-making and their usage of the 
financial system. Among the participants within the financial system, the banks are often the 
first point of contact for households. Thus, a study that evaluates the impact of the healthcare 
system on bank deposits, taking into account a country’s economic development level, is 
helpful for policy decisions.  
In the human capital literature, education and health are often highlighted as the factors 
affecting economic growth. Education increases the personal skillset and productivity, and 
good health provides an opportunity to reap the benefits of that skillset and productivity for a 
long period. In contrast to health shocks, education encourages households to save by helping 
them understand and access more sophisticated financial products and financial systems. Most 
studies have shown that education is one of the important determinants of using a formal 
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financial system (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012; Zins & Weill, 2016). Moreover, the role 
of education and financial literacy in portfolio allocation behavior has been explored 
extensively in portfolio management and savings literature (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Lusardi 
& Mitchelli, 2007; Van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2011). The portfolio allocation behavior of 
households eventually influences the financial system of the country. To the best of my 
knowledge, research investigating the effects of education on bank deposits is limited.  
The aim of this essay is to explore the influence of human capital development on bank 
deposits. This study has several policy implications. One is that the development of a healthcare 
system can improve work-life endurance, lifespan, and cognitive abilities of households, 
which, in turn, increases the income level and the saving behavior, thereby increasing bank 
deposits. Governments of low and middle-income countries should be cautious in promoting 
public and private contributions for the healthcare system. These contributions reduce 
households’ disposable income, decreasing their usage of the banking system. The results show 
that education increases the cognitive abilities and skillsets that are used along with the good 
health to improve the income status of households. Education supports households’ 
understanding of financial products. They use deposit products for transaction and saving 
purposes thus increasing bank deposits.  
To accomplish this aim, I conduct regression analysis using 2SLS and GMM methods 
on panel data for 70 countries, including high-income and low and middle-income countries. I 
use four main variables, government expenditure on the healthcare system (in USD), 
government expenditure on the healthcare system (%), public and private compulsory 
contribution to healthcare system (in USD), and public and private compulsory contribution to 
healthcare system (%) to measure the healthcare development. I depart from traditional 
measures of education level in the country such as primary and secondary enrollment data due 
to limited and inconsistency in data availability. I use education index to measure the education 
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level in the country. The data is obtained from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). The macroeconomic variables data have been collected from the World bank. The 
Healthcare expenditure data is obtained from the World Health Organisation (WHO).  
This paper contributes to the health economics literature studying the effects of health 
shocks on income and savings of households (Genoni, 2012; Wagstaff, 2007). It extends the 
work of Jappelli et al. (2007) who studied the impact of the quality of healthcare systems on 
income inequality in Italy. Their study was at the district level and found that districts with 
lower quality healthcare systems have increased income inequality, and that precautionary 
savings tended to increase in those districts. This essay examines the impact of the healthcare 
system on the financial system, the banking system in particular. This study explores the 
relationship between household incomes and the healthcare system and further contributes to 
the human capital and financial development literature by studying the effect of education on 
bank deposits.   
The main findings of the research are as follows: public expenditure on improving the 
healthcare system increases bank deposits. This result is consistent across regions and the 
incomes levels of the countries studied. However, the impact of the healthcare system is more 
prominent in market-driven economies and the countries with high financial inclusion. The 
results also show that education plays a key role in increasing bank deposits, primarily in high-
income countries. Moreover, good governance in countries encourages households to use the 
banking system, especially in countries with better regulatory qualities and less corruption. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents the prior literature 
related to health shocks, education, and savings. Section 2.3 discusses data collection, 
econometric methodologies and primary investigations. Section 2.4 and 2.5 comprises the 
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discussion and analysis of the main findings. Section 2.6 presents the validation of the findings 
by employing different control variables and section 2.7 provides the conclusion.  
2.2. Existing literature 
The literature on human capital and economic development discusses the effects of the 
health and education status of households on economic growth. In this section, the existing 
literature on the relationship between health shocks and economic and financial development 
is presented first. The later part of section discusses the role of education on the banking system.  
Good health helps households by improving their productivity and earning capacity. 
Generally, a healthy person lives longer and can take more risks to earn income. Several studies 
show a positive relationship between income and health status (Deaton, 2003; Pickett & 
Wilkinson, 2015; Preston, 1980; Pritchett & Summers, 1993; Strauss & Thomas, 1998). Two 
types of income impact on health have been observed: one is direct, in which income allows 
households to access better medical facilities as and when needed. The second is indirect, in 
which income growth allows governments and households to attain a healthy environment such 
as access to water, proper sanitation, and healthy lifestyle that improves life expectancy 
(Marmot, 2002).  
Some economists show a reverse causal relationship between health and income (Arora, 
2001; Bloom & Canning, 2000). They state that health increases the productivity, clarity of 
thought, life expectancy and other factors improving earnings and therefore bank deposits 
(Well, 2007). Some economists believe that today’s health is a function of various factors such 
as current and previous income, environment, education, and medical care (Deaton, 2003; 
Grossman, 1972). Case et al. (2002) studied the effect of economic status on the health status 
of children. They found that children from lower income households reach adulthood in poorer 
health conditions. Hence, literature shows a two-way relationship between health and income.  
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Income is used for consumption and savings. The consumption and savings of 
households depend on education, health status, and other macroeconomic factors. Poor health 
conditions affect savings in two ways: (i) it increases immediate consumption in terms of 
medical expenditure, hence, reducing savings. (ii) it increases the proportion of safe assets in 
the portfolio due to risk aversion. The study of health status and its impact on portfolio 
allocation is relatively new.  
According to the life-cycle hypothesis, portfolio managers advise investors to increase 
the proportion of safe assets in their portfolio, as their customers’ age increases (Basu & Drew, 
2009; Bikker, Broeders, Hollanders, & Ponds, 2012; Campbell, Viceira, & Viceira, 2002). One 
of the main reasons for such advice is the risk that ageing deteriorates health conditions, which 
may increase medical expenditure (Edwards, 2008). Similarly, Rosen and Wu (2004) found 
that poor health conditions incentivize investors to decrease the proportion of risky assets. On 
one hand, poor health condition or health shocks decreases the proportion of risky assets, while 
on the other hand, it encourages households to increase their proportion of safe assets such as 
bonds, bank deposits, and treasury bills (Fan & Zhao, 2009). Yogo (2016) reported a negative 
relationship between the ratios of out of pocket health expenditure to income and the health 
status of the household. Moreover, Rosen and Wu (2004) reported that households sometimes 
decrease their investment in bonds, retirement accounts and stocks to smoothen consumption 
at the time of health shocks. 
Households use multiple ways to meet their health expenses such as withdrawing 
savings, insurance, availing themselves of credit facilities, and selling assets. Wagstaff (2007) 
found that poor households in Vietnam rely on dissaving and informal credit to cover medical 
expenditures. Wagstaff and Lindelow (2010) obtained similar results in Laos. On the other 
hand, Genoni (2012) reported an insignificant relationship between health shocks and dissaving 
in Indonesia. However, according to the survey conducted by Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 
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(2011), 62 percent of households in the United States prefer using savings accounts (including 
retirement investments and investments with a penalty withdrawal facility) to cover unexpected 
expenditures. Similarly, in a recent study in India, Pradhan and Mukherjee (2018) reported a 
positive relationship between dissaving and health shocks.  
Households’ saving decisions depends on health insurance and the healthcare system 
of the country. If a country has comprehensive public health insurance, it reduces the financial 
damage arising due to health shocks, thereby discouraging households’ precautionary savings 
(Cheung & Padieu, 2015; Hsu, 2013; Starr-McCluer, 1996). The same results are obtained via 
using government healthcare system (De Freitas & Martins, 2014; Jappelli et al., 2007). The 
reduction in precautionary savings increases surplus funds. A robust healthcare system 
provides improved medical facilities, which increases households’ capability and life span. 
This increased life span and capability improve households’ income, which they manage 
through a banking system either for consumption or for savings. This paper investigates the 
effects of health shocks on bank deposits at the macro level.  
In the last few decades, the importance of financial education on households’ financial 
decision-making have been widely explored (Bernheim, Garrett, & Maki, 2001; Cole, 
Sampson, & Zia, 2011; Lusardi & Mitchelli, 2007). Lusardi and Mitchelli (2007) reported that 
financial illiteracy is one of the main reasons for lack of retirement savings. Furthermore, 
according to the Lusardi et al. (2011) households’ financial fragility survey in the United States, 
less educated households were more severely prone to financial difficulties. The study shows 
that financial literacy enhances households’ skill sets in the optimal allocation of funds in high 
yield assets (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011). Van Rooij et al. (2011) reported that around 23.8 
percent of households hold stocks in the Netherlands. This percentage of stock ownership 
increases with education and financial literacy. Education enables households to understand 
and analyze financial products and use them according to their needs and desires.  
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To operate a bank account, one needs to be educated enough to at least read and write. 
Although bank employees generally help people who face difficulties due to their limited 
literacy in filling in forms for the deposits and withdrawals, they feel embarrassed and thus 
avoid such situations. Education gives confidence to households to operate a bank account. 
Hogarth, Anguelov, and Lee (2005) stated that amongst unbanked households, the proportion 
of less educated people were high. Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) showed education is 
one of the important factors in using the banking system. They found that people with higher 
education in developing and emerging economies are two times more likely to have formal 
accounts than the people with only primary education. According to the Cole et al. (2011) 
survey in Indonesia, the second most cited reason for people being unbanked is lack of 
knowledge of using a bank account. Hence, financial education helps households to understand 
sophisticated financial products and increases the usage of such products (Calvet, Campbell, 
& Sodini, 2007; Hilgert, Hogarth, & Beverly, 2003).  
Several studies show that financial literacy is based on the cognitive abilities of 
households (Hogarth et al., 2005). Hence, they used education as a proxy for financial literacy. 
Most researchers reported a strong positive relationship between education and cognitive 
abilities. Sekita (2011) stated that people with higher education are more likely to be financially 
literate. Data related to financial literacy is not available for the selected countries; therefore, 
the education index (UNDP) has been employed as a proxy for the cognitive abilities of 
households in this paper.   
2.2.1 Research objective 
The objective of this essay is to identify the effect of human capital development on 
bank deposits at country level. 
1. How does the development of human capital affects bank deposits at country level? 
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H1 : Human capital development increases bank deposits.  
2.3. Data collection and methodology 
I have collected data for bank deposit to GDP, stock traded value to GDP, commercial 
bank branching, inflation, bank stability (Z score) and per-capita income covering the period 
2005 to 2015 from the World Bank Database. Data on political stability, regulatory quality, 
voice and accountability, control for corruption, and government effectiveness indexes are also 
collected from the World Bank Database. The data related to health care expenses such as out-
of-pocket health expenditure, public and private compulsory contribution to health care 
financing schemes in value terms, public and private compulsory contribution to health care 
expenditure to GDP ratio, government expenditure on healthcare, and government expenditure 
on healthcare to GDP ratio have been obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO).  
In human capital development literature, enrollment in primary school, secondary 
school, and government expenditure on education are used for the measurement of education 
level of the country (Baldacci, Clements, Gupta, & Cui, 2008; Loening, 2005; Ranis, Stewart, 
& Ramirez, 2000). However, the education index developed by UNDP has been used in this 
essay to measure the education level of the country. One of the main reasons for not using 
traditional variables is limited data availability. The education index developed by UNDP is 
constructed using the mean and expected years of schooling (UNDP, 2018).   
Table 1 Variables’ names, notations, and their expected signs 
Variables’ 
Name 
Abbreviation Measure Expectation Literature 
Dependent 
Variable 
    
Deposit to GDP DGDP Log of Total Deposit to 
GDP 
  
Deposit Value Deposit Log of total Deposits   
Explanatory 
Variables 
    
Health     
Public and 
private 
PPCCGDP Log of public and 
private compulsory 
Positive Cheung and Padieu 










scheme to GDP 
(%) 
contribution to 
healthcare financing to 
GDP 
Starr-McCluer (1996); 













Positive Kutzin (2001); 
Thomson and 
Mossialos (2006); 




GE Log of government 
expenditure  
Positive Thomson and 
Mossialos (2006); 
Clemente, Marcuello, 
and Montañés (2008); 




GEGDP Log of Government 









OOPUSD Log of out-of-pocket 
health expenditure  
 Self and Grabowski 





Education Index EI Education index 
designed by UNDP 
Positive Ghosh (2006); Iqbal 




    
Stability of Firm Bank Z Shareholders’ fund/ 
Total Assets 
Positive Berger et al. (2009); 
Goetz (2018); Hakenes 
and Schliephake 
(2019); Fu, Lin, and 
Molyneux (2014) 
Stock traded to 
GDP 
STGDP Log of stock traded to 
GDP 
Negative Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 




    
Income LINCOME Log value of GDP per 
capita income 
Positive Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, 
and Song (2013) 
Inflation Inflation Country level consumer 
price inflation 




EFI The index measures the 
economic freedom and 
state interference in 
financial system.  
Negative Krieger and Meierrieks 
(2016); Xu and Li 
(2008); Gropper, 







WGI The world governance 
indicators measure the 
political stability, 
Positive Köhler (2015); Ahamed 
and Mallick (2019); 





Abbreviation Measure Expectation Literature 
regulatory quality, 
voice and 
accountability, rule of 
law, and control for 





 Data were initially collected for 110 countries, but this was later reduced to 70 countries 
due to the limitations in data availability. The data set of 70 countries covers 40 high-income, 
15 low income and 15 middle-income countries. The countries are also distributed by region, 
covering East Asia and Pacific (EAP, 9), Europe and Central Asia (ECA, 30), Latin American 
and Caribbean (LAC, 10), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, 9), North America (NA, 
2), South Asia (SA, 2), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA, 4) (for more details see Appendix 1).  
Due to the different income level of the countries, variables such as deposits to GDP, 
stock traded value to GDP, health expenses, trade openness, bank stability, have high 
variability. The deposits to GDP ratio varies from 11.98 percent to 263.13 percent. Similarly, 
the stock traded value to GDP ratio varies from 0 percent to 372.26 percent. The out of pocket 
expenditure of individuals shows high variation from USD 7.30 to USD 2,928 with the standard 
deviation 399. Hence, to normalize the variation in the dataset, I used the log value of deposit 
to GDP ratio (Jokivuolle, Pesola, & Viren, 2015), deposit value (Kraft & Galac, 2007), and 
health expenses (Bech, Christiansen, Khoman, Lauridsen, & Weale, 2011; Hartwig, 2008).  
In the financial development literature, deposits to GDP ratio is generally used as a 
proxy for the usage of the banking system in the country; it has thus been used as the dependent 
variable in this study. Along with the deposits to GDP ratio, the total value of deposits has also 
been used as dependent variable to identify the change in total deposit base of the country.  
Table 2 Summary statistics 
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Variables Name Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Deposit to GDP 725 84.67 48.34 11.98 263.13 
Log of Deposit 725 25.76 1.89 20.80 30.00 
Public and private compulsory contribution to health 
Care financing scheme to GDP (%) 
730 4.26 2.41 0.43 13.78 
Public and private compulsory contribution to health 
Care financing scheme (in USD millions) 
730 53,802 182,483 107 2,297,545 
Government expenditure in Healthcare (in millions) 720 752 1,221 3.23 6826 
Government expenditure in Healthcare to GDP (%) 730 35 11 11 65 
Education Index 730 0.72 0.14 0.33 0.94 
Stock Traded Value to GDP 719 36.44 51.86 0.00 372.26 
Out of Pocket Expenditure in USD (OOPSUSD) 727 348.65 398.94 7.30 2,928.07 
Inflation 730 4.72 4.85 -4.86 48.70 
Bank Stability (Bank Z) 727 12.94 9.07 -0.34 48.90 
Political Stability 730 0.11 0.94 -2.81 1.60 
Voice and Accountability 730 0.40 0.87 -1.91 1.74 
Government effectiveness 730 0.60 0.87 -1.21 2.44 
Regulatory Quality 730 0.60 0.80 -1.30 2.26 
Rule of Law 730 0.50 0.92 -1.35 2.03 
Control for Corruption 730 0.45 1.01 -1.43 2.47 
Economic Freedom Index 730 65.33 8.86 44.10 89.40 
Per capita income (GDP) 730 22,464  21,343   599   91,617  
 
2.3.1 Methodology 
It is important to identify a robust econometric methodology to find the effects of 
healthcare system and education on bank deposits. In the economic development literature, 
healthcare and education are considered endogenous variables (Gilleskie & Harrison, 1998). 
Therefore, these variables are considered endogenous in this study too. Furthermore, I conduct 
an endogeneity test and find evidence for the endogeneity of these variables. I do not believe 
that this endogeneity is due to reverse causality between human capital (healthcare and 
education) and bank deposits. It is because of omitted variables, which also influence bank 
deposits of the countries, and which are correlated with the human capital. Literature suggests 
that depositors monitor banks (Diamond & Rajan, 2001) and penalize them by asking for higher 
interest rates on deposits or withdrawing funds from them (Egan et al., 2017). Hence, I treat 
bank stability as an endogenous variable. The Wu-Hausman test also suggests that bank 
stability is an endogenous variable. However, finding a suitable instrument for endogenous 
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variables is very difficult. In the absence of exogenous instruments, it is recommended using 
the lagged value of endogenous variables. I employ the lagged value of the endogenous 
variables, which are also considered in the system GMM model as valid instruments 
(Roodman, 2009). The results show that variables such as per-capita health expenditure 
(OOPSUSD), education index, and bank stability (Z score) are endogenous through the Wu-
Hausman test.  
The Hausman test confirms that the fixed effects method is suitable for this study. The 
heteroscedasticity test results favor using the heteroscedastic model. I do not find 
multicollinearity in the regressor variables through variance inflation factor (VIF) test. Bank 
deposits carry a lagged effect, which means that the deposits of period (t) depends on the 
deposits of period (t-1). The panel fixed effect OLS model gives biased results in such 
situations, whereas the dynamic panel data model would be applicable to address these issues. 
Although the dynamic panel data model is suitable for this dataset, I also employ the fixed 
effect and first difference models for preliminary analysis.  
 Arellano and Bond (1991) have proposed a two-step difference GMM estimator. In the 
first step, they assume that the errors are homoscedastic and estimate the residuals by using the 
first difference of the variables to eliminate the firm specific factors. The model uses the lagged 
level of variables as instruments. In the second step, the residuals are used to estimate the 
weighting matrix that makes the estimator asymptotically efficient and robust when the dataset 
is heteroscedastic. However, this model was later criticized by Blundell and Bond (2000) when 
instruments are weakly correlated with the first difference equation. They proposed the 
extended system GMM method that uses both level and first-differenced variables as 
instruments for each other to reduce the bias and provide better estimation even in the smaller 
dataset. The Windmeijer (2005) correction has also employed to make the two-step system 
GMM estimation more robust. Even though the system GMM is an advanced technique, it has 
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certain limitations such as using too many instruments. To avoid this situation, I use the 
collapse function to make the set of instruments smaller. The Hansen tests have been performed 
to check for the over-identification of instruments (Roodman, 2009). I also present the results 
of the two-step difference GMM estimator.  
 I apply the model on a full dataset of 70 countries to identify the effect of health and 
education on bank deposits. Then, the dataset is divided into two subgroups based on the 
income level of the countries and replicate the same model. The empirical model has the 
following form. 









𝑒 + 𝜇𝑐 + ℰ𝑐𝑡 … … (2.1) 
 
Where Υ𝑐𝑡 is the dependent variables: ratio of bank deposits to GDP ratio and total 
deposits at a time "t" and of country "c". Υ𝑐𝑡−1 is a lag of dependent variables of one year. 𝜃𝑐 -
country fixed effects and 𝜇𝑐 presents the time effects. 𝒳𝑐𝑡
𝑔
 consists of the banking industry 
factors such as financial stability of the firm. 𝒳𝑐𝑡
𝑒  indicates the vector of macroeconomic factors 
including the health expenses and the education index. ℰ denotes disturbance or error term. 
2.4. Preliminary analysis 
 The relationship between the betterment of the healthcare system, education and the 
usage of the banking system for savings has been examined using the panel fixed effect 
(Appendix 2) and the first difference methods (Appendix 3). I use public and private 
compulsory contributions to healthcare in value (PPCC) and to the GDP ratio (PPCCGDP) in 
columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 and government expenditure on healthcare to GDP ratio (GEGDP) and 
an absolute term (GE) in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. Columns 1-4 show the ratio of deposit to GDP 
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as a dependent variable whereas columns 5-8 use log of total deposits for the country as a 
dependent variable. This is to identify the trend of total deposits base. Seven out of the eight 
regressions show positive and statistically significant results. Columns 5-8 show higher 
coefficients for healthcare expenditures than columns 1-4. This shows that although the 
expenditure on healthcare system increases bank deposits, it also increases the country’s GDP. 
Therefore, total deposits are showing higher coefficients for the healthcare system than the 
deposits to GDP ratio. The same results are obtained through first difference method, as shown 
in Appendix 3. 
   Another main explanatory variable is the education index. It does not show a 
statistically significant relationship with bank deposits using either panel fixed effects or first 
difference methods. With the control variables, I do not find statistically significant 
relationships between out-of-pocket health expenditure, stock traded value to GDP ratio or 
bank deposits in the fixed effects or first difference methods. I find a negative relationship 
between bank stability and bank deposits in the fixed effects method but do not find a 
statistically significant result with the first difference method. On the other hand, inflation 
shows a positive relationship in the first difference method, but no statistically significant 
relationship in the fixed effects method.  
An interesting finding is the relationship between bank deposits and income. Both fixed 
effects and first difference methods show a negative relationship between income and the ratio 
of bank deposits to GDP and a positive relationship with bank deposit value. This indicates that 
income improves the country’s total deposit base, but this does not translate into bank deposits 
in the same proportion. I employ the economic freedom index to measure the effect economic 
freedom and rule of law on bank deposits. Both methods, fixed effects and first difference, 
show a positive and statistically significant relationship between economic freedom index and 
bank deposits.  
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2.5. Discussion and analysis 
 This section discusses the main results of the study and presents the results of sensitivity 
analysis. The sensitivity analysis is conducted using (i) economic development level, (ii) 
financial inclusion level, and (iii) including different control variables.    
 This section presents 2SLS, two-step difference and GMM results for the entire dataset. 
As mentioned earlier, the first section (columns 1-4) of Table 3 presents the results for the 
dependent variable natural log of deposit to GDP ratio and the second section (columns 5-8) 
shows the natural log of the total deposit of the country as dependent variable. The same pattern 
is followed in other results tables. Four primary independent variables, public and private 
compulsory contribution to healthcare (PPCC), public and private compulsory contribution to 
healthcare to GDP ratio (PPCCGDP), government expenditure to healthcare (GE), and 
government expenditure on healthcare to GDP ratio (GEGDP) are used for measuring a 
country’s healthcare system. Columns 1- 2 show a positive effect of PPCC, PPCCGDP on bank 
deposit to GDP ratio and columns 5-6 show the same effect on bank deposits, and the effects 
are statistically significant at 1 the percent level.  
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Table 3 Human capital (healthcare and education) development: bank deposits (2SLS) 
The table presents the results for 70 countries for the period of 2005-2015. Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, whereas columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit 
value of the country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, education index, and economic freedom index. I use bank stability, education index, per capital health 
expenditure as endogenous variables and the instrument variable for the same are lag-level variable of respective variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. The 
robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Deposit to GDP Deposit to 
GDP 
Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC 0.278***    0.457***    
 (0.0504)    (0.0558)    
PPCCGDP (%)  0.325***    0.361***   
  (0.0559)    (0.0659)   
GE   0.0806***    0.123***  
   (0.0297)    (0.0297)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.464***    0.557*** 
    (0.0831)    (0.0955) 
Education index 1.108** 1.163** 1.859*** 1.236** 1.166** 1.714*** 2.510*** 1.725*** 
 (0.539) (0.514) (0.543) (0.521) (0.558) (0.557) (0.620) (0.585) 
Bank Z -0.0190*** -0.0213*** -0.0224*** -0.0174** -0.0261*** -0.0309*** -0.0319*** -0.0260** 
 (0.00661) (0.00736) (0.00736) (0.00681) (0.00931) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0104) 
OOPSUSD 0.292*** 0.254*** 0.214*** 0.180*** 0.189** 0.0933 0.0550 0.0103 
 (0.0678) (0.0721) (0.0740) (0.0690) (0.0793) (0.0992) (0.100) (0.0951) 
Stock Traded to 
GDP 
0.0279 0.0271 0.0286 0.0272 0.0276* 0.0279 0.0279 0.0276* 
 (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0168) 
Inflation 0.000436 -0.000168 -0.000210 0.0000858 -0.00171 -0.00276 -0.00284 -0.00245 
 (0.00179) (0.00191) (0.00193) (0.00179) (0.00221) (0.00254) (0.00256) (0.00237) 
Income -0.864*** -0.541*** -0.620*** -0.429*** 0.0802 0.621*** 0.495*** 0.754*** 
 (0.144) (0.134) (0.144) (0.135) (0.143) (0.158) (0.169) (0.158) 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
0.0206*** 0.0215*** 0.0198*** 0.0213*** 0.0236*** 0.0237*** 0.0227*** 0.0236*** 
 (0.00305) (0.00305) (0.00318) (0.00290) (0.00317) (0.00324) (0.00345) (0.00314) 
F 20.38 20.53 16.12 20.94 60.15 55.70 52.82 67.73 
r2 0.370 0.378 0.324 0.409 0.689 0.653 0.629 0.675 
N 640 640 635 640 640 640 635 640 
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However, the impact of healthcare expenditure on the total deposit base is stronger than 
the deposits to GDP ratio. This result is consistent with the preliminary analysis of the findings. 
As per column 1, the coefficient of PPCC is 0.278, when the deposits to GDP ratio has been used 
as a dependent variable. The same explanatory variable shows coefficients of 0.457, when total 
deposits are the dependent variable, as shown in column 5 of Table 3. A similar pattern has been 
observed for other explanatory variables. For example, PPCCGDP shows a coefficient of 0.33 for 
deposit to GDP and 0.36 for deposits, GE shows coefficients of 0.08 for deposits to GDP and 0.12 
for deposits, and GEGDP shows 0.46 for deposits to GDP, and for deposits 0.56. The economic 
impact of these variables is also significant. For example, as per columns 1 and 5, a 10 percent 
increase in the PPCC will increase the ratio of deposits to GDP by 2.78 percent and it will increase 
a country’s total deposits by 4.57 percent. Hence, for instance, a 10 percent increase in the public 
and private compulsory contribution to healthcare of Australia increases the deposit to GDP ratio 
by 2.78 percent. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in government expenditure on healthcare 
increases bank deposits by 1.23 percent in Australia. 
Table 4 and Table 5 present the results of two-step difference GMM and system GMM 
methods. The difference GMM shows a positive relationship between the healthcare system and 
the bank deposits. Unlike 2SLS, difference GMM shows higher coefficients for the dependent 
variable the deposit to GDP ratio than for total deposits. Column 1 shows a coefficient 0.34 for 
PPCC when using deposits to GDP ratio as dependent variable, whereas the same variable shows 
the coefficient 0.30 when total deposits are used as the dependent variable. On the other hand, no 
regressions show a statistically significant relationship with system GMM methods, except column 
2. Column 2 of Table 5 shows a negative but moderately statistically significant relationship, 
contrary to the findings from other methods. However, this result is significant at a 10 percent 
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level and seven out of the eight regressions are showing over-identification issues. Hence, I am 
cautious in inferring the results of system GMM. Instead, I rely on the findings of 2SLS which I 
discuss in the following sections.  
36 
 
Table 4 Human capital (healthcare and education) development: bank deposits (two-step difference GMM) 
The table presents the results for 70 countries for the period of 2005-2015. Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, whereas 
columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit value of the country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, 
education index, and economic freedom index. I use bank stability, education index, per capital health expenditure as endogenous variables and the 
instrument variable for the same are lag-level variable of endogenous variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. 
The robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC 0.337***    0.289***    
 (0.0730)    (0.0599)    
PPCCGDP (%)  0.345***    0.287***   
  (0.0814)    (0.0664)   
GE   0.136*    0.118**  
   (0.0700)    (0.0591)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.416***    0.293** 
    (0.141)    (0.145) 
Education index 4.042* 5.204* 5.230* 4.255* 3.284* 4.325** 3.816* 3.853* 
 (2.444) (2.670) (3.170) (2.559) (1.710) (1.902) (2.192) (2.167) 
Control Variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 567 567 562 567 567 567 562 567 
No. of instruments 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
AR2 (p-value) 0.436 0.499 0.292 0.212 0.219 0.309 0.116 0.161 






Table 5 Human capital (healthcare and education) development: bank deposits (two-step system GMM)  
The table presents the results for 70 countries for the period of 2005-2015. Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, whereas 
columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit value of the country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, 
education index, and economic freedom index. I use bank stability, education index, per capital health expenditure as endogenous variables and the 
instrument variable for the same are lag-level variable of endogenous variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. 
The robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC -0.00785    0.0252    
 (0.0206)    (0.217)    
PPCCGDP (%)  -0.230*    -0.255   
  (0.129)    (0.178)   
GE   0.0244    -0.0290  
   (0.0288)    (0.0341)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.0149    -0.0239 
    (0.175)    (0.128) 
Education index 1.087 2.820** 0.665 0.804 0.967 3.730* -0.386 0.430 
 (0.765) (1.367) (0.682) (0.953) (2.036) (1.906) (0.988) (1.373) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 639 639 634 639 639 639 634 639 
No. of instruments 28 26 28 28 28 28 28 28 
AR2 (p-value) 0.190 0.140 0.260 0.204 0.0262 0.0569 0.0349 0.0455 
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.00313 0.602 0.00634 0.00761 0.0281 0.0496 0.00347 0.00150 
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 The results support the hypothesis that a better healthcare system improves households’ 
savings, which eventually increases usage of the banking system for deposits. A better healthcare 
system, by improving health, enables people to save more. One of the interesting findings is that 
the coefficients of the public and private compulsory contributions to healthcare variables are 
higher than the government expenditures to healthcare system when total deposits are used as a 
dependent variable. The public and private compulsory contribution to healthcare includes the 
government expenditure on healthcare. Higher coefficients suggest that the private contribution of 
households encourages people to save more and hence increases their bank deposits and eventually 
increases a country’s bank deposit base.  
2.5.1 Economic development 
 Literature suggests that banking systems behave differently according to countries’ 
economic development level (Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2008; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2014; 
Gupta, Tressel, & Detragiache, 2005; Hoggarth, Reis, & Saporta, 2002). Therefore, the dataset has 
been divided into two subgroups, high-income countries and low and middle-income countries, 
based on the World Bank Database. The results for the subgroups are consistent with the main 
findings. Table 6 shows that the coefficients of PPCC and PPCCGDP are 0.32 and 0.38 for the 
dependent variable deposits to GDP ratio respectively. These coefficients increase to 0.58 and 0.54 
respectively for the dependent variable total deposits. The coefficients of government expenditure 
to healthcare are also higher when using total deposits as the dependent variable. On the other 
hand, the coefficients of PPCC and PPCCGDP for both the dependent variables for low and 
middle-income countries are lower than for those higher income countries, as shown in Table 7. 
The coefficients of PPCC and PPCCGDP are 0.27 and 0.41, when using deposit to GDP ratio as 
dependent variable and the coefficients of the GE and GEGDP are 0.24 and 0.40 for the same 
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dependent variable. The economic significance of the healthcare system in high-income countries 
is higher than in the low and middle-income countries. This observation is consistent with the 
income and savings literature, which suggests that a dollar increase in the income of rich 
households increases their savings more than an increase for low and middle-income households. 
Moreover, the impact of government expenditure on healthcare on bank deposits in low and 
middle-income countries is relatively higher than in high-income countries. This may be due to 
existing poor healthcare systems in low and middle-income countries; a small improvement makes 
a larger impact in the system.  
Table 6 Human capital (healthcare and education) development: bank deposits (high income countries-2SLS) 
The table presents the results for 40 countries representative of high-income countries for the period of 2005-2015. Columns (1-4) 
present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, whereas columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit value of the country. All the 
variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, education index, and economic freedom index. I use bank stability, 
education index, per capital health expenditure as endogenous variables and the instrument variable for the same are lag-level 
variable of respective variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. The robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC 0.315***    0.584***    
 (0.0486)    (0.0578)    
PPCCGDP (%)  0.384***    0.545***   
  (0.0593)    (0.0808)   
GE   0.0697**    0.581***  
   (0.0271)    (0.178)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.430***    0.146*** 
    (0.133)    (0.0337) 
Education index 0.962* 1.040** 1.409*** 1.916*** 0.859 1.423* 1.988*** 2.764*** 
 (0.520) (0.521) (0.534) (0.584) (0.657) (0.734) (0.734) (0.802) 
Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F 21.96 20.80 15.67 13.07 29.56 21.48 17.21 15.87 
r2 0.505 0.492 0.466 0.399 0.683 0.587 0.557 0.520 





Table 7 Human capital (healthcare and education) development: bank deposits (low and middle-income countries-
2SLS)  
The table presents the results for 30 countries representative of low- and middle-income countries for the period of 2005-2015. 
Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, whereas columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit value of the 
country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, education index, and economic freedom index. I 
use bank stability, education index, per capital health expenditure as endogenous variables and the instrument variable for the same 
are lag-level variable of respective variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. The robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC 0.272***    0.305***    
 (0.0963)    (0.0856)    
PPCCGDP (%)  0.405***    0.338***   
  (0.0859)    (0.0834)   
GE   0.236***    0.432***  
   (0.0715)    (0.0986)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.400***    0.212*** 
    (0.114)    (0.0634) 
Education 
index 
-0.0725 -0.667 0.255 0.118 -0.380 -0.583 0.0180 0.0171 
 (1.122) (1.075) (1.080) (1.010) (1.009) (0.991) (1.020) (0.962) 
Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F 12.71 13.70 12.50 11.07 74.62 75.14 80.62 67.77 
r2 0.374 0.415 0.434 0.386 0.796 0.804 0.817 0.797 
N 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 
 
    Moving to another main variable, the education index, a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between education and bank deposits is found. Columns 1-4 of Table 3 
show coefficients ranging between 1.10 and 1.90 for the first dependent variable, whereas the same 
coefficient are in the range of 1.17 to 2.51 for the second. The same positive relationship has been 
found through the difference GMM method. The coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 5 shows that the two regressions are statistically significant when using the system GMM 
method. Hence, the relationship between education and bank deposits are consistent with different 
methodologies. This result is consistent with the literature which suggests that education increases 
use of the financial system for savings (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012).  
Like the healthcare system, education increases both the country’s total income and total 
deposits. The effects of an increase in deposits is lower than the increase in country’s income. 
Therefore, the coefficients for total bank deposits are higher than the bank deposits to GDP ratio. 
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This relationship is further verified through two subgroups of the datasets. I find a consistent 
positive relationship between education and bank deposits in high-income countries, whereas the 
relationship between education and bank deposits is insignificant in low and middle-income 
countries.      
The other important variable is bank stability, which influences depositors’ behavior in 
using the banking system. I find a negative and statistically significant relationship between bank 
stability and bank deposits in all countries. The coefficients of this variable are in the range of 0.02 
to 0.03, as shown in Table 3 . I also estimate this relationship through difference and system GMM 
model but do not find a statistically significant relationship, except using GEGDP as a main 
independent variable and total deposit as dependent variable, which shows a contrary relationship. 
The negative relationship is consistent in the high-income countries. This result may be due to two 
reasons: one, as banks become more stable, they increase funds from other sources such as 
interbank borrowings, short-term, and borrowing from the central bank, therefore, decreasing their 
bank deposit funding. Two, stable banks offer relatively lower interest rates, which is a 
disincentive for households to deposit funds (Calomiris & Kahn, 1991; Diamond & Rajan, 2001). 
I do not find a statistically significant relationship in low and middle-income countries.  
An individual’s health shocks play a key role in their income and saving. To test this, out-
of-pocket per-capita health expenditure is employed as a control variable and I find a positive and 
statistically significant impact on bank deposits using 2SLS method. The difference and system 
GMM methods do not show a statistically significant relationship, except in one system GMM 
regression. I find a negative relationship in that regression but significant only at the 10 percent 
level (see Table 3). I am cautious to interpret this result due to the over-identification issue. Hence, 
I conclude that households save money to combat health shocks. I further estimate the impact of 
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the variable on the subgroups. Similar positive relationships in low and middle-income countries 
have been observed, but the relationship in higher-income countries cannot be determined. One of 
the main reasons for this finding is that the low and middle-income countries generally do not have 
an effective healthcare system28. Therefore, households rely on their savings to meet a health 
shock, incentivizing households in low and middle-income countries to save more.  
I envisage that the development of financial markets affects bank deposits, since it provides 
an alternative channel for savings. I employ the stock market turnover value to GDP ratio as a 
control variable29. Table 3 does not show a statistically significant relationship in all countries, 
except in column 5 and 6. However, the coefficients are significant at the 10 percent levels only. 
A similar trend is observed with the difference GMM method and in high-income countries. 
Moreover, the results of low and middle-income countries are not statistically significant. Hence, 
the relationship between the stock market development and bank deposits cannot be determined.       
 Table 3 shows an insignificant relationship between inflation and bank deposits in all 
countries. The same results are obtained through difference and system GMM methods. This same 
pattern is followed in low and middle-income countries. On the contrary, a negative relationship 
between inflation and bank deposits in higher income countries has been found, as shown in Table 
6. This negative relationship suggests that households in higher income countries are rate sensitive. 
They recover their inflation cost by investing in high yield assets.   
The impact of per capita income on bank deposits has also been examined. Columns 1-4 
of Table 3 show a negative relationship between income and bank deposits, whereas columns 5-8 
 
28 The average public and private contribution to GDP ratio in lower- and middle-income countries was 2.54 percent 
in 2014, whereas in high income countries it was around 6.10 percent.  
29 This is one of the many variables, which measures the financial market development of the country. However, an 
in-depth study on this front is the out of scope for the paper.  
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show a positive relationship with bank deposits. The dependent variable in column 1-4 is bank 
deposit to GDP ratio, whereas the dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 is total bank deposits. The 
inverse relationship between income and the two dependent variables suggests that although 
income has a positive impact on bank deposit, the relationship with the GDP is relatively higher 
than for bank deposits. This trend is consistent in both subgroups viz. high-income and low and 
middle-income countries.  
I also use the economic freedom index as a control variable. The economic freedom index 
measures a country’s business, trade, fiscal, government spending, monetary, investment, 
financial, and property freedom. I find that economic freedom has a positive impact on bank 
deposits, as shown in Table 3. The same relationship has been estimated through difference and 
system GMM methods; I do not find a statistically significant relationship. The 2SLS findings are 
consistent with the fixed effects and first difference methods. Hence, I infer that the relationship 
between the two variables is positive. This positive relationship is consistent with the subgroup 
regressions’ finding. Moreover, the impact of the variable in low and middle-income countries is 
relatively smaller than in high-income countries.  
In addition to subgroup analysis, I also used dummy variables for high-income countries 
in the full dataset to identify the impact of high-income countries. The results are broadly 
consistent with the main findings30.  
2.5.2 Bank based economy and market-based economy 
Although stock market turnover to GDP ratio has been employed to control for the effect 
of financial market development, the relationship between the independent and the dependent 
 
30 The results are available upon request.  
44 
 
variables in the bank-based and financial market-based economies has also been investigated. 
Countries with a higher deposit to market capitalization ratio than the mean are classed as bank-
based economies, and remaining economies are considered as market-based economies (Delis, 
Hasan, & Kazakis, 2013).    
I employ the same set of independent variables as in the main model and find the same 
consistent relationships in both types of economies for the healthcare system (see Appendix 4 and 
Appendix 5). The sensitivity of health expenditure in market-based economies is higher than in 
the bank-based economies. Most of the high-income countries are market-based economies and 
low and middle-income countries are bank-based economies, consistent with the findings of Beck 
et al. (2010), with both markets following the same trends as high-income and low and middle-
income countries. For the second independent variable, a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with the education index and bank deposits has been found in bank-based economies 
but not in market-based economies.  
2.5.3 Financial inclusion 
 The effects of the education and healthcare systems will be higher in countries which have 
higher financial inclusion (Arora, 2012). The dataset is therefore divided into two subgroups, the 
countries with the high and the less financial inclusion. To identify the countries with high and 
less financial inclusion, I have taken the mean value of the percentage of account holders for the 
selected countries of year 2014. Countries with a higher percentage of account holders31 than the 
mean value are considered high financially inclusive countries and remaining are considered less 
financially inclusive. Due to limited data availability on the percentage of account owners over the 
 
31 Account holders whose age is more than 15 years.  
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age of 15, the total number of countries for this study is reduced to 54, out of which 32 are high 
financially inclusive and the remaining countries are classed as less financially inclusive.   
 The relationship between the healthcare system and bank deposits in both groups of 
countries is positive and statistically significant. The impact of government expenditure on bank 
deposits is higher in the countries with high financial inclusion32.    
2.6. Robustness 
 The economic development literature mentions that factors such as political stability and 
quality of governance play an important role in economic growth (Barth et al., 2013; Fratzscher, 
König, & Lambert, 2016). The variables political stability, voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control for corruption have been employed in the main 
model. To save space, I only discuss the findings of regressions using the governance indicators. 
These results are available upon request.  
 The relationship between the healthcare system and bank deposits are consistent with the 
main findings when political stability is used as a control variable. Similarly, the education index 
also has positive and statistically significant coefficients. However, I do not find a relationship 
between political stability and bank deposits. Similar relationships between healthcare, education 
and bank deposits are obtained when using voice and accountability as a control variable. Although 
a negative relationship between voice and accountability and bank deposits has been found in three 
out of eight regressions, I am cautious in interpreting these results due to the low significance level.  
 I employ government effectiveness as a control variable and find a positive impact of 
healthcare and education on bank deposits. The elasticity of the education index is higher than that 
 
32 The results for high financially included and less financially included countries are available upon request.  
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obtained when using political stability and voice and accountability as control variables. Moreover, 
the results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between government 
effectiveness and bank deposits. The economic impact of government effectiveness is in the range 
of 0.29 to 0.39, which suggests that a one unit increase in government effectiveness increases bank 
deposits by around 30 percent.  
 Regulatory quality, a key variable of the World Governance Indicator, is used as a control 
variable in the main model. The relationship between healthcare, education and bank deposits do 
not change. Four out of eight regressions show a positive and statistically significant elasticity for 
regulatory quality on bank deposits. The coefficients are in the range between 0.11 and 0.16. This 
finding is consistent with the finding for government effectiveness, although the elasticity is 
slightly lower. I further use control for corruption in the main model. The relationship between the 
key independent variables and dependent variables are the same. Furthermore, the results show a 
positive impact for the control for corruption on bank deposits. Hence, I conclude that the 
relationship between healthcare, education and bank deposits do not change even after employing 
additional control variables. Moreover, among the World Governance Indicators, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption play an important role in determining 
bank deposits.  
2.7. Conclusion 
 To the best of my knowledge, this essay is first to study the effects of individuals health 
expenses on bank deposits. The results show that the improvement in the healthcare system makes 
the banking system stable by increasing bank deposits. However, the impact of the healthcare 
system varies depending on countries’ economic development level, market versus bank-based 
economies, and financial inclusion level. 
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 The impact of government expenditure on the healthcare system on bank deposits is more 
than that of the public and private compulsory contribution to healthcare system, primarily in low 
and middle-income countries. It may be because public and private compulsory contributions to 
healthcare include the contribution from households, thereby reducing their disposable income. 
Hence, it reduces the households’ deposit in banks. Although improvement in the healthcare 
system increases bank deposits, the impact of the healthcare system on GDP of the country is 
higher than for deposits. Thus, the elasticity of the dependent variable total deposit of the country 
is higher than the deposits to GDP ratio.  
The results show a greater effect of the healthcare system on bank deposits in highly 
financial included and market-based economies than the less financial included and bank-based 
economies. This may be due to the better governance in the high financial included and the market-
based economies. This relationship is examined by employing the World Governance Indicators 
in the study and as expected; the governance indicators showed a positive impact on bank deposits.  
The relationship between education and the usage of the banking system has been 
investigated in terms of obtaining loans, access to financial system, and savings. However, the 
relationship between education and bank deposits has had limited attention from researchers. The 
positive relationship between education and bank deposits shows that education helps individuals 
in understanding and using the banking system, thereby increasing bank deposits mostly in high-
income countries and bank-driven economies.  
What are the policy implications of this study? Public expenditure on the healthcare system 
aims on one hand at improving capability and income, and on the other hand reducing household 
uncertainty as to expenditures. Several studies have shown the impact of health shocks on income 
(Deaton, 2003; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015; Yogo, 2016) and savings behavior (Fan & Zhao, 2009; 
48 
 
Rosen & Wu, 2004). The relationship between public health insurance, the healthcare system and 
savings has also been explored (Cheung & Padieu, 2015; Pradhan & Mukherjee, 2018). 
Furthermore, education influences cognitive ability. Hence, it helps in improving households’ 
saving decisions (Cole et al., 2011) and usage of the banking system (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 
2012). However, it is worth exploring how human capital development affects bank deposits.  
To answer this question, I argue that a good healthcare system provides timely health 
services to households, which makes them healthy and increases their general capacities. Good 
health increases endurance, life span, and cognitive abilities that helps to improve the income 
levels of households. It insures households against financial damage that arises due to health 
shocks, thereby reducing the need for precautionary savings and increasing surplus funds. These 
funds can be used either for consumption or for savings, depending on households’ incomes and 
life expectancy. However, for both consumption and savings households find convenience in using 
the banking system for managing their funds. In addition, bank deposits, being the first point of 
contact to financial system for households, increase. Education also enhances the financial 
decision-making abilities of households. It facilitates understanding how to use the banking 
system, thereby increasing bank deposits.  
 There are five suggestions from this essay for improving the bank stability by increasing 
bank deposits: (i) Government should focus on improving the healthcare system, which increases 
the income level of households and allows them to use that increased income either for savings or 
for consumption, thereby increasing bank deposits. (ii) Compulsory contributions by households 
for healthcare in low and middle-income countries reduce the disposable income of households. 
They discourage households from saving, thus reducing bank deposits. Thus, it is recommended 
to use private contribution methods cautiously in low and middle-income countries. (iii) Education 
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plays a key role in accessing the banking system mainly in high-income countries and highly 
financially included countries. Hence, it is advisable to develop a policy which increases the 
number of schooling years in the country, as this leads to increased use of the banking system. (iv) 
Good governance develops the trust of households in the financial system. This in turn increases 
the usage of the banking system for savings and transactions. (v) Higher bank stability incentivizes 
them to acquire low-cost fund to increase their profitability in high-income countries, bank-based 
economies, and high-financial included countries, causing fragility in the banking system. 
Therefore, banks should be vigilant on their funding portfolio even when they have adequate 
capital and are stable.    
 This study could provide stronger results if I were able to use microeconomic level data 
from household surveys. It would enable investigation of the relationship between households’ 
characteristics and their usage of the banking system for savings. Moreover, banks generally 
provide both transaction accounts and non-transaction accounts and studying the relevance of 
human capital development on individual deposit products will enable better understanding of the 




3. Effects of financial markets development on bank deposits 
3.1. Introduction 
There are two types of system that characterise a country’s financial structure: market-
based and bank-based systems (Beck et al., 2010; Levine, 2002). Market-based systems are 
based on the financial markets, which includes equity, bond, money, and derivative markets. 
Generally, the development of financial markets depends on there being a robust banking 
system. Moreover, both systems provide an investment channel for surplus holders (Allen & 
Carletti, 2010). Hence, they compete with each other by offering differing yields, better 
services and such (Hubbard & O'Brien, 2012a; Rajan, 1992). However, this view raises two 
questions. Is the growth of financial markets always at the cost of banking system? What kind 
of financial structure is required to attract depositors in the banking system? 
One of the early contributors to the literature regarding financial system structure was 
Frankel, Montgomery, Friedman, and Gertler (1991), where they argued that the increase in 
the domination of market-based transactions caused a deterioration in the banking system 
during the 1980s, particularly in the United States. Other western countries were not untouched 
by this change. Allen (1993) reported a significant jump in the financing activities by the stock 
market in the United Kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth century. In financing 
activities, both banks and financial markets compete to attract providers of funds. This 
competition decreases the proportion of retail deposits (Hubbard & O'Brien, 2012a).  
The level of competition between banks and financial markets depends on the level of 
financial inclusion and financial integration within the country and across countries. If financial 
inclusion is high, most people will have access to the formal banking system. Therefore, other 
financial institutions will need to compete with banks to attract bank account holders for 
investment. Such competition, if successful, will reduce investors’ interest in using deposits 
products offered by banks (Gilkeson, List, & Ruff, 1999; Gurley & Shaw, 1955). On the other 
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hand, if financial inclusion is low, both systems have an opportunity to attract new savers who 
do not currently use the formal banking system. However, in the current regulatory 
environment, it is essential to have a bank account to invest in financial markets33. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (1996) show a positive relationship between financial markets and the 
banking system. They argue that the international financially integrated countries are more 
likely to have large financial markets and banks. Hence, both systems not only compete but 
also complement each other in certain situations.  
In their seminal 1997 paper “Financial System Architecture”, Boot and Thakor (1997) 
outline the various scenarios where banks and financial markets can coexist. For example, firms 
with a poor credit reputation go to banks for their financial needs whereas high rated firms are 
more likely to go to financial markets (p 726). Similarly, Chinn and Ito (2006) argue that a 
well-developed banking system is a precondition for the development of financial markets in 
less developed economies. Although banks and financial markets compete with each other to 
attract funders and borrowers, they also complement each other and co-evolve (Song & Thakor, 
2010).  
The financial system architecture literature mainly studies the relationship between 
banking and financial markets from a borrower’s perspectives. Since financial markets provide 
alternative investment and saving vehicles for households to those provided by banks, it is 
important to investigate the relationship between the banking system and financial markets. 
This affects bank deposit funding and composition (retail and time deposit proportions). 
However, very little research has been done on the impact of the financial markets development 
on the banking system from a funder’s point of view, which is primary focus of this study.  
 
33 Investment in financial markets- Before buying a stock from a stock market, we need three types of accounts 
viz. bank, dematerialization (a process, which converts the physical certificates into electronic forms), and trading 
accounts. Investors need to transfer money from their bank accounts to trading accounts through cheque or online 
to buy a stock. Thus, if an investor wants to invest in the stock market, he/she must open bank account first. This 
will increase the use of the banking system. 
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This essay examines how the financial markets of selected developed and developing 
economies have influenced deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions over the period 
2004-2014 in 88 countries. There are various tools to measure the development level of the 
financial markets such as stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, stock-turnover ratio, stock 
turnover value, market capitalization value, and the number of listed domestic companies 
(Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2009). In this study, the financial markets indices constructed by 
Svirydzenka (2016) have been used. These indices cover factors such as efficiency, depth, and 
access to financial markets, to develop a financial market index. Moreover, she has produced 
three financial markets’ sub-indices based on depth, efficiency and accessibility. The details of 
the indexes are available in Section 3.3.  
According to the findings, financial markets generally work as a competitor to banking 
systems. However, this relationship turns into co-evolution and becomes complementary in 
highly economically and financially developed economies. I find a positive relationship 
between retail, time deposit proportions and financial markets development in highly 
financially developed economies. On the other hand, in less financially developed economies 
the relationship between these two systems is negative. The difference in the relationship in 
the high and the less financially developed economies are consistent even after controlling for 
various economic and political factors. This finding is consistent with the findings of Song and 
Thakor (2010) who argue that banking and financial markets compete in fragmented markets 
but in financially integrated and developed markets, they complement each other.  
This essay contributes to the literature on financial system architecture, which has 
attracted limited attention from researchers (Allen & Carletti, 2010; Boot & Thakor, 1997; 
Song & Thakor, 2010). The study is also related to fast growing literature on financial 
integration, financial system, and economic growth (Fratzscher, 2002; Friedrich et al., 2013; 
Korajczyk, 1996). By studying the impact of deposit insurance on bank deposits, this essay 
53 
 
contributes to the literature on market discipline. Lastly, it also touches the literature related to 
economic and financial development by conducting the study in subgroups viz. high income, 
low income, high financially developed, and less financially developed economies.   
This study has four clear policy implications. (i) The key stakeholders of financial 
system such as banks, financial markets, government, and regulators should work on financial 
openness and integration to make the banking system stable by increasing retail and time 
deposits. This increase will assist banks in complying with the Basel-III liquidity norms, the 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). (ii) The positive impact of 
deposit insurance in less financially developed economies suggests that regulators should 
implement deposit insurance schemes to strengthen banking system stability. (iii) Interest rates 
are generally used to attract depositors, but they should be cautiously used in less economic 
and financially developed economies. (iv) Economic freedom and good governance improve 
the trust factor for the financial system in less developed economies, which motivates 
individuals to deposit their money in time deposits. Hence, regulators are advised to improve 
the quality of governance to improve countries’ financial inclusion level. 
The essay is organized in the following manner. Section 3.2 discusses the existing 
literature on financial markets, the banking system and financial structure. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
explain data collection, methodology and preliminary analysis. The empirical findings and their 
policy implications are included in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. Section 3.7 discusses the results 
obtained, including robustness testing, and concludes.  
3.2. Prior literature on financial architecture  
 There have been numerous studies on the comparison between the effects of bank-based 
and market-based financial systems on economic growth. The literature on financial 
development is divided into two broader categories i.e. the bank-based and the market-based 
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views. Economists who support the bank-based system argue that banks play an important role 
in acquiring information related to firms and managers, improving capital allocation, and 
eventually aiding in economic growth (Arestis, Demetriades, & Luintel, 2001; Diamond, 1984; 
Levine, 1998, 2002). Rajan and Zingales (1998) highlight the benefits of relationship-based 
funding (bank-based system) in East Asia. They argue that a dominant banking system creates 
good relationships with firms, ensuring firms repay loans in the weaker regulatory 
environment.  
Those economists who favour a market-based economy highlight the importance and 
benefits of financial markets in economic development (Beck et al., 2010; Levine, 1997, 2002). 
These economists argue that financial markets are more efficient in the dissemination of 
information, improving corporate governance, and capital allocation (Sirri & Tufano, 1995), 
which help in increasing the growth rate of the economy (Allen & Santomero, 1997; 
Greenwood & Smith, 1997; Levine, 1997; 1995). Tadesse (2002) states that a market based 
financial system outperforms in developed economies with good governance, whereas a bank-
based system is more effective in underdeveloped and developing economies. Moreover, 
Levine and Zervos (1999) show that both strong financial markets and development of the 
banking system lead to a higher growth rate for the economy.  
Another strand of literature developed in last two decades has found a negative 
relationship between financial system development and economic growth (Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1999; Ramey & Ramey, 1995; Schularick & Taylor, 2012). Rioja and Valev (2004) 
find a variation in the effects of financial development on economic growth, as per the income 
level of the countries. They show strong and positive effects of financial development on 
economic growth in the middle-income countries, which vanishes as the country reaches the 
high-income category. Similarly, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) report a “U” shape 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. They state that there is a 
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point in the financial development, beyond which the financial sector negatively affects 
economic growth. Similarly, Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2015) indicate that once private 
credit to GDP ratio crosses the range of 80-120, it reduces economic growth. The relationship 
between economic growth and the financial system have been explored in different dimensions, 
but there is limited research on the relationship between financial markets and banking systems, 
which is the focus of this paper.  
The similar business model, i.e. mobilization of funds from savers to borrowers, creates 
competition amongst financial intermediaries (financial markets and the banking system). 
However, due to differences in characteristics between the systems, investors and borrowers 
prefer one or the other, according to their requirements, expectations, and status. New 
borrowers or start-up companies prefer borrowings from banks, whereas high reputational 
firms go to the open market for funding (Boot & Thakor, 1997; Diamond, 1991). Similarly, 
Bolton and Freixas (2000) argue that large, safe firms like to finance their needs through equity 
or bond markets, whereas distressed or risky firms approach banks.  
In the same way, from the investment side, investors with high risk-appetites are willing 
to invest directly in capital market, whereas low risk-appetite investors prefer banks for 
investment. According to Guiso and Sodini (2013), households’ needs and expectations 
determine their choice of financial products and financial intermediaries. They further state 
that the institutional and regulatory environment shape the financial decisions of households. 
In the United States, the role of the political system and populism in increasing the number of 
banks in the financial system was significant, which created a fragile banking system in the 
country (Calomiris & Haber, 2015; Rousseau, 2016). The relative weakness of the banking 
system was one of the important factors for the evolution of financial markets during the 
industrial revolution in the United States (Bordo, Redish, & Rockoff, 2015). Thus, the 
economic situation, regulatory environment, and investors' behavior determine their choice of 
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system. Therefore, in any country, one system is used more than the other. The dominance of 
one financial system over another varies globally. In the United States, investors hold a large 
amount of equities and bonds compared to Japan (Allen & Carletti, 2010). This difference in 
household saving decisions and usage of the financial system determine the proportions of 
retail and time deposits in the banking system. To influence households saving decisions, both 
systems compete by offering higher yields and/or services.  
Although both banks and financial markets have the same set of customers and compete 
with each other to attract them, banks provide a range of other services such as portfolio 
management, investment management and underwriting that assist both systems in co-
evolution. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) found a positive correlation between bank 
inefficiency and mispricing in the stock markets. They argued that a well-developed financial 
market needs an efficient banking system. Song and Thakor (2010) show three forms of 
relationships between banks and financial markets, competition, co-evolution, and 
complementarity according to their interdependency. In their theoretical paper, they argue that 
since banks play a crucial role in providing certification of securitization, there is a 
complementary relationship between financial markets and the banking system. They further 
state that as a stock market develops, it allows banks to raise funds for their financing activities. 
Hence, both the financial markets and the banking system co-evolve or complement each other 
in a well-developed financial system.   
Most studies in financial architecture and structure literature investigate the impact of 
the financial system and their financing activities. Effects of financial market development on 
bank deposit funding and the retail depositors has attracted limited attention. This paper, 
therefore, focuses on how financial markets shape the banking system, especially deposit 
funding, retail and time deposit proportions in developed and developing countries.  
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3.2.1 Research objective 
The objective of this chapter is to identify the effect of financial markets development 
on the banking system regarding their deposit activities. 
H1 : Financial market development has a negative impact on bank deposit funding and 
composition34.  
H2 : The negative impact of financial market development on bank deposit funding and 
composition are higher in financially developed economies than in less financially 
developed economies. 
3.3. Data collection and methodology 
Bank-level financial statement data from the Bankscope database has been collected 
for 193 countries covering period from 2004 to 2015. However, in many countries the data was 
not consistently available for the entire analysis period. Hence, I identify banks which have at 
least 9 years of data from year 2004 to 2014 and covering more than 50 percent of the market 
share of total deposits of the country. Further, banks which have less than 9 years of interest 
expense to average interest-bearing liabilities are dropped. This exercise brings the sample 
from 193 countries down to 90 countries. Due to the unavailability of inflation data, Argentina 
and Georgia are dropped from the analysis. Thus, the final dataset consists of 88 countries (see 
Appendix 7 for a full list).  
Three dependent variables, deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions have 
been used. Deposit funding is measured as deposit and short-term funding to total assets, retail 
 
34 The negative impact of financial market development on bank deposit funding implies that the proportion of 
bank deposits in relation to total assets will decrease. Similarly, the negative relationship between bank deposit 
composition and financial market development suggest that rate of growth of retail deposits and time deposits 
are less than the total deposits and total customer deposits. This makes the relationship negative.   
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deposit proportion as customer deposits to total deposits and short-term funding, and time 
deposit proportion as the proportion of time deposits to total customer deposits.  
Macroeconomic data such as GDP growth rate, inflation, proportion of population aged over 
65 year are obtained from the World Bank Database. The data related to the financial markets 
index, financial markets access index, financial markets depth index, and financial markets 
efficiency index developed by Svirydzenka (2016)35 have been obtained from the IMF 
database. Table 10 presents variables names, definition, and expected relationship with the 
dependent variables.  
Generally, researchers use stock market turnover activity and market capitalization as 
indicators for financial markets development (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2009). However, in this 
essay, financial markets index, financial markets depth index, financial markets access index, 
and financial markets efficiency index have been employed to measure the development of 
financial markets in the country. The financial markets depth index comprises the variables, 
stock market capitalization to GDP, stock traded to GDP, international debt securities of 
government to GDP, total debt securities of financial corporations to GDP and total debt 
securities of nonfinancial corporations to GDP ratio. The financial markets access index 
includes percentage of market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies and total 
number of issuers of debt including domestic and foreign, nonfinancial and financial 
corporations. The financial market efficiency index considers the stock traded value to market 
capitalization ratio. Finally, the financial market index is constructed by combining the 
efficiency, depth and access to financial markets (Svirydzenka, 2016). 
This is the first financial market index capturing the information about the access to 
financial markets in the country. Ease of access to the financial system plays an important role 
 
35 See https://data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C-43B1-AC26-493C5B1CD33B 
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in a household financial decision making (Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2013). The indices not 
only cover the share market but also debt markets. They consider both domestic and 
international markets, which allow me to capture countries’ level of financial integration. I 
further employ stock market capitalization and stock turnover to GDP ratios for robustness 
tests. Limited data availability causes reduction in the dataset to 50 and 53 countries for market 
capitalization and stock-turnover ratio validation respectively. 
 The main explanatory variables are country level data. I aggregate the bank-level 
variables into country level. Moreover, because the dataset shows high variability due to large 
differences in macroeconomic conditions, I employ the three years moving average method. 
This process reduces the year on year volatility and allows me to deal with missing data (Crane 
& Crotty, 1967; McCulloch & Baulch, 2000; Raudys, Lenčiauskas, & Malčius, 2013; Syntetos 
& Boylan, 2005). The Table 8 presents the summary statistics of regional and income level 
distribution of countries. The details of the countries according to region and income level are 
available in Appendix 7.  
Table 8 Summary statistics of regional and income level distribution of countries 
Row Labels High income Lower and upper middle 
income 
Grand Total 
East Asia & Pacific 5 5 10 
Europe & Central Asia 27 11 38 









Grand Total 42 46 88 
 
 
Table 9 shows large variations in dependent variables e.g. retail deposit proportion 
ranges between 17 percent and 88 percent, whereas time deposit proportion has a range from 
0.86 percent to 100 percent. Similarly, the financial markets access index, an explanatory 
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variable, has a range between 0.001 and 1.00. Equity capital moves in the range from -4.70 to 
35. This clearly indicates the heterogeneity of the data.  
Table 9 Summary statistics of variables 
Variables Name Observation Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Deposit Funding 900 76.79 7.71 42.01 92.05 
Retail Deposit Proportion 900 63.27 13.43 16.59 87.94 
Time Deposit Proportion 888 49.09 19.85 0.86 100.00 
Financial Development Index 900 0.42 0.24 0.07 0.98 
Financial Market Index 900 0.33 0.28 0.00 0.98 
Financial Market Depth 900 0.34 0.31 0.00 0.99 
Financial Market Efficiency 900 0.32 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Financial Market Access 900 0.32 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Interest Expenses 900 3.47 2.65 0.12 42.84 
Equity Capital 900 12.01 4.39 -4.70 34.76 
GDP per capita 900 19,505 22,128 165 113,066 
CPI Inflation 872 4.94 5.42 -7.98 74.85 
Per Capita Income Growth 900 2.36 3.37 -12.24 27.90 
Economic Freedom Index 897 64.04 9.53 35.57 89.87 
Voice and Accountability 900 0.20 0.95 -1.88 1.72 
Rule of Law 900 0.29 0.98 -1.92 2.03 
Regulatory Quality 900 0.42 0.89 -1.78 2.15 
Political Stability 900 0.08 0.87 -2.08 1.57 
Government Effectiveness 900 0.38 0.93 -1.27 2.36 
Control for Corruption 900 0.29 1.03 -1.38 2.44 
 
The notation and expected signs of the variables are shown below in Table 10. 
Table 10 Variables’ names, notations, and their expected signs 
Variable Notation Measure Expectation  
Dependent Variables     
Deposit Funding DF Ratio of deposit and short-




RDP Customer deposits to deposit 




TDP Time deposit to total customer 
deposit 
  
Banking Market:     
Interest costs to 
average interest- 
bearing liabilities 
IC Interest expenses/ Average 
Interest-bearing liabilities 
Positive Craig and Dinger 





Variable Notation Measure Expectation  
Stability of the firm Capital Equity to Total Assets Positive Berger et al. 
(2009) 
Financial Market:     
Financial Market Index 
and sub-indexes: 
financial market access 
index (FMA), financial 
markets depth index 
(FMD), and financial 
market efficiency index 
(FME) 
FMI This index measures the 
accessibility, depth, and 
efficiency of financial markets. 
Positive Altunbaş and 
Thornton (2019); 
Mlachila et al. 
(2016); Dafe, 






and Unger (2018) 
Macroeconomic 
Factors: 
    
Countries’ economic 
performance 
GDPG GDP Growth Rate Positive Bikker and 
Metzemakers 
(2005); Bolt, de 
Haan, 
Hoeberichts, van 







Inflation Inflation Country level consumer price 
inflation 
Positive Bourke (1989) 
Barth et al. (2013) 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
EFI The index measures the 
economic freedom and state 
interference in financial 
system.  
Negative Krieger and 
Meierrieks (2016); 
Xu and Li (2008); 
Gropper et al. 
(2015); Chortareas 
et al. (2013) 
The World Governance 
Indicators 
WGI The world governance 
indicators measure the political 
stability, regulatory quality, 
voice and accountability, rule 
of law, and control for 
corruption in the country.  




Beck et al. (2006) 
 
3.3.1 Methodology 
The empirical model has following form: 

















Where Υ𝑐𝑡 is the ratio of deposit funding/ retail deposit proportions/ time deposit 
proportions of country c at a time t. 𝜐𝑐 denotes the countries’ fixed effects; 𝜃𝑡 time fixed effects. 
𝒳𝑐𝑡
𝑔
 is the banking variables such as financial stability of the banking industry and interest 
costs. 𝒳𝑐𝑡
𝑚 represents financial market indices. 𝒳𝑐𝑡
𝑒  indicates country specific variables such as 
the GDP growth rate of the country, economic freedom index, and country level governance 
indicators. ℰ denotes disturbance or error term. 
One of the primary concerns in determining a suitable econometric method is 
identifying the potential endogeneity of financial markets and other variables in the model. The 
financial development and economic growth literature suggest a bi-directional relationship 
between these two variables (Calderón & Liu, 2003). Moreover, Chinn and Ito (2006) argue a 
reverse causal relationship between banking system and financial markets. Equity capital and 
interest rates are also considered endogenous variables, due to their dependence on bank 
deposits. The hypothesis of endogeneity has been validated through the Wu-Hausman test. To 
address the endogeneity issue, I employ instrumental methods (2SLS). Another major problem 
with the instrumental variable method is identifying suitable instruments for the endogenous 
variables. Many researchers suggest using lag of endogenous variables as instruments, in the 
absence of external instrumental variables (Bellemare, Masaki, & Pepinsky, 2017; Reed, 
2015).   
The Hausman test results show that the fixed effects method would be suitable for this 
dataset. In a cross-country analysis, datasets are expected to show heterogeneity and this dataset 
is no exception. Multicollinearity (VIF) tests show multicollinearity for the variables associated 
with governance indicators, hence only one governance variable has been employed at a time. 
In addition to this, I expect a persistence in the behaviour of deposits, which means deposit(t) is 
dependent on deposit(t-1). In such situations, dynamic panel data methods would be suitable. I 
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use system GMM method proposed by Blundell and Bond (2000) along with two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) for the entire dataset. The two-step system GMM method uses both level and 
first-differenced variables as instruments that reduces bias and provides precise estimation. 
Though the two-step system GMM estimator is an advanced and robust technique, it has certain 
limitations, such as over identification of instruments. I address this issue by employing 
collapse function, which makes a smaller set of instruments. Further, Hansen tests have been 
conducted to explore the over-identification issue.  
The panel fixed effects method has been used for the preliminary analysis. Later, I 
report 2SLS and system GMM estimation results for all countries. Further, the dataset is 
divided into two subgroups based on the income level of the countries, high income, and lower 
and upper middle-income economies. This division is to detect if the impact of financial 
markets development varies according to countries’ economic development level. The 
classification of the high and the lower and upper-middle income countries are based on the 
World Bank Database. The dataset is further divided into two subgroups based on the financial 
development level of the countries, higher and less financially developed economies, to 
identify the effects of financial market development on bank deposits. The division into 
subgroups creates problems of over-identification of instruments; thus, 2SLS estimation 
method has been applied for the analysis of sub-groups. Moreover, two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) is an efficient method, due to implementation of fixed effects, which improves the 
precision of estimates (Baltagi, Bresson, & Pirotte, 2003; Delis et al., 2013).  
3.4. Preliminary analysis 
 I start with baseline analysis using the panel fixed effects method for all countries. The 
explanatory variables of main interest are financial market index, financial market depth index, 
financial market efficiency index, and financial market access index. Results show a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of financial market index using deposit funding as a 
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dependent variable. Column 1 of Appendix 8 shows that the coefficient of financial market 
index is -6.72, which is marginally statistically significant at 10 percent. This relationship is 
insignificant for the other dependent variables, retail and time deposit proportions. For the other 
explanatory variables, I find an insignificant relationship between deposit funding, time deposit 
proportion and financial market depth index. However, financial market depth shows a 
negative effect on retail deposit proportion. The financial market efficiency and financial 
market access index do not show a statistically significant relationship with the retail and time 
deposit proportions. The result shows a negative effect of financial market efficiency on deposit 
funding.  
The impact of interest rates on the time deposit proportion is significant but the use of 
deposit funding and retail deposit proportion as dependent variables make the interest cost 
insignificant. The coefficients of interest costs are around 0.65 for time deposit proportion at 
the 5 percent significance level, meaning that a 1 percent increase in interest rates causes a 0.65 
percent increase in time deposit proportion. Although bank stability shows a negative 
relationship with deposit funding, it does not show a significant relationship with retail and 
time deposit proportions. A negative relationship between bank stability and deposit funding 
shows that stable banks are keen on increasing their assets. This increase in assets may be 
funded by other sources such as wholesale funding, so that the proportion of deposit funding 
decreases.  
The other macroeconomic variables such as inflation, GDP growth rate and economic 
freedom index have been employed as control variables. Inflation shows a negative impact on 
deposit funding. A negative impact of GDP growth rate on retail and time deposit proportions 
have been observed. This shows that as a country grows, households prefer liquid assets rather 
than time deposits, causing a reduction in time deposit proportion. Moreover, I do not find a 
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relationship between retail, time deposit proportions and inflation. On the other hand, results 
show a statistically significant negative impact of inflation on deposit funding.  
3.5. Empirical findings and policy implications  
 The Table 11 presents main regressions results using 2SLS method. Columns 1-4 show 
the results for deposit funding, columns 5-8 and 9-12 present the results for retail and time 
deposit proportions respectively. For each dependent variable, I first employ financial market 
index (FMI) followed by financial market depth index (FMD), financial market efficiency 
index (FME) and financial market access index (FMA) to measure the impact of different 
dimensions of financial markets. The country fixed and time effects have been applied in all 
the regressions model.  
 Column 1 shows that the financial market index has a negative relationship with deposit 
funding. The coefficient is -7.6 percent at a 5 percent significance level. Similarly, financial 
market efficiency index shows a negative relationship with deposit funding but at a 10 percent 
significance level. I do not find a statistically significant relationship with financial market 
depth index or financial market access index. The negative relationship between financial 
market index and deposit funding suggests that an improvement in financial markets increases 
economic activity in countries, increasing the lending activities of banks36. Banks generally 
face difficulties in attracting retail deposits to fulfil the sudden surge in lending demand, 
causing them to use wholesale funding, counterbalanced by a relative reduction in deposit 
funding (Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). 
 
36 Banks’ lending activities and deposit both have increased over the period. However, the rate of growth of 
deposit base is lesser than the rate of growth of lending activities. Therefore, banks use wholesale funding to fill 
this gap.   
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Table 11 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition for all countries- 2SLS 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-12) show the results for 
bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportions as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year effects. I use interest 
cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of 
instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit proportion report the 
results for 88 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 87 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level 
respectively. 

































Interest Cost 0.0967* 0.100* 0.105* 0.108* 0.702 0.657 0.712 0.710 0.984*** 1.018*** 0.966*** 0.964*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0575) (0.0569) (0.0596) (0.464) (0.452) (0.464) (0.466) (0.307) (0.308) (0.306) (0.307) 
Equity 
Capital 
-0.735*** -0.726*** -0.732*** -0.713*** 0.201 0.168 0.227 0.216 -0.140 -0.115 -0.167 -0.179 
 (0.114) (0.117) (0.115) (0.116) (0.259) (0.253) (0.262) (0.253) (0.366) (0.371) (0.361) (0.360) 
FMI -7.599**    -5.276    13.88    
 (3.420)    (8.130)    (10.36)    
FMD  -2.152    -16.67**    18.25**   
  (3.177)    (7.210)    (8.653)   
FME   -2.750*    4.008    0.322  
   (1.547)    (3.553)    (5.589)  
FMA    -6.617    -4.575    9.304 
    (4.825)    (9.569)    (7.798) 
Inflation -0.133*** -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.131*** -0.248** -0.248** -0.253** -0.247** -0.192 -0.184 -0.187 -0.195 
 (0.0332) (0.0336) (0.0339) (0.0337) (0.107) (0.103) (0.108) (0.108) (0.177) (0.179) (0.176) (0.177) 
GDP Growth -0.00842 -0.0153 -0.0182 -0.0126 -0.434*** -0.402** -0.446*** -0.437*** -0.914*** -0.938*** -0.890*** -0.900*** 




-0.186** -0.182** -0.176** -0.175** 0.117 0.0610 0.129 0.125 0.245 0.290 0.226 0.229 
 (0.0816) (0.0795) (0.0815) (0.0803) (0.184) (0.184) (0.183) (0.183) (0.204) (0.201) (0.202) (0.203) 
F 8.447 7.993 9.123 8.095 2.243 2.602 2.217 2.209 16.37 16.28 15.95 15.50 
r2 0.203 0.196 0.206 0.198 0.0680 0.0794 0.0675 0.0673 0.229 0.229 0.233 0.235 
N 689 689 689 689 681 681 681 681 680 680 680 680 
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The relationship between financial market indices and the retail deposit proportion is 
insignificant, except for the financial market depth index. Column 6 shows that as the financial 
markets depth index increases, customers’ usage of the banking system decreases. The 
economic significance is also substantial. The coefficient of the financial market depth index 
is -16.67, suggesting a one-point increase in the depth of the financial markets, retail deposit 
proportion decreases by 17 percent. For example, the retail deposit proportion in Australia was 
58.1 percent in 2014, decreasing to 48.22 percent in 2015 due to one-point increase in the depth 
of the financial markets, keeping other deposits constant. I further test the relationship between 
the financial markets and time deposit proportion. Columns 9, 11, & 12 show an insignificant 
relationship between financial market indices with time deposit proportion. Column 10 of 
Table 11 presents a positive impact of financial market depth on time deposit proportion. This 
positive relationship suggests that as financial market depth improves, households’ saving 
activities increases, encouraging them to use time deposits.  
 Pricing of deposits is one of the key determinants to attract depositors into the banking 
system, therefore, it is used as a control variable. The relationship between interest cost and 
retail deposit proportion is inconclusive. The results show a positive impact of interest on 
deposit funding and time deposit proportion. The coefficients of deposit funding are in the 
range of 0.10 to 0.11, whereas the impact on time deposit proportion are in the range of 0.96 
to 1.02. Columns 1 and 9 of Table 11 reveals that a one-point increase in interest rate causes 
0.10 percent increase in deposit funding and 0.98 percent in time deposit proportion. The 
difference in elasticity is due to inclusion of checking and saving deposits in deposit funding, 
generally at low or no interest. Households use these accounts for liquidity and/or transaction 
purposes, and thus these accounts are less interest rate sensitive. On the other hand, time 




 Bank stability plays an important role in attracting deposits. To control for this, equity 
capital is used as a proxy for bank stability. Columns 1-4 show a negative relationship between 
capital and deposit funding. This may be due two reasons: one, stable banks acquire more assets 
by increasing loans and advances. Two, greater stability incentivizes and allows banks to 
acquire other sources of funding such as interbank and central bank borrowings, which are less 
costly than deposits. However, validating these hypothesises are beyond the scope of this essay. 
The effects of bank stability on retail and time deposit proportions have been examined, but 
none of the regressions results is significant.  
 Households generally use deposit instruments to combat inflation37, thus, inflation has 
been used as a control variable. Contrary to this hypothesis, a negative relationship between 
deposit funding, retail deposit proportion and inflation has been found (see columns 1-4 and 5-
8 for deposit funding and retail deposit proportion respectively). The same negative 
relationship is reported by Gambacorta (2008). They suggest that higher inflation creates a 
demand for deposits, causing a reduction in interest rates on deposits. The reduction in interest 
on deposits leads to lower deposit funding. Contrary to deposit funding and retail deposit 
proportion, time deposits proportion does not show a significant relationship with inflation. 
 GDP growth rate is also used as an instrumental variable in the model to control for 
economic growth of countries. Results do not show a significant relationship between deposit 
funding and economic growth. On the other hand, it shows a negative impact on retail and time 
deposit proportions. The elasticity for time deposits is greater than for the retail deposits. This 
suggests that households in high growth economies are willing to keep funds in liquid forms 
or be involved in more entrepreneurial activities, causing a reduction in retail and time deposits 
proportions (Gambacorta, 2008).  
 
37 Inflation increases the cost of living in the country. To maintain the cost of living in future, households save/ 
invest their money in financial products such as deposits, bonds, and money market instruments.  
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 An economic freedom index has been applied in the main model to measure the impact 
of regulatory efficiency, government size, openness of market and rule of law on bank deposit 
funding. The results of columns (1-4) show a negative relationship between economic freedom 
index and deposit funding. The elasticity is in the range of -0.18 to -0.19. The negative effect 
shows that economic freedom increases economic activity in the country. Thus, the demand 
for loans and advances from banks increases. To meet this demand, banks use other sources of 
funding thereby decreasing the proportion of deposit funding. The results do not show a 
statistically significant relationship with retail deposit proportion. Columns 9-10 show a 
positive relationship between economic freedom and time deposit proportion. The economic 
impact is also substantial. It suggests that better governance and regulatory efficiency improves 
the trust of households in banks, so that households keep their money as time deposits.  
Table 12 reports the results of two-step system GMM method investigating the impact 
of financial market development on deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions. 
Columns 1-4 show a negative impact of financial markets development on deposit funding. 
The economic impact is in the range of 4 to 6 percent. According to column 1 of Table 12, a 
one-point increase in financial market index causes 6 percent reduction in deposit funding. 
Other sub-indices of financial market development also show negative effects on deposit 
funding. I do not find a statistically significant relationship between retail, time deposit 
proportion and financial market indices. The control variables of the main model have been 
replicated in the system GMM method. However, none of the control variables is significant, 
except equity capital. Columns 1-4 show a negative relationship between capital and deposit 
funding, consistent with the main findings. Using retail deposit proportion as the dependent 
variable changes the relationship to positive. It is statistically significant at the 10 percent only. 
Moreover, column 10 shows a negative relationship with time deposit proportion. I do not find 
a significant result in 2SLS method.   
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Since system GMM results have an over-identification issue, I am cautious in 
interpreting these results. A two-step difference GMM has also been conducted in all countries 
and find the same over-identification issue. The results are available upon request. In further 
analysis, the 2SLS results are presented, which are robust and do not have an over-
identification problem.  
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Table 12 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition for all countries- two-step system GMM. 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for all countries. Columns (1-4) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (5-12) 
show the results for bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail time deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables. In all regression equations, 
I employ year effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that all the regressions results 
has over-identification issue. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 



































0.557*** 0.537** 0.546** 0.588***         
(0.162) (0.176) (0.185) (0.145)         
Retail Deposit 
Proportion t-1 
    1.044*** 1.344*** 1.348*** 1.279***     
    (0.138) (0.119) (0.126) (0.100)     
Time deposit 
proportion t-1 
        0.893*** 0.931*** 0.837*** 0.874*** 
        (0.120) (0.119) (0.122) (0.105) 
Interest Cost 0.0141 0.0423 0.0309 0.0542 -0.613 -1.065 -0.879 -0.968 0.266 0.272 0.152 0.196 
 (0.0179) (0.0540) (0.0344) (0.0838) (0.663) (0.825) (0.758) (0.715) (0.294) (0.327) (0.250) (0.218) 
Equity Capital -0.405** -0.469*** -0.466*** -0.394*** 0.175 0.589 0.782* 0.698* -1.049 -0.870** -1.131 -1.052 
 (0.152) (0.139) (0.194) (0.128) (0.434) (0.439) (0.419) (0.387) (0.662) (0.517) (0.694) (0.690) 
FMI -6.646**    -3.985    7.619    
 (2.880)    (10.23)    (15.22)    
FMD  -4.326*    -1.818    7.330   
  (2.548)    (10.55)    (8.728)   
FME   -3.952*    9.986    -7.688  
   (2.264)    (6.079)    (7.318)  
FMA    -5.967*    -8.120    7.605 
    (3.459)    (25.61)    (21.70) 
Inflation -0.0237 -0.0160 -0.0264 -0.0228 0.138 0.186 0.183 0.163     
 (0.0453) (0.0510) (0.0563) (0.0405) (0.127) (0.187) (0.172) (0.160)     
PCI 0.191 -0.0360 -0.0587 0.246 0.881 2.099 0.948 2.542 -0.530 -0.363 1.632 -0.421 
 (0.500) (0.565) (0.435) (0.490) (1.204) (1.449) (0.784) (2.606) (1.997) (1.227) (1.648) (2.649) 
EFI 0.0177 0.0222 -0.0329 0.0348 0.0153 -0.0371 -0.0484 0.0258 -0.0229 -0.0541 -0.0215 -0.0370 
 (0.0578) (0.0526) (0.0639) (0.0637) (0.0809) (0.117) (0.104) (0.290) (0.198) (0.186) (0.197) (0.267) 
Observations 697 697 697 697 688 688 688 688 687 687 687 687 
No. of Inst. 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
AR2 (p-val) 0.535 0.488 0.567 0.502 0.343 0.322 0.334 0.351 0.859 0.831 0.890 0.868 
Hansen-J (p) 0.00850 0.00402 0.00662 0.00278 0.0556 0.00245 0.00136 0.00113 0.00764 0.00785 0.00975 0.00616 
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3.5.1 Relationship between financial market development and bank deposits: based on 
economic development level of countries  
There is a two-way relationship between economic and financial development level of 
the countries. Literature suggests that initially economic development leads to financial 
development of the countries (Arcand et al., 2015; Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012; Law & Singh, 
2014). Thereafter, financial development creates an environment conducive to economic 
growth (Durusu-Ciftci, Ispir, & Yetkiner, 2017; Hermes & Lensink, 2003). Therefore, to 
investigate the relationship between financial markets development and bank deposits 
according to economic development level, the dataset has been divided into two subgroups, 
high income and lower and upper-middle income countries, based on the definition in the 
World Bank database. Due to the small number of countries, I merge the lower and the upper-
middle income countries into one group.  
According to Table 13, none of the regressions for deposit funding shows significant 
results. Retail and time deposit proportions both show a positive relationship with the financial 
market indices. Columns 5 shows the elasticity between the financial market index and retail 
deposit proportion is 33.69. Hence, a one-point increase in financial market index causes 34 
percent of increase in retail deposit proportion. Moving to sub-indices of the financial market 
index, financial market depth index and financial market efficiency index show coefficients of 
26.79 and 11.92 percent, as shown in columns (6-7). This relationship becomes insignificant 
when financial market access index is used as an explanatory variable. Similarly, columns 9, 
10 and 12 show a positive impact of financial market development on time deposit proportion. 
This relationship turns insignificant with use of financial market efficiency index as 
explanatory variable (see column 11).  
The positive relationship between banking system and stock market development is 
counterintuitive. It is however consistent with the finding of Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
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(1996), who reported a positive relationship between stock market development and the 
banking system. They stated that developed financial intermediaries accelerate the growth of 
financial markets. Moreover, Song and Thakor (2010) argued that banks and financial markets 
compete only when seen in isolation. When they are interdependent, they co-evolve. In 
developed economies, financial integration is high, which causes the coevolution of both the 
banking and financial markets. Similar findings are reported by Duong, Rhee, and Vu (2018), 
that bank managers in the United States observe short selling activities of clients’ shares before 
taking lending decisions. This suggests that the information and activity of one market 
influences the other markets. Financial integration is not limited to the domestic market; it 
covers the integration with international markets that makes the market efficient and attractive 
for investment (Fratzscher, 2002).  
Nowadays banks’ business activities in developed countries are not limited to accepting 
deposits and lending. They also provide financial management services such as investment 
management, consultancy, and portfolio management. These services help financial markets in 
attracting investors and consequently help banks in attracting deposits that cause the 
coevolution of financial markets and the banking systems. Chinn and Ito (2006) argued that to 
improve a country’s financial markets, it is essential to have a robust banking system. However, 




Table 13 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition in high-income countries 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-12) show the results for 
bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year effects. I use interest 
cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of 
instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding, retail and time deposit proportion report 
the results for 42 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 


































Interest Cost 0.134 0.140 0.131 0.122 -0.101 -0.117 -0.136 -0.186 1.241*** 1.230*** 1.191*** 1.201*** 
 (0.0903) (0.0904) (0.0888) (0.0822) (0.168) (0.172) (0.169) (0.174) (0.329) (0.330) (0.328) (0.325) 
Equity 
Capital 
-0.823*** -0.792*** -0.838*** -0.835*** 0.124 0.236 0.00807 0.0882 -1.137*** -1.056*** -1.176*** -1.090*** 
 (0.262) (0.264) (0.257) (0.256) (0.364) (0.352) (0.357) (0.351) (0.396) (0.388) (0.394) (0.386) 
FMI 3.926    33.69***    23.77**    
 (3.823)    (10.41)    (11.58)    
FMD  6.382    26.79***    19.18**   
  (5.227)    (9.350)    (9.471)   
FME   1.553    11.92***    2.315  
   (1.846)    (4.117)    (6.276)  
FMA    -2.550    -0.917    21.98** 
    (4.603)    (5.654)    (8.783) 
Inflation -0.0501 -0.0622 -0.0345 -0.0165 -0.500** -0.484** -0.367* -0.363 -0.263 -0.253 -0.170 -0.329 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.108) (0.107) (0.223) (0.231) (0.221) (0.233) (0.261) (0.245) (0.247) (0.266) 
GDP Growth -0.147** -0.146** -0.140* -0.131* -0.127 -0.0988 -0.0685 -0.0755 -1.079*** -1.060*** -1.044*** -1.142*** 




-0.412*** -0.389*** -0.412*** -0.395*** 0.330 0.454 0.335 0.388 -0.570** -0.482** -0.541** -0.623*** 
 (0.145) (0.134) (0.147) (0.133) (0.272) (0.284) (0.272) (0.277) (0.227) (0.224) (0.232) (0.238) 
F 6.717 6.580 6.660 6.444 2.251 2.114 2.094 1.584 14.41 15.31 14.06 13.63 
r2 0.261 0.269 0.258 0.257 0.0803 0.0680 0.0914 0.0693 0.370 0.374 0.364 0.389 
N 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 327 
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I further replicate the model in lower and upper-middle income countries. Columns 1, 
3 and 4 of Table 14 show the negative effects of financial market development on deposit 
funding. The coefficients are substantial and significant. This relationship becomes 
insignificant when employing the financial market depth index as the explanatory variable, as 
seen in column 2. The impact of the financial market development index is consistently 
negative for retail deposit proportion. The elasticity for retail deposit proportion is higher than 
for the deposit funding. This suggest that the development of financial markets in lower and 
upper-middle income economies accelerates economic growth (Friedrich et al., 2013), thereby 
increasing credit creation in the banking sector (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996). 
However, due to low income and limited access to the banking system for households, there is 
a little scope for banks to increase retail deposits. Thus, banks in lower income countries meet 
this credit demand through short-term borrowings and other sources of funding, causing a 
reduction in deposit funding and retail deposit proportion.  
The relationship between time deposit proportion and financial markets development is 
inconclusive, except for the financial market depth index, which is statistically significant at 
10 percent. Due to the lower significance level, I am cautious in forming an opinion on this 
finding. The negative relationship between financial markets and the banking system supports 
the argument of Korajczyk (1996), who reported the fragmentation of financial system in the 
emerging markets. This fragmentation causes the growth of financial markets at the cost of the 
banking system and vice-versa. Hence, these two systems, financial markets and banks 
compete with each other in lower and upper-middle income countries.  
I further employ the dummy variables for high-income countries to find out if the high-
income countries coefficients are significantly different. I find that the results are consistent 
with the main findings. The results are available upon request.   
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Table 14 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition in lower and upper-middle income countries 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors (in parentheses). Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-12) show the 
results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportions as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year 
effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright 
test confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and 
retail deposit proportion report the results for 46 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 44 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 

































Interest Cost 0.155*** 0.148** 0.180*** 0.211*** 1.730*** 1.584*** 1.777*** 1.896*** 0.763 0.862 0.769 0.814 
 (0.0564) (0.0610) (0.0535) (0.0607) (0.302) (0.282) (0.304) (0.340) (0.515) (0.550) (0.520) (0.542) 
Equity Capital -0.805*** -0.800*** -0.824*** -0.749*** -0.0524 -0.0589 -0.0325 0.132 0.0386 0.0615 0.000121 0.105 
 (0.124) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.330) (0.329) (0.361) (0.314) (0.462) (0.476) (0.463) (0.449) 
FMI -20.13***    -49.90***    2.470    
 (7.104)    (17.24)    (17.80)    
FMD  -5.667    -42.48***    25.67*   
  (4.324)    (12.46)    (15.32)   
FME   -9.949***    1.122    -11.88  
   (3.477)    (7.470)    (9.231)  
FMA    -22.97*    -76.84***    -31.49 
    (13.32)    (21.27)    (22.85) 
Inflation -0.162*** -0.164*** -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.362*** -0.371*** -0.365*** -0.375*** -0.158 -0.144 -0.152 -0.164 
 (0.0340) (0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0355) (0.111) (0.108) (0.117) (0.113) (0.222) (0.226) (0.222) (0.221) 
GDP Growth 0.125* 0.108 0.117* 0.0699 -0.511** -0.465** -0.595*** -0.668*** -0.709*** -0.792*** -0.664*** -0.742*** 




-0.0477 -0.00286 -0.00996 -0.0515 -0.214 -0.224 -0.0323 -0.290 0.671** 0.760** 0.641** 0.555* 
 (0.0698) (0.0715) (0.0731) (0.0765) (0.256) (0.261) (0.268) (0.263) (0.312) (0.308) (0.311) (0.326) 
F 5.279 4.786 5.725 5.068 6.410 7.037 5.852 6.256 7.644 7.385 7.696 7.831 
r2 0.229 0.223 0.230 0.232 0.169 0.196 0.147 0.181 0.227 0.220 0.227 0.229 
N 362 362 362 362 354 354 354 354 353 353 353 353 
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3.5.2 Relationship between financial market development and bank deposits: based on 
financial development level of the countries 
The results in the previous section show that the banking system and financial markets 
co-evolve in high-income countries due to high financial integration. A financially integrated 
country has a developed financial system. To measure the impact of financial markets on the 
banking system in financially developed countries, the countries are divided into two subgroups 
based on their financial development, the high and the less financially developed economies. 
The average (mean) of the financial development index has been taken for all countries for the 
entire analysis period as a benchmark of financial development. The countries with a lower 
value for the financial development index than the benchmark are considered less financially 
developed and the remaining as high financially developed economies. These two subgroups 
have 43 and 45 countries respectively.  
Table 15 shows the impact of financial market development on deposit funding and 
composition in high financially developed economies is broadly consistent with the findings 
for high-income countries38. Columns (1-4) of Table 15 display insignificant coefficients for 
deposit funding, consistent with the findings for high-income countries. Columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 15 show the positive impact of the financial market index and financial market depth 
index on the retail deposit proportion. Other financial market indices present inconclusive 
relationships with retail deposit proportion. Columns 9, 10 and 12 of Table 15 show positive 
and statistically significant elasticities of the financial market indices for time deposit 
proportion. The impact of financial market indices on the time deposit proportion in highly 
financially developed economies is greater than for the high-income countries. This is because 
some countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Argentina are high-income countries but less 
financially developed and integrated. This lowers the impact of financial market development 
 
38 There are about eight (8) high income countries which are classified as less financially developed and eleven 
(11) low income countries are classed into highly financially developed economies.  
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on the banking system in high-income countries.  
The results report an inverse relationship between financial market development and 
deposit funding and retail deposit proportion in less financially developed economies. Columns 
1, 3 and 4 of Table 16 show coefficients -12.34 percent for financial market index, -6.05 percent 
for financial market efficiency index, and -19.46 percent for financial market access index. The 
elasticity of the financial market access index is greater than for the other two indices. This 
may be due to two reasons: first, access to financial markets allows households to shift their 
funds from bank deposits to financial markets, which decreases deposits. Second, an 
improvement in financial market access increases credit creation in the banking system 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996; Duong et al., 2018), which is funded from other sources, 
thereby decreasing deposit funding. This negative relationship is consistent with retail deposit 
proportion (see columns 5, 6 and 8 of Table 16). However, the elasticity for retail deposit 
proportion is higher than for deposit funding. This shows that the financial markets and the 
banking system compete in less financially developed countries. The improvement of one 
system causes a deterioration in the other. This finding is consistent with findings for lower 
and upper middle-income countries. The literature also suggests that in fragmented and 
emerging markets, the banking system and financial markets compete (Song & Thakor, 2010). 




Table 15 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition in highly financial developed countries 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-12) show the results for 
bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year effects. I use interest 
cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of 
instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding, retail and time deposit proportions report 
the results for 45 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 

































Interest Cost 0.349 0.383 0.380 0.378 -1.171* -1.346** -1.299** -1.479** 1.932* 1.621 1.536 1.749* 
 (0.250) (0.245) (0.250) (0.237) (0.658) (0.634) (0.626) (0.631) (1.054) (1.000) (1.076) (1.016) 
Equity 
Capital 
-1.019*** -1.024*** -1.004*** -1.012*** 0.318 0.394 0.229 0.218 0.371 0.426 0.229 0.354 
 (0.166) (0.175) (0.166) (0.159) (0.292) (0.283) (0.284) (0.274) (0.551) (0.542) (0.533) (0.531) 
FMI -3.816    23.25**    35.51**    
 (4.147)    (11.11)    (14.64)    
FMD  -3.169    26.77***    31.19***   
  (4.787)    (9.043)    (11.97)   
FME   -0.646    6.383    2.155  
   (1.755)    (4.446)    (7.385)  
FMA    -2.051    -1.215    28.81*** 
    (4.767)    (8.075)    (9.316) 
Inflation -0.444** -0.447** -0.462** -0.441** 0.162 0.148 0.277 0.282 -0.0287 -0.00569 0.138 -0.155 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.204) (0.202) (0.449) (0.436) (0.427) (0.460) (0.445) (0.424) (0.432) (0.446) 
GDP Growth -0.101 -0.0993 -0.115 -0.103 -0.446** -0.492** -0.362 -0.358 -1.455*** -1.479*** -1.330*** -1.493*** 




-0.467*** -0.481*** -0.464*** -0.454*** 0.565** 0.688** 0.549** 0.544** -0.625** -0.491* -0.661** -0.794*** 
 (0.159) (0.157) (0.158) (0.148) (0.275) (0.286) (0.276) (0.272) (0.285) (0.296) (0.284) (0.293) 
F 9.789 9.568 9.906 9.360 1.399 1.773 1.608 1.513 7.609 7.884 7.764 7.819 
r2 0.319 0.316 0.318 0.316 0.0461 0.0404 0.0453 0.0454 0.242 0.254 0.262 0.281 
N 350 350 350 350 350 358 358 358 350 350 350 350 
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 Table 16 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition in less financial developed countries 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors (in parentheses). Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-12) show the results 
for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportions as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year effects. I use 
interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test confirms the 
validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit 
proportion report the results for 43 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 41 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 

































Interest Cost 0.0866* 0.0799 0.103* 0.0927* 0.861 0.753 0.892 0.877 0.908*** 0.908*** 0.924*** 0.915*** 
 (0.0500) (0.0491) (0.0529) (0.0557) (0.546) (0.510) (0.550) (0.568) (0.323) (0.321) (0.326) (0.323) 
Equity Capital -0.531*** -0.538*** -0.555*** -
0.443*** 
0.210 0.174 0.178 0.521 -0.734* -0.737 -0.762* -0.653 
 (0.106) (0.113) (0.114) (0.0958) (0.370) (0.366) (0.414) (0.320) (0.446) (0.450) (0.454) (0.445) 
FMI -12.34**    -44.21***    -10.70    
 (5.497)    (13.11)    (11.41)    
FMD  -4.838    -47.52***    -2.219   
  (3.948)    (11.30)    (11.05)   
FME   -6.049**    -3.834    -7.072  
   (2.907)    (6.444)    (7.078)  
FMA    -19.46*    -67.26***    -16.79 
    (10.46)    (25.48)    (19.45) 
Inflation -0.116*** -0.124*** -0.114*** -0.11*** -0.270** -0.300*** -0.292** -0.265** -0.288 -0.295 -0.282 -0.285 
 (0.0313) (0.0316) (0.0328) (0.0321) (0.108) (0.104) (0.114) (0.114) (0.197) (0.199) (0.198) (0.199) 
GDP Growth 0.0219 0.0213 0.0186 -0.0045 -0.497** -0.444** -0.525*** -0.593*** -0.685*** -0.690*** -0.683*** -0.712*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0582) (0.0570) (0.0547) (0.196) (0.191) (0.191) (0.195) (0.160) (0.163) (0.160) (0.161) 
Economic 
Freedom Index 
0.00492 0.0175 0.0238 -0.0390 -0.169 -0.181 -0.0862 -0.330 0.994*** 1.005*** 1.016*** 0.948*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0620) (0.0652) (0.0667) (0.246) (0.255) (0.249) (0.248) (0.281) (0.278) (0.282) (0.300) 
F 3.729 3.426 3.924 4.464 2.733 2.943 1.279 1.432 11.48 10.47 10.87 10.19 
r2 0.154 0.149 0.155 0.184 0.142 0.163 0.0897 0.0925 0.292 0.292 0.291 0.293 
N 339 339 339 339 331 331 331 331 330 330 330 330 
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3.5.3 Crisis effects 
 The analysis period covers the GFC period, which may impact on the analysis 
(Goldsmith-Pinkham & Yorulmazer, 2010; Kim, Batten, & Ryu, 2020; Shin, 2009). Therefore, 
I controlled for this, using dummy variable 1 for crisis period. The crisis years for the countries 
have been taken from the World Bank Database39. Literature has reported that the crisis had 
more impact on high financially developed countries than on less financially developed 
economies. I run the regressions first in all countries, then into two subgroups: the higher and 
the less financially developed economies.  
 The results show a negative impact of the crisis on deposit funding and retail deposit 
proportion in all countries (see Appendix 9). The economic impact on retail deposit proportion 
is higher than for deposit funding. On the other hand, a positive relationship between time 
deposit proportion and crisis has been found. The risk aversion behaviour incentivizes 
households to withdraw their funds from risky investments in the crisis period and save in safe 
assets. The other main variables such as financial market indices show a negative effect on 
deposit funding and retail deposit proportion. Moreover, the results show a positive effect of 
financial market development on time deposit proportion. The results are consistent with the 
main findings.  
 The effects of crisis on deposit funding in the high financially developed economies 
and the less financially developed economies have been examined (see Appendix 10 and 
Appendix 11). Results show a negative effect of the crisis on deposit funding in highly 
financially developed economies, consistent with the literature. During the global financial 
crisis period liquidity in the financial system dried up. Hence, banks from developed economies 
 
39 The World Bank Database. Data exported from the datamarket.com 
(https://datamarket.com/data/set/47dy/banking-crisis-dummy-1banking-crisis-
0none#!ds=47dy!73ca&display=line&s=9v4 ).  
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were facing difficulties in attracting deposits. Results do not show a statistically significant 
relationship between deposit composition, retail and time deposit proportions and crisis. In less 
financially developed economies, I find a negative impact of the crisis on retail deposit 
proportion. The relationships between deposit funding, time deposit proportion and crisis 
period are inconclusive. Retail deposits are one of the main sources of funding in less 
financially developed economies. During the crisis period, households use their savings to 
smooth their consumption. Hence, the proportion of retail deposits declines during this period. 
The relationship between other main variables and deposit funding and compositions are 
consistent with the main findings. 
3.5.4 Deposit insurance   
 The banking regulatory authority provides deposit insurance to protect and incentivize 
deposit holder to save their funds in deposit products (Congress, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, 
& Laeven, 2015). Most countries offer deposit insurance to their bank deposit holders. I use 
the insured deposits to GDP ratio of the country as a control variable. The data are collected 
from the database Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015), who have conducted a worldwide survey of 
deposit insurance in the years 2003, 2010 and 2013. I interpolate the data for the year 2005-10 
and 2011-12. Due to absence of year 2014 data, I consider the year 2013 deposit to GDP ratio 
to carry forward to the year 2014. Out of 88 countries, 10 countries do not have data from year 
2003; hence, these countries are dropped from the analysis.  
 The results show a positive impact of deposit insurance on deposit funding and time 
deposit proportion in all countries (see results in Appendix 12). Although the elasticity of 
deposit insurance for time deposit proportion is higher than for bank deposit funding, the 
economic significance is very low. A one percent increase in the ratio of deposit protection 
fund to GDP causing a 0.02 percent increase in time deposit proportion. Similar positive 
relationship between deposit funding, retail, time deposit proportion, and deposit insurance are 
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obtained in less financially developed economies (see Appendix 14). The elasticity of deposit 
insurance on bank deposit funding and retail deposit proportion is almost the same. On the 
other hand, deposit insurance shows a higher coefficient for time deposit proportion. This 
suggests that deposit insurance creates trust among households in the banking system. This 
encourages households to save their money for a longer duration in higher earning deposit 
products.  
The results for the relationship between deposit funding, retail, time deposit proportions 
and deposit insurance for high financially developed economies are insignificant (see Appendix 
13). I also find that the direction of relationship between deposit funding, retail; time deposit 
proportion and financial market indices are broadly consistent with the main findings in all 
three datasets.  
3.6. Robustness tests 
To examine the effects of financial market development based on region, I divide the 
dataset into three regions: Africa, America, and Asia (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Hasan, 
Koetter, & Wedow, 2009; Liu, Molyneux, & Nguyen, 2012; Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2013). 
However, due to limited number of observations of the American group, I drop this from this 
study. The Asian group has 49 countries including 28 European countries. The global financial 
integration in the Euro area is higher than the other countries. Hence, a separate study has been 
conducted for this region40.  
The African region consists 30 countries out of which seven are highly financially 
developed. Due to the mix of high and less financially developed economies, the relationship 
between deposit funding, time deposit proportion and financial markets development cannot 
 
40 The results are available upon request.  
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be determined. I find a negative elasticity for the financial market depth index for retail deposit 
proportion, consistent with the less financially developed economies finding. 
 The results for retail and time deposit proportions of the Asian group is consistent with 
the findings of high financially developed economies. The results show a negative impact of 
financial market development on deposit funding, whereas in high financially developed 
economies, the relationship is inconclusive. The Asian group consists of 49 countries out of 
which 15 are less financially developed economies, which may be the reason for the negative 
relationship between financial market development and deposit funding. I further run the 
regressions for the Euro area, which consist only of highly financially integrated countries. As 
per expectation, the positive relationship between deposit funding, retail deposit proportion and 
financially market development are observed. The results are substantial and statistically 
significant. However, the relationship between financial market developments on time deposit 
proportion is insignificant.  
 Apart from banking and macroeconomic factors, there are other factors such as political 
stability of the country, civil war, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, corruption, 
which influence a households’ decision for savings and usage of the banking system. 
Kaufmann (2007) has prepared an index which covers the broad range of countries governance 
system such as voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control for corruption. I conduct a VIF analysis and find a 
multicollinearity in these variables. Hence, I employ them separately in the regression models.  
 I first report the findings of regulatory quality in all countries. The results show a 
negative relationship between regulatory quality and deposit funding. It is because of the higher 
impact of better regulation on banking assets, which causes a deterioration in the proportion of 
deposit funding. On the other hand, retail and time deposit proportions show positive and 
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statistically significant coefficients with regulatory quality. This finding is consistent in less 
financially developed countries. However, the coefficients for highly financially developed 
economies are not statistically significant. The results for financial market indices follow the 
same trend of main analysis in all three datasets, all countries, high and less financially 
developed economies.  
I further controlled for government effectiveness, political stability, control for 
corruption, voice & accountability, and rule of law (Andrianova, Demetriades, & Shortland, 
2008; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Doumpos, Hasan, & Pasiouras, 2017). The direction of the 
relationship between financial market indices and the dependent variables are broadly 
consistent in all three datasets, all countries, high and less financially developed economies. 
To save space, I do not report the results in the essay, but they are available upon request.  
In addition to this, the 2SLS with Bartlett-Kernel and Newey-West bandwidth tests have 
also been employed to address heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in all three datasets, all, 
high, and less financially developed economies. Finding an optimum lag for bandwidth is an 
issue. I applied quadratic spectral (QS) prewhitened method41 to identify the optimum level of 
lag proposed by Newey and West (1994). The results are broadly consistent with the main 
findings. The results are available upon request.  
3.7. Conclusion 
This study investigates how financial markets development affects deposit funding and 
composition, retail and time deposit proportions. To measure countries’ financial markets 
development, I used the financial market index and its sub-indices. These indices not only 
cover the value creation (market capitalization to GDP), efficiency (stock turnover to GDP 
ratio), and liquidity (stock turnover to GDP ratio) but also the access to stock markets, and 
 
41 The number of optimal lag = [3(T/100) 〗^(2/25) ………… (2) 
86 
 
domestic and international debt markets (Svirydzenka, 2016). The pattern is not similar across 
all financial market indices (including sub-indices), or the financial and economic development 
levels of the countries involved.  
Financial market indices do not show an impact on deposit funding and time deposit 
proportion in all countries using 2SLS method. However, the panel fixed effects and the system 
GMM methods suggest a negative impact of financial markets on deposit funding. I conclude 
that the financial markets provide an alternative channel of investment for household savings 
in all countries. This relationship becomes stronger for the retail deposit proportion. The 
insignificant relationship between financial market indices and time deposit proportion, and 
negative relationship between retail deposit proportion and financial market index suggest that 
households shift their low yield deposits to financial markets for a greater return. This negative 
relationship becomes more economically and statistically significant in lower and upper 
middle-income and less financially developed economies. However, it turns positive in high 
income and the highly financially developed economies for retail and time deposit proportions. 
These results are robust even after controlling for various macroeconomic and political factors.  
The general perception of academics is that the development of financial market brings 
forth competition within the banking system. The financial architecture literature suggest that 
most countries show competition between the banking system and financial markets (Berglof 
& Bolton, 2002). On the other hand, Chinn and Ito (2006) support the argument of a 
complementary relationship between the financial markets and the banking system. Similarly, 
Song and Thakor (2010) propose three relationship between banks and financial markets, 
competition, coevolution, and coexistence. They find coevolution and coexistence in a well-
developed financial system and competition in fragmented and emerging economies. Their 
study is based on banks’ lending perspective. This study evaluates the relationship between 
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these two systems viz. financial markets and banking system from banks’ borrowing viewpoint. 
The findings support the argument of Song and Thakor (2010).  
There are five clear suggestions from this study. First, a well-developed and financially 
integrated system provides an environment which supports financial markets and the banking 
system growing together. This will help banks in attracting retail deposits and especially time 
deposits, which are stable sources of funding. The increase in retail and time deposit 
proportions will assist banks in complying with the Basel-III liquidity norms. Second, the 
interest rate is a key determinant in attracting time depositors in both subgroups, high and less 
financially developed countries. This relationship is more prominent in high financially 
developed countries than in less financially developed countries, largely because of the greater 
access to other financial products, which makes investors in developed countries more sensitive 
to interest rates. Banks in developed countries should therefore use interest rates wisely.  
Third, the negative relationship between deposit funding, retail, time deposit 
proportions and capital suggest that active depositors generally monitor banks. This also shows 
that when banks have less capital, they are more likely to have a high amount of time deposits 
in their funding to enhance their stability. This is against the hypothesis of the new Basel-III 
regulation, where banks are encouraged to increase their capital to improve banking system 
stability. Higher capital incentivizes banks to increase the proportion of checking accounts or 
other sources of funding, which may eventually decrease their stability. Thus, policymakers 
need to be cautious when using capital as a macro-prudential tool in stabilizing the banking 
system (Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 2015; Arping, 2019). Fourth, deposit insurance helps 
increase deposit funding, retail and time deposit proportions in less financially developed 
economies. Regulators should therefore focus on providing deposit insurance. This will 
improve the trust level amongst deposit holders for the banking system that will enable banks 
to attract more bank deposits. Fifth, good governance and economic freedom increases credit 
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creation in the banking system. It also develops trust in the banking system in lower and upper 
middle-income and less financially developed economies, which causes increase in time 
deposit funding.  
I used financial market indices constructed based on the stock, debt, domestic and 
international markets. A separate study of these variables on bank deposits will give an in-
depth understanding about their relationship with bank deposits. There are other factors such 
as competition within the banking system, stability, ownership, income, and education, which 
affect deposit funding, retail and time deposit proportions. The study of these variables and 
their relationship with deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions will give a more 
holistic view of the determinants of bank deposits. The role of banking regulation on deposit 




4. Effects of competition on bank deposits 
4.1. Introduction 
Banks as financial intermediaries ensure the flow of funds from funders to borrowers. 
Banks source funds through a variety of channels to meet loan demand. Prior to deregulation, 
banks’ main source of funding was retail deposits and they had abundant low-cost deposits, 
which is why their main job was to manage assets. The economic boom during 1960s increased 
the lending activity of banks, thus, banks started facing shortages of funds, in the United States 
(Sinkey, 1992). Then, the First City Bank of New York (more recently known as Citibank) 
introduced negotiable certificate of deposits (NCDs) in 1961 (OCC, n.d.). Soon, this instrument 
became one of the major sources of funding in the United States banking system, beginning 
the era of wholesale funding42. Many countries followed the United States banking system 
model and introduced this type of instrument into their banking systems (Buckle & Thompson, 
1992; Murdeshwar, 1970; Tan, 2005).  
Wholesale funding is short-term and market driven, making the banking system 
vulnerable, and became an important factor contributing to the global financial crisis (GFC) 
(Huang & Ratnovski, 2011; Koch et al., 2014). On the other hand, deposits are one of the most 
stable sources of funding (King, 2013). Hence, after the GFC, BCBS (2010b, 2014) proposed 
guidelines under Basel-III to improve the proportion of deposits by determining lower run-off 
factors for deposits for maintaining the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR). Moreover, certain types of time deposits43 are not considered for 
calculation of LCR and NSFR respectively. This makes time deposits more attractive and 
 
42 Primarily, the use of certificate of deposit started in the USA. However, due to the unique feature of 
transferability, banks from other countries such as Singapore, UK, and India also started using this instrument to 
fulfil their shortage of funds (Buckle & Thompson, 1992; Murdeshwar, 1970; Tan, 2005). 
 
43 The retail time deposit, which has residual maturity more than 30 days and one year and attracts penalty more 
than or equal to the interest amount on early withdrawals.  
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increases competition in the banking system. Thus, Basel-III norms not only focus on bank 
deposit funding44 but also on bank deposit composition45 (e.g. retail and time deposit 
proportion) for bank stability.  
An understanding of the effects of deposit competition on bank deposit funding and 
composition will assist regulators in designing regulatory policies. This area is still under-
explored in the banking literature. Therefore, the objective of this essay is to identify the impact 
of deposit competition and market structure on bank deposit funding and composition.  
Market structure and competition have always been important areas of concern for 
banking policymakers. Regulators design policies and guidelines for the stability of the 
financial system. Matutes and Vives (1996) find a positive relationship between deposit 
competition and bank instability. Similarly, Craig and Dinger (2013) show that the banks with 
lower deposit market power opt for riskier funding strategies. On the other hand, Boyd and De 
Nicolo (2005) state that higher market concentration induces banks to take more risk, causing 
fragility and systemic risk. Literature has yet to reach a conclusion on the impact of bank 
competition and stability. Most regulators around the globe provide guidelines and regulations 
to strike a balance between the competition and the stability in the banking system.  
There have been several studies on banking competition and concentration and their 
effects on factors such as stability, profitability, efficiency, and economic growth (Beck et al., 
2013; Berger et al., 2009; Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Carletti & Hartmann, 2002; Craig & 
Dinger, 2013). These studies have also been carried-out in different settings such as country-
specific (Shaffer, 1989; Zhao, Casu, & Ferrari, 2010), continent-specific (Olivero, Li, & Jeon, 
 
44 Bank deposit funding = (Total customer deposits + deposits from banks + Other deposits and short-term 
borrowings)/ Total Assets of Banks 
45 Bank deposit composition: Retail deposit Proportion= Total Customer deposits (Current + Savings + Term)/ 
Total deposits (Total customer deposits + deposits from banks + Other deposits and short-term borrowings);  
Time deposit proportion= Customer term deposit/ Total customer deposits 
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2011), cross-country (De Bandt & Davis, 2000), and worldwide analyses (Vives, 2001). 
However, to the best of my knowledge, there has been limited research on the effects of deposit 
competition and market power on bank deposit funding and composition, which is the primary 
focus of this study.  
To carry out this study, I have used panel data for 75 countries covering the period 
2004-2014. The countries represent both developed and developing economies. The bank level 
data is obtained from the Bankscope database. Tools to measure market power and competition 
include the Lerner index, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, concentration ratio, and Boone 
indicators. The Lerner and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) indexes are extensively used in the 
competition literature (Aghion et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2004; Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Spierdijka 
& Zaourasa, 2018). HHI is popular amongst regulators, due to its straightforward computation 
(Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos, & Molyneux, 2009; Rhoades, 1995). In this study, the 
methodology of Craig and Dinger (2013) have been followed, who argued that deposit pricing 
reflects a better picture of deposit competition intensity than other measures such as HHI, 
Boone indicator or Panzar-Rosse model. Due to the limited availability of deposit interest rates 
data, the interest cost on average interest-bearing liabilities has been employed as a proxy for 
deposit pricing and deposit competition. Interest cost on average retail deposits along with the 
interest cost on average interest-bearing liabilities have also been used on a smaller dataset. 
This assists in finding the difference between the impact of interest cost of retail deposit and 
interest cost of average interest-bearing liabilities on bank deposit funding and composition. 
Furthermore, HHI at deposit and loan levels have been employed as a control variable for 
banks’ market structure.  
The results show a negative relationship between bank deposit funding and deposit 
competition in all countries and less financially developed countries. The negative impact of 
deposit pricing on bank deposit funding implies that deposit competition encourages banks to 
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use riskier sources of funding such as subordinated borrowing, capital market funding, and 
loans from banks. Although deposit competition helps banks attract retail deposits in less 
financially developed economies, it encourages banks to use other sources of funding in high 
financially developed economies, causing a negative relationship between interest cost and the 
proportion of retail deposits. Similarly, once banks face competition in retail deposit pricing, 
they use other sources of funding to reduce costs. However, this contributes to further fragilities 
in the banking system. A positive impact of interest cost on time deposit proportion, 
irrespective of the countries’ financial development, has been observed. This suggests that 
households are rate sensitive for time deposits, consistent with the literature (Bikker & 
Gerritsen, 2017; Streit, Lange, & Paul, 2016).  
The concentration measures show a negative relationship with bank deposit funding 
and composition. This implies that higher concentration creates market power in the banking 
system; banks use their power to increase profitability by reducing high cost deposits. The 
results show a negative relationship between deposit funding, time deposit proportion and 
employee cost in high financially developed economies. This may be because of technology 
adoption, which makes the banking system more efficient and hence reduces employee costs 
relative to total assets. This finding is consistent with the literature on banks’ adoption of online 
banking as a result of increasing labor costs (Corrocher, 2006). On the contrary, the results for 
high and less financially developed economies show positive relationship between employee 
costs and retail deposit proportion, suggesting that banks require more employees to manage 
their transaction accounts.  
This study has several academic contributions and policy implications. It contributes to 
the literature on deposit competition by studying the effects of deposit competition on bank 
deposit funding and composition. This study also touches the financial development literature 
by examining two subgroups, high and less financially developed economies (Beck et al., 2010; 
93 
 
Delis et al., 2013; Levine, 1997; Song & Thakor, 2010). Moreover, the study fills a gap in 
banking market structure literature by investigating the effects of market concentration on bank 
deposit funding and composition. In the real financial world, this study will help banks use 
interest rates to assist them in achieving the Basel-III liquidity norms. Moreover, it will 
encourage bank regulators to form policies to maintain bank deposit composition supporting 
banking system stability. Finally, this study identifies synergies for banking system regulators 
and competition authorities in monitoring a country’s banking market structure.  
The essay is organized in the following manner. Section 4.2 discusses the existing 
literature on market concentration, importance of deposits, and other key variables. Section 4.3 
explains the data collection and methodology, while section 4.4 and 4.5 discusses the empirical 
findings and policy implications. Section 4.6 discusses the results obtained including 
robustness testing. Finally, section 4.7 concludes with policy implications and discusses future 
research opportunities. 
4.2. Literature review 
This section discusses the importance of deposits and deposit competition for bank 
stability. I also present a review of literature on the market concentration and competition and 
their effects on bank stability and performance.  
4.2.1 Prior research on deposits 
One of the most important sources of funds for banks is household savings. Banks 
generally offer a variety of deposit products to depositors as per their needs (Hubbard & 
O'Brien, 2012b). However, due to competition from other financial institutions and within the 
banking system, attracting deposits has become difficult, which encourages banks to use 
wholesale funding (also known as other borrowings) such as repurchase agreements, NCDs, 
and interbank borrowings (Wilkins, Gardner, & Chapman, 2016). The use of wholesale funding 
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has made the banking system fragile (Craig & Dinger, 2013; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). 
Hence, BCBS (2010a) introduced Basel-III norms with new liquidity management guidelines 
to encourage banks to attract more retail deposits, increasing competition within the banking 
system for deposits. For the Australian market, Deans and Stewart (2012) found that after the 
GFC, banks shifted their focus to time deposits from wholesale funding. The proportion of time 
deposits increased to 45 percent (2012) from 30 percent (2007).  
The deregulation of interest rate ceilings allowed banks to offer varying interest rates 
to depositors. This variation in interest rates can make the deposit products of one bank appear 
more attractive than other banks’ (Koch et al., 2014). Banks compete against each other through 
interest rates (Diamond & Rajan, 2012; Egan et al., 2017). Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz 
(2000) suggested that due to stiff competition, banks offer higher deposit rate to depositors at 
the cost of the firm’s financial stability. In addition to managing bank deposit composition, 
banks also manage the maturity profile of deposits to manage their assets and liabilities. Hence, 
they offer varying interest rates according to their funding requirements (Diamond & Dybvig, 
1983; Holmes, 1972). Looking at the Belgian market, De Graeve, De Jonghe, and Vander 
Vennet (2007) found that stable banks offered lower interest rates, and time deposits were more 
interest rate sensitive than checking and saving deposits.  
The market discipline literature argues that the depositors of a bank monitor its risks 
and charge a premium for risk or bearing the cost of monitoring and managing those risks 
(Flannery, 2001; Martinez Peria & Schmukler, 2001), allowing banks to choose between an 
interest rate premium or stability. A less stable bank may offer a premium on deposits to attract 
deposit holders. Craig and Dinger (2013) found a positive relationship between non-performing 
loans, volatility in stock price, and deposit rates. Similarly, Egan et al. (2017) argued that firms 
with higher probability of default offer higher interest rates. Hence, most studies revolve 
around the effects of competition on interest rates. Berger and Hannan (1989); Calem and 
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Carlino (1991) found that highly concentrated markets show lower interest rates than less 
concentrated markets. They reported that the contractual maturity deposit products such as 
certificates of deposit (CDs) were more competitive than other deposit products.  
4.2.2  Market power 
The history of competition policy in the banking industry dates back to 1960s (Dick & 
Hannan, 2010; Harnay & Scialom, 2016). This competition policy led to the deregulation of 
the industry by allowing banks to offer varying interest rates and services to the depositors and 
borrowers. This gained academics’ interest in identifying the market structure and the 
concentration level in the banking industry and their impact on economic environment. The 
benefits of competition encouraged governments to monitor concentration and competition at 
the industry level. The central bank’s role is contradictory: on one hand, the country’s central 
bank monitors this concentration and establishes rules and regulations to promote competition 
(Beck et al., 2006; Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Schaeck, Cihak, & Wolfe, 2009). On the other 
hand, it shows its concern about high competition, which can make the banking system fragile 
and can cause systemic risk in the system (Beck et al., 2013; Brunnermeier, 2009; Leroy & 
Lucotte, 2017). On the contrary, recent literature suggest that although increase in the market 
power of banks increases their loan risk taking behavior, they still enjoy the stability by 
employing other risk management techniques such as increasing equity capital and smaller loan 
portfolio (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2017).   
Market concentration and market power have been studied in the light of the conduct 
and performance of banks in the economic environment (Bain, 2013). This approach further 
increased the scope of study to include other factors such as stability, efficiency, and the 
economy (Berger et al., 2004). After the GFC, most studies were around competition and bank 
stability. Some economists show that competition encourages risky behavior of banks, creating 
instability in the banking system (Berger et al., 2004; Chan, Greenbaum, & Thakor, 1986). 
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Other economists argue that competition induces banks to attain higher profit, with that higher 
profitability creating a cushion for banks (Pilloff & Rhoades, 2002). The effects of market 
power and concentration also vary with geography and institutional setup (Hsieh & Lee, 2010). 
A bank with higher market power is likely to have higher capital, which decreases the 
probability of default and makes it more stable (Jiménez, Lopez, & Saurina, 2013; Keeley, 
1990). 
Despite the vast literature on market concentration and market power, there is scarce 
research on the deposit competition. This paper focuses on the effect of the competition on 
deposit funding and composition and implementation of Basel-III norms (LCR and NSFR) 
makes this study crucial in current economic environment.  
4.2.3 Research questions 
To examine the relationship between bank deposit funding, composition and deposit 
competition, the following research questions and hypotheses are formulated.  
1. How does deposit competition affect bank deposit funding and composition? 
H1 : Higher competition for deposits increases bank deposits funding and 
composition46. 
2. How does market concentration of the banking system affect bank deposit funding 
and composition? 
H2 : Higher market concentration decreases bank deposit funding and 
composition47.  
 
46 Bank deposit composition consists the retail and time deposit proportion. Higher deposit composition means 
increase in retail and time deposit proportion and lower deposit composition means decrease in retail and time 
deposit proportions.  
47 Higher market concentration in the banking system makes the banks more stable. Therefore, their reliance on 
wholesale funding increases for two reasons: one, it becomes easier for them to access wholesale funding; and 
two, wholesale funding is generally lower cost. This increases the profitability of banks.  
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4.3. Data collection 
Bank-level financial statement data is collected from the Bankscope database for 193 
countries covering period from 2004 to 2014. In most countries, data was not available for the 
entire period. Therefore, this study limits to banks with at least 9 years data from year 2004 to 
2014 and covering more than 50 percent of market share of total deposits of the country. This 
exercise brings down the sample from 193 to 90 countries. Further, banks which do not have 
employee expenses data are dropped. I am careful about maintaining the 50 percent market 
share while dropping banks, if market share drops below 50 percent of a country; I drop 
countries from the dataset than the banks. Due to the unavailability of inflation data for 
Argentina and Georgia, these two countries are also dropped from analysis, leaving me with 
75 countries (see Appendix 16). Table 17 and Table 18 show the number of countries and 
number of banks as per income and regional classifications. 









East Asia & Pacific 4 3 2 9 
Europe & Central Asia 27 1 9 37 
North America, Latin 
America & Caribbean 
2 2 3 7 
Middle East & North Africa 7 1 1 9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
9 4 13 
Grand Total 40 16 19 75 
 









East Asia & Pacific 43 95 24 162 
Europe & Central Asia 561 8 489 1058 
North America, Latin 
America & Caribbean 224 12 22 258 
Middle East & North Africa 40 10 10 60 
Sub-Saharan Africa  53 25 78 




Three dependent variables, bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions 
have been used. Bank deposit funding is measured as the deposits and short-term funding to 
total assets ratio. Retail deposit proportion is measured as customer deposits to total deposits 
and short-term funding, while time deposit proportion is measured as the proportion of 
customer time deposits to total customer deposits. Bank-specific data such as balances in 
transaction and non-transaction accounts, employee expenditures, capital, interest cost of 
funding, interest cost of retail deposits, and total assets of banks are obtained from the 
Bankscope database. There are several reasons for using Bankscope. First, it has a 
comprehensive database of banks’ financial statements. Second, it provides the data such as 
customer deposits, bank deposits, and other funding in a standard format. Third, the database 
adjusts for the differences in accounting policies between countries. Gross domestic products 
(GDP) and inflation data are collected from the World Bank database. The political stability 
index, voice and accountability, rules of law, government effectiveness, control for corruption 
and regulatory quality index are collected from the Global Economy database. 
4.3.1 Control variables 
 Early research suggested that the higher the competition for deposits, the more unstable 
the banking system (Berger et al., 2009; Smith, 1984). In general, depositors monitor the banks’ 
stability and take actions such as withdrawal of funds from unstable banks and switch their 
bank accounts to stable banks (Diamond & Rajan, 2001; Iyer, Puri, & Ryan, 2012). There are 
various tools to measure bank stability such as Z-score, loan loss provision, and equity capital 
ratio. I use equity capital to total assets as a proxy for bank stability in my regression models.  
Banks need employees to provide services to their deposit holders and borrowers. Poor 
service is one of the primary reasons for losing customers. The number of employees in banks 
can be a good proxy for the services of banks. However, due to limited data availability for the 
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number of employees, employee cost to total assets ratio has been used as a control variable 
for bank services.  
To control for the cost of living and its impact on household expenditure and savings 
decisions, consumer price inflation (CPI) index has been used in the regression model. 
According to Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) on financial inclusion, household income is 
one of the highest cited reasons for households being unbanked. Therefore, I include log value 
of per capita income as a control variable. Craig and Dinger (2013) argue that older people like 
to save into bank deposits, therefore, the proportion of older population (65 years and above) 
has been used as a control variable. It is generally observed that countries’ regulators and 
government interfere in the financial system, which affects the performance of the banking 
system. This interreference varies as per social, economic, and financial development level of 
the country. Therefore, to control the variability in financial freedom, the financial freedom 
index developed by Heritage and Wall Street (2009) has been employed (Fu et al., 2014).  
4.3.2 Econometric methodology  
 The effects of market structure on bank deposit funding, retail and time deposit 
proportions have been examined using firm level data. The econometric model is based on 
panel data and has the general form: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
= 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑐 , 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 , 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑐) … (4.1) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
= 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑐 , 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 , 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑐) … (4.2) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
= 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑐 , 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 , 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑐) … (4.3)  
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Where interest denotes interest expenses on average interest-bearing liabilities and 
market structure is the concentration of markets measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) at deposit and loan levels. The subscripts “i” and “c” indicate bank and country level 
variables respectively.  
An increase in bank deposits allows banks to decrease interest rates on deposits, leading 
to a reverse causality between bank deposits and interest rates. The higher bank deposits are, 
the higher is market concentration. Moreover, higher bank deposits increase total assets, 
incentivizing banks to increase their loans and advances and employees to manage those assets. 
Hence, a reverse causality between interest cost, market concentration, equity capital, 
employees’ expenditure, and bank deposits are expected. To address the issue of reverse 
causality between equity capital, employees’ cost, market size and bank deposits, the lagged 
level of the independent variables have been used as explanatory variables (Khan et al., 2017). 
One of the main issues with endogeneity in the dataset is identifying a suitable instrument 
which directly affect the endogenous variables but not the dependent variables. Craig and 
Dinger (2013) use wholesale banking rate as an instrument for the deposit rate. However, due 
to the limited availability of wholesale rate data, the lagged value of endogenous variables 
(interest cost of average of interest-bearing liabilities, interest cost of retail deposits, and market 
concentrations) have been used as instruments. Using a lagged variable of endogenous variable 





Table 19 contains the definition of dependent, explanatory, and control variables with 
the sign of expected relationship with the dependent variables.  
Table 19 Literature survey 
Variables’ 
Name 
Abbreviation Measure Expectation Literature 
Dependent 
Variable 
    
Deposit 
Funding 





RDP Customer deposit to 




TDP Customer time deposit 





    
Bank Specific 
factors 
    




IC Interest expenses/ 
Average Interest-
bearing liabilities 
Positive Craig and Dinger 
(2013); Egan et al. 
(2017); Hutchison 
(1995) 
Interest cost to 
retail deposits 
ICR Interest expenses of 
customer deposits 
/Average of customer 
deposits 
Positive Craig and Dinger 
(2013); Egan et al. 
(2017); Hutchison 
(1995) 
Employee Cost STA Salary expenses/Total 
Assets 
Positive Berry (2000); Dick 
(2007); Keaveney 
(1995); O'Cass and 
Grace (2004); Bikker & 
Haaf, 2002); Bourke 
(1989) 
Stability of Firm CAP Shareholders’ fund/ 
Total Assets 
Positive Berger et al. (2009) 
Market Size MS Log value of total 
assets 









HHID3 A country level 
indicator- concentration 
of top three banks of 
each country based on 
total deposits. 
Positive Craig and Dinger 





HHIL3 A country level 
indicator- concentration 
of top three banks of 
each country based on 
total loans. 
Positive Berger et al. (2009); 




    
Income LINCOME Log value of GDP per 
capita income 
Positive Barth et al. (2013) 
Inflation Inflation Country level consumer 
price inflation 






Abbreviation Measure Expectation Literature 
Old Population OP Age beyond 65 years 
and above 
Positive Craig and Dinger 
(2013) 
     
Financial 
Freedom Index 
FFI The index measures the 
financial freedom and 
state interference in 
financial system.  
Negative Chortareas et al. 
(2013); Heritage and 
Wall Street (2009) 
     
 
I follow the method of Craig and Dinger (2013) who employ interest rates to measure 
deposit competition. They use money market deposit accounts (MMDA) interest rates as a 
proxy for the deposit rate. However, finding interest rates according to the availability of 
deposit products is difficult in a cross-country study, I therefore employ interest expenses over 
average interest-bearing liabilities as a proxy for deposit rates. Further, interest on retail 
deposits is also used to identify the sensitivity of households’ saving behavior with respect to 
retail deposit rates. However, due to limited data availability of interest on retail deposits, I 
carry out this analysis with a smaller dataset, which includes 40 countries.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) measured at deposits and loan levels have been 
used to investigate the impact of market structure on bank deposits. HHI3 is measured at a 
national level and is a frequently-used tool for measuring the degree of concentration (Berger 
et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2009; Craig & Dinger, 2013). The HHI is calculated as sum of 
squared market share (in percentage) of the firms. The HHID3 and HHIL3 are calculated using 
following models 4 and 5. 




… … … … … (4.4) 








Where, 𝐵𝑖 stands for market share (total deposits) of the banks, 𝐵𝑘 is the market share 
of loans, and n= n number of banks between 1 and 3 in the banking system are included for the 
calculation of HHI.  
In high financially developed economies, competition within the banking system will 
have higher impact than in less financially developed economies. To divide the full dataset into 
two subgroups, the average (mean value) of financial development index of selected countries 
has been taken for the analysis period. Countries with a lower financial development index than 
the benchmark48 are considered less financially developed and remaining are high financially 
developed economies. The descriptive statistics for the full and subgroup datasets are available 
in Table 20.  
Table 20 Descriptive statistics 






Deposit Funding 14,547 70.36 19.58 0.03 99.46 
Retail Deposit 
Proportion 14,464 68.64 30.06 0.00 100.00 
Time Deposit 
Proportion 13,409 65.37 31.93 0.00 100.00 
Interest Cost to 
interest bearing 
liabilities 14,547 3.50 2.70 -0.16 57.26 
Interest cost to 
retail deposits 11,206 16.06 42.48 -0.21 722.64 
Employee Costs  14,547 1.94 1.69 0.00 21.22 
Equity Capital 14,547 13.98 11.81 -76.24 99.72 
Market Size 14,547 13.91 2.78 4.39 21.81 
HHID3 14,547 1,281.09 1,120.77 254.16 6,828.13 
HHIL3 14,547 1,248.75 1,050.65 265.57 6,732.65 
CPI 14,547 4.98 3.98 -7.98 43.59 
Old Population 14,547 9.70 1.21 5.10 11.64 
Per Capita income 14,547 58.17 19.45 10.00 90.00 
Financial 
Freedom 14,547 12.99 4.58 1.03 21.58 
Regulatory 
Quality 14,547 0.62 0.89 -1.54 2.06 
Developed Countries 
Deposit Funding 8,407 77.11 15.38 0.03 99.46 
Retail Deposit 
Proportion 8,339 78.36 24.18 0.00 100.00 
 
48 Average of financial development index of selected countries for our analysis period. 
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Proportion 7,458 53.97 30.12 0.00 100.00 
Interest Cost to 
interest bearing 
liabilities 8,407 2.54 1.84 -0.16 24.80 
Interest cost to 
retail deposits 5,472 3.15 6.15 -0.21 137.99 
Employee Costs 8,407 1.23 0.98 0.00 14.89 
Equity Capital 8,407 10.95 9.56 -0.52 98.69 
Market Size 8,407 15.26 2.22 8.21 21.81 
HHID3 8,407 1,617.71 1,184.90 338.45 6,828.13 
HHIL3 8,407 1,537.80 1,128.59 318.89 6,732.65 
CPI 8,407 2.58 1.82 -0.95 10.58 
Old Population 8,407 10.31 1.04 6.57 11.64 
Per Capita income 8,407 70.61 14.48 30.00 90.00 
Financial 
Freedom 8,407 14.37 4.28 2.08 21.58 
Regulatory 
Quality 8,407 1.25 0.58 -0.91 2.06 
Developing Countries 
Deposit Funding 6,140 61.12 20.89 0.13 96.93 
Retail Deposit 
Proportion 6,125 55.40 32.15 0.00 100.00 
Time Deposit 
Proportion 5,951 79.66 28.19 0.00 100.00 
Interest Cost to 
interest bearing 
liabilities 6,140 4.82 3.09 0.00 57.26 
Interest cost to 
retail deposits 5,734 28.38 56.39 0.00 722.64 
Employee Costs 6,140 2.90 1.95 0.01 21.22 
Equity Capital 6,140 18.12 13.26 -76.24 99.72 
Market Size 6,140 12.06 2.37 4.39 18.70 
HHID3 6,140 820.18 828.39 254.16 6,216.44 
HHIL3 6,140 852.98 774.86 265.57 5,013.56 
CPI 6,140 8.28 3.76 -7.98 43.59 
Old Population 6,140 8.85 0.87 5.10 11.35 
Per Capita income 6,140 41.14 10.37 10.00 90.00 
Financial 
Freedom 6,140 11.10 4.30 1.03 19.30 
Regulatory 
Quality 6,140 -0.24 0.36 -1.54 1.16 
  
Table 20 shows that most of the data (variables) for less financially developed countries 
show higher variability than for the highly financially developed countries. The standard 
deviations for deposit funding, retail and time deposit proportions for more highly financially 
developed economies are 15, 24 and 30 respectively, whereas the developing countries dataset 
shows 21, 32, and 28 percent standard deviations for the same variables. This indicates that 
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time deposits in developing countries are less volatile than in highly financially developed 
countries. On the other hand, interest costs and concentration indices such HHID3 and HHIL3 
show higher standard deviation in developed countries than the developing countries. This 
variation also reflects the effect of GFC in the developed countries, which did not have much 
effect in developing countries (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). To smooth the data and filling 
missing values, I apply a three years moving average (Crane & Crotty, 1967; McCulloch & 
Baulch, 2000; Raudys et al., 2013; Syntetos & Boylan, 2005). The analysis is also conducted 
without using the moving average and results are broadly consistent49. The Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg homoscedasticity test has also conducted for the dataset. These results 
reject the null hypothesis in the favour of heteroscedasticity. The Hausman test results are in 
favour of fixed effect methods. 
Deposits consist of the sum of net deposits50 plus interest on deposits for that period. 
Hence, I expect a dynamic characteristic in the dataset. The autocorrelation (serial correlation) 
test confirms this. The system GMM method has been used to address heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and endogeneity issues. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a two-step 
difference GMM model. The first step assumes that error terms in the dataset are independent 
and homoscedastic. The second step uses the residuals obtained from the first step to determine 
the variance and co-variance matrix, which makes the two-step GMM estimator asymptotically 
more efficient. However, this model was criticized by Blundell and Bond (2000) due to the 
large finite sample bias when the time-period was small and proposed system GMM, which 
allows additional instruments and provides efficient estimates. The two-step system GMM 
estimation technique has been employed for robustness testing.  
 
49 The results are available upon request. 
50 Net deposits= Opening deposits + Deposit inflow – Deposit outflow  
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Generally system GMM has certain limitations such as usage of weak instruments and 
over-identification of instrumental variables. Bun and Windmeijer (2010) suggested using the 
testing procedures for weak instruments such as Lagrange multiplier test (Kleibergen, 2005) 
and Conditional Likelihood Ratio test suggested by Moreira (2003). Roodman (2018) 
suggested using the robust function in the two-step GMM model works as a Windmeijer (2005) 
correction. Hence, I use a two-step GMM model with the robust function. Moreover, Hansen-
J test is used to detect the over-identification issues of instrumental variables.  
The following model for all countries and other subgroups has been used. The three 
dependent variables, bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportion are used.  









𝑒 + ℰ𝑐𝑏𝑡 … … (4.6) 
 Where 𝛱𝑐𝑏𝑡 are the dependent variables: deposit funding, retail, and time deposit 
proportions of bank “b” at time “t” and of country “c”. 𝛱𝑐𝑏𝑡−1 is previous year’s value of 
dependent variables. 𝜙𝑏- consists the Bank’s fixed effects; 𝜑𝑐 -country fixed effects. 𝒳𝑏𝑐𝑡
𝑔
 are 
the vector of the bank specific factors such as interest cost, employee cost, and financial 
stability of the firm (capital to asset ratio). 𝒳𝑏𝑐𝑡
𝑒  indicates the macroeconomic factors and 
market concentration indexes for each country. ℰ- denotes disturbance or error term. 
4.4. Preliminary analysis 
The impact of deposit competition, market structure have been investigated on bank 
deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions through panel fixed effects method in the 
all countries dataset (as shown in Table 21). The results show a negative relationship between 
bank deposit funding and interest cost. The coefficients are around -0.82, which suggest that 
for a 1 percent increase in interest costs, the proportion of deposit funding decreases by 0.8 
percent. The negative relationship indicates that as interest cost increases, banks increase other 
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sources of funding such as subordinated debt and treasury bills, which are generally short-term 
in nature and carry a lower cost. This causes a reduction in the proportion of deposit funding. 
On the other hand, an increase in interest rates incentivizes retail depositors to place their funds 
in banks. As expected, interest rates show a positive impact on retail and time deposits 
proportions. Retail deposits include customers’ transaction account deposits. The transaction 
accounts deposits are less rate sensitive, therefore, retail deposit proportion shows less 
elasticity than time deposit proportion.  
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Table 21 Bank deposit competition and banking market structure: banking deposit funding and composition for all countries. 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors (in parentheses). Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (4-9) show the results for 
bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and 
year effects. The deposit funding and retail deposit proportion report the results for 75 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 73 countries. The ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 



















Interest cost  -0.793*** -0.830*** -0.816*** 0.644*** 0.624*** 0.635*** 2.101*** 2.033*** 2.086*** 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.140) (0.184) (0.184) (0.184) (0.287) (0.289) (0.289) 
HHID3  -0.00284***   -0.00149**   -0.00200*  
  (0.000393)   (0.000674)   (0.00105)  
HHIL3   -0.00366***   -0.00148*   -0.000549 
   (0.000490)   (0.000766)   (0.00114) 
Employee Cost t-1 -0.215 -0.214 -0.203 0.479 0.481 0.485 -1.412 -1.402 -1.410 
 (0.251) (0.247) (0.246) (0.352) (0.354) (0.354) (0.997) (0.991) (0.996) 
Equity Capita t-1 -0.566*** -0.559*** -0.559*** -0.129*** -0.126** -0.126*** -0.339*** -0.331*** -0.337*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0392) (0.0391) (0.0489) (0.0488) (0.0489) (0.0829) (0.0838) (0.0836) 
Market Size t-1  0.364 0.376 0.392 -2.165** -2.157** -2.152** 0.264 0.248 0.275 
 (0.792) (0.788) (0.786) (0.900) (0.903) (0.902) (1.257) (1.263) (1.258) 
CPI 0.137*** 0.0338 0.0110 -0.00536 -0.0594 -0.0562 -0.0724 -0.110 -0.0864 
 (0.0519) (0.0499) (0.0512) (0.122) (0.121) (0.119) (0.123) (0.120) (0.124) 
GDP per capita -4.493*** -6.589*** -6.309*** -0.357 -1.467 -1.103 0.840 -1.145 0.403 
 (1.201) (1.190) (1.217) (1.774) (1.771) (1.762) (2.707) (2.785) (2.755) 
Financial Freedom -0.0132 -0.000328 0.00465 -0.0684* -0.0618* -0.0612* 0.0384 0.0584 0.0429 
 (0.0232) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0352) (0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0475) (0.0486) (0.0485) 
Population Old 3.527*** 2.656*** 2.931*** 1.939*** 1.479** 1.696*** 3.602*** 3.536*** 3.643*** 
 (0.415) (0.410) (0.410) (0.570) (0.588) (0.579) (1.004) (1.000) (1.018) 
Constant 199.3*** 204.6*** 204.8*** 117.6*** 119.9*** 119.8*** 69.78*** 81.45*** 68.26*** 
 (8.867) (8.727) (8.806) (11.17) (11.18) (11.13) (18.73) (19.77) (19.52) 
F 46.42 47.23 47.13 12.07 11.38 11.34 15.48 15.14 14.67 
r2 0.247 0.258 0.259 0.0347 0.0368 0.0361 0.119 0.121 0.119 
N 12929 12929 12929 12858 12858 12858 8632 8632 8632 
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I further investigate the effects of market concentration using HHID3 and HHIL3 on 
bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions. The results show a negative 
relationship between bank deposit funding, retail, time deposit proportions, and market 
concentration (HHID3) measured at deposit level. The elasticity for bank deposit funding is 
higher than for retail deposit proportion. However, the economic significance is low for both 
dependent variables, bank deposit funding and retail deposit proportion. Market concentration 
(HHIL3) shows negative relationships with deposit funding and retail deposit proportion. I do 
not find a statistically significant relationship between market concentration and time deposit 
proportion.  
Employee cost has been used as a control variable on the basis that banks will need 
more employees to manage a large number of deposit account holders. I do not find an impact 
of employee costs on bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions. On the other 
hand, the results show capital is a crucial factor in determining bank deposit funding, retail, 
and time deposit proportions. Among the macroeconomic variables, inflation exhibits positive 
effects on bank deposit funding, but these results turn insignificant when market concentration 
is used as a control variable. No other dependent variables show a significant relationship with 
inflation. Hence, it can be inferred that the relationship between inflation and bank deposits is 
insignificant.  
There is also no significant relationship between the financial freedom index and bank 
deposits funding and time deposit proportions. The retail deposit proportion shows a negative 
relationship with financial freedom index. This relationship is statistically significant at 10 
percent. Thus, I am cautious in making inferences from this result. Per capita income exhibits 
a negative relationship with the bank deposit funding. I cannot determine the relationship 
between retail, time deposit proportions, and income. 
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4.5. Main findings 
Table 22 shows the results of 2SLS using bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit 
proportions as dependent variables in all countries. Columns (1-9) have independent variables 
interest costs and employee costs as main variables to measure the impact of deposit 
competition and aggressiveness of banks on the dependent variables. Furthermore, 
concentration indexes measured at deposits (HHID3) and loans (HHIL3) levels have also been 
used for detecting the effects of market structure on bank deposits, as shown in columns 2, 3, 
5, 6, 8, and 9. The other bank and economy related variables such as market size, consumer 
price inflation, per capita income, financial freedom index, and per capita income are used as 
control variables. To address the issue of time invariant factors, I include year effects in the 
model.  
The first column of Table 22 shows a negative impact of interest cost on bank deposit 
funding. The coefficient of interest cost is -0.683 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. This relationship is consistent using market structures viz. HHID3 and HHIL3 as control 
variables. In fact, the coefficients decreased to -0.739 and -0.752 and statistically significant at 
1 percent level, as shown in columns 2 and 3 respectively, and the economic significance is 
also substantial. A one percent increase in interest cost causes a 0.74 percent decrease in the 
proportion of bank deposits to total assets. This negative relationship shows that when banks 
face increase in interest costs, they opt for a lower cost of funds, leading to a reduction in the 
proportion of bank deposit funding. This is consistent with the findings in the literature that 
argues that an increase in retail deposit rates incentivizes banks to use wholesale funding to 
smooth their costs (Feldman & Schmidt, 2001; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). Similarly Craig 
and Dinger (2013) report that increases in retail deposit rates cause banks to fund riskier 
products to compensate for their cost. On the other hand, the results show the same riskier 
behaviour of banks from the banks’ borrowing perspective.  
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Columns (4-6) and (7-9) of Table 22 show a positive impact of interest costs on retail 
and time deposit proportions. The results show a higher impact of interest cost on time deposit 
proportion than for retail deposit proportion. As per columns 4 and 7 of Table 22, a one percent 
increase in interest rates increases retail and time deposit proportions by 0.61 and 2.39 percent 
respectively. A positive relationship between retail, time deposits, and interest rates are 
consistent with the general understanding and literature (De Graeve et al., 2007). This 
relationship is also consistent with the panel fixed effects findings. Although interest cost 
comprises the interest on both short-term borrowings and retail deposits including transaction 
and non-transaction deposits, I consider it to be a proxy for retail deposit interest rates and cost 
of funding. Although a study regarding the impact of interest rates on deposits requires deposit 
interest rates according to deposit products, due to limited data availability, I leave this avenue 





Table 22 Bank deposit competition and banking market structure: banking deposit funding and composition for all countries. 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors (in parentheses). Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (4-9) show the results for 
bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and 
year effects. I use interest cost, HHID3 and HHIL3 as endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variables. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of 
instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit proportion report the 
results for 75 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 73 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level 
respectively.  



















Interest Cost -0.683*** -0.739*** -0.752*** 0.611*** 0.588*** 0.584*** 2.390*** 2.321*** 2.378*** 
 (0.119) (0.122) (0.124) (0.142) (0.141) (0.140) (0.244) (0.246) (0.249) 
HHID3  -0.0027***   -0.0011***   -0.00161**  
  (0.000261)   (0.000404)   (0.000760)  
HHIL3   -0.0039***   -0.0015***   -0.000308 
   (0.000333)   (0.000487)   (0.000857) 
Employee Cost t-1 -0.228 -0.224 -0.210 0.483** 0.485** 0.490** -1.397** -1.390** -1.395** 
 (0.154) (0.152) (0.151) (0.206) (0.206) (0.207) (0.586) (0.584) (0.586) 
Equity Capital t-1 -0.564*** -0.558*** -0.558*** -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.332*** -0.326*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0560) (0.0566) (0.0564) 
Market Size t-1 0.297 0.321 0.354 -2.146*** -2.135*** -2.123*** 0.115 0.110 0.123 
 (0.472) (0.469) (0.468) (0.567) (0.567) (0.567) (0.834) (0.838) (0.836) 
CPI 0.131*** 0.0334 0.000260 -0.00354 -0.0439 -0.0536 -0.0948 -0.123 -0.102 
 (0.0322) (0.0325) (0.0344) (0.0634) (0.0642) (0.0645) (0.0793) (0.0791) (0.0812) 
GDP per capita -4.55*** -6.549*** -6.449*** -0.339 -1.174 -1.079 0.746 -0.842 0.503 
 (0.743) (0.766) (0.774) (1.042) (1.061) (1.054) (1.628) (1.772) (1.742) 
Financial 
Freedom 
-0.0157 -0.00292 0.00419 -0.0676*** -0.0624*** -0.0599*** 0.0314 0.0479 0.0340 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0277) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
Population Old 3.596*** 2.750*** 2.938*** 1.918*** 1.564*** 1.662*** 3.659*** 3.603*** 3.681*** 
 (0.241) (0.246) (0.239) (0.326) (0.343) (0.332) (0.589) (0.588) (0.595) 
F 105.8 105.8 107.4 15.51 15.03 14.98 34.52 34.76 33.59 
r2 0.247 0.258 0.259 0.0346 0.0367 0.0360 0.118 0.120 0.119 
N 12929 12929 12929 12858 12858 12858 8627 8627 8627 
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Turning to market structure variables and their impact on bank deposits, columns (2-3) show a 
negative relationship between market concentration and bank deposit funding. The HHID3 shows a 
coefficient of -0.0027, whereas HHIL3 shows -0.0039, both statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Similarly, the results show a negative relationship of these variables with retail deposit proportion. 
However, the elasticity for retail deposit proportion is lower than for bank deposit funding. The 
coefficients are -0.001 and -0.0015 for HHID3 and HHIL3 respectively using retail deposit proportion 
as dependent variable. Further, results show a negative relationship between HHID3 and time deposit 
proportion. I do not find a statistically significant relationship between HHIL3 and time deposit 
proportion. The higher market concentration decreases competition within the banking system. 
Therefore, banks feel stable in the less competitive environment, which encourages them to increase 
low-cost funding to increase profitability. This finding is consistent with the literature, with a positive 
relationship between market concentration and bank stability (Jiménez et al., 2013; Keeley, 1990). 
Moreover, the results show a higher impact of market concentration on bank deposit funding than for 
retail deposit proportion. This finding is consistent with the literature, which suggests that retail deposits 
are less sensitive than wholesale funding (King, 2013). Moreover, the results also show a higher 
elasticity for market concentration measured at loan level than for bank deposits for both the dependent 
variables viz. bank deposit funding and retail deposit proportion. This suggests that higher concentration 
in the loan market gives a higher feeling for stability to banks than the concentration measured at the 
deposit level.  
Employee cost has been used as another variable to study the effects of banks’ aggressiveness 
on bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions. The results do not show a statistically 
significant relationship between bank deposit funding and employee costs. On the other hand, employee 
cost (as shown in columns 4-6) show a positive impact on retail deposit proportion and a negative effect 
on time deposit proportion (as shown in columns 7-9). The retail deposit proportion consists transaction 
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accounts including demand deposits, checking account, and saving account. The frequency of the 
transactions in these accounts are relatively more than the time deposits. Hence, to provide services to 
transaction accounts, banks require higher number of employees. On the other hand, the frequency of 
transactions for time deposits is less, meaning that fewer employees are required to manage these 
accounts. This negative relationship is also because of technological improvements in the banking 
system, which improve employees’ performance. Hence, banks need relatively fewer employees to 
manage the business and require fewer branches. This finding and arguments are aligned with the 
literature. Hernández-Murillo, Llobet, and Fuentes (2010) argue that online bank adoption is helpful in 
achieving cost efficiency and acquiring customer deposits. Similar findings are reported by Goh and 
Kauffman (2013) who found that the online banking implementation increases deposits by 29.3 percent 
in the United States banking system. They further reported a negative relationship between number of 
employees and total deposits. Controlling for the usage of online banking system will give more insights 
in the research. However, I leave this area for future research.  
The effects of bank stability on bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions. 
According to columns (1-3) of Table 22, equity capital and bank deposit funding show a negative 
relationship. Column 1 shows a coefficient of -0.56 at a 1 percent significance level, suggesting that a 1 
percent increase in equity capital reduces bank deposits by 0.56 percent relative to total assets. Similarly, 
I find a negative relationship between retail, time deposit proportions and equity capital. Results suggest 
that time deposit proportion is more elastic than retail deposit proportion. This negative relationship for 
bank deposit funding and time deposit proportion with bank stability obtained through 2SLS is 
consistent with panel fixed effect findings. This leads me to conclude that stable banks prefer low-cost 
deposits, which creates a moral hazard issue. This finding is consistent with the argument of Arping 
(2019), who states that increase in capital requirement crowds out deposits. Thus, it raises questions on 
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the Basel capital adequacy norms, which hypothesize that increasing banks’ capital makes banking 
systems more stable.  
To control for the market size of the firm, log of total assets has been used as a control variable. 
The results do not show a statistically significant relationship between deposit funding, time deposit 
proportion, and market size. On the other hand, market size shows a negative relationship with retail 
deposit proportion. The elasticity of market size is in the range -2.15 to -2.12 percent. This indicates that 
as lending demand increases, banks use other sources of funds such as deposits from banks, other 
deposits, other short-term funding, causing a decrease in the retail deposit proportion.  
As to other macroeconomic control variables, column 1 shows a positive impact of consumer 
price inflation (CPI) index on bank deposit funding. However, I do not find a significant relationship 
with other dependent variables. Since, no other regression results show a significant relationship, I am 
cautious to make any inference from the positive result. The GDP per-capita has been used to control 
for countries’ income level. The results show a negative relationship between bank deposit funding and 
per capita income. Columns (1-3) exhibit elasticity in the range of -4.55 to -6.55 percent for bank deposit 
funding. The relationship between retail, time deposit proportions and per capita income cannot be 
determined. The negative coefficients and higher elasticity for bank deposit funding support the 
argument that as economic activity increases in countries banks fulfil their funding requirement with 
less use of retail deposits and bank deposits, which causes reduction in bank deposit funding (Sinkey, 
1992).  
The financial freedom index has been employed to control for the effects of government 
intervention in the financial system. The financial freedom index includes effectiveness of government 
regulations, degree of state intervention, development of financial markets, and openness to foreign 
competition among others. The financial freedom provides opportunities to bankers and householders 
in using different sources of funding and investment instruments, which may cause a reduction in bank 
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deposits. As per expectation, a negative relationship between the financial freedom index and retail 
deposit proportion has been observed. On the other hand, I do not find any impact of financial freedom 
on deposit funding and time deposit proportion. Columns (4-6) show elasticity around -0.06, which 
suggests that a one (1) point increase in financial freedom decreases retail deposit proportion by 0.06 
percent.  
Recent research shows a significant impact of the older population in using the banking system 
(Acharya & Mora, 2012; Craig & Dinger, 2013). Hence, the proportion of older population is used as 
an instrumental variable in the regression model. Columns (1-9) show a positive elasticity for older 
population with bank deposit funding and composition. Column (7-9) exhibits a higher elasticity for 
older population on time deposit proportion than the retail deposit proportion. The positive relationship 
between deposits and older population is consistent with the general understanding that older people 
like to save in safe assets. 
The effects of deposit competition on bank deposit funding and composition have also been 
examined using the two-step system GMM method. The results show a negative impact of interest cost 
on bank deposit funding, consistent with the main findings (2SLS). Retail and time deposit proportions 
do not show a significant elasticity for interest cost. On the other hand, a positive relationship between 
retail, time deposit proportions, and market structure is found, which is contrary to the main findings. 
However, I am cautious in interpreting this result due to the over-identification issue. Since two-step 
system GMM shows over identification, I employ 2SLS for further analysis, which does not have over- 
or under-identification issues. The results of system GMM are available upon request.  
4.5.1 Financial development level of the country  
A further investigation of the impact of deposit competition on bank deposit funding, retail and 
time deposit proportions in high and less financially developed economies has been conducted, as 
earlier research has shown the variability in households’ and banks behaviour in using the financial 
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system according to the country’s financial development level (Boot & Thakor, 1997; Song & Thakor, 
2010).  
 As shown in Table 23, interest cost does not show a significant relationship with bank deposit 
funding in highly financially developed economies. The results show a negative elasticity between 
interest cost and retail deposit proportion, contrary to the main findings. On the other hand, time deposit 
proportion presents a positive elasticity for interest cost, consistent with the main findings (see columns 
(7-9) of Table 23). The negative relationship between retail deposit proportion and interest cost 
suggests that as interest cost increases banks use low cost deposits such as deposits from banks, money 
market instruments and other deposits that decreases the proportion of retail deposits. On the contrary, 
an increase in interest rates encourages households to save more by using time deposits. This helps 
them in earning higher yields and eventually increases the time deposit proportion. On the other hand, 
Table 24 shows a negative impact of interest cost on bank deposit funding, but positive effects on retail 
and time deposit proportions in less financially developed economies, which is consistent with the main 
findings. Hence, the negative relationship in less developed economies and positive relationship in high 
financially developed economies suggest that the main results for interest cost are driven by less 
financially developed economies.  
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Table 23 Bank deposit competition and banking market structure: Banking deposit funding and composition for high financially developed 
economies 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors (in parentheses). Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (4-9) show the results 
for bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm 
fixed and year effects. I use interest cost, HHID3 and HHIL3 as endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test confirms 
the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding, retail deposit proportion, 
and time deposit proportion for 43 countries and the dataset consists 935 number of banks. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level respectively.  



















Interest cost -0.166 -0.162 -0.169 -0.902*** -0.922*** -0.890*** 2.626*** 2.594*** 2.628*** 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.238) (0.236) (0.236) (0.322) (0.322) (0.322) 
HHID3  0.000428   -0.00229***   -0.0026***  
  (0.00031)   (0.000484)   (0.000875)  
HHIL3   0.000731   -0.0028***   -0.000571 
   (0.000469)   (0.000710)   (0.00116) 
Employee 
cost t-1 
-1.569*** -1.595*** -1.586*** 0.945** 1.080** 1.008** -1.846*** -1.846*** -1.851*** 
 (0.313) (0.316) (0.315) (0.478) (0.476) (0.474) (0.687) (0.683) (0.686) 
Equity 
Capital t-1 
-0.693*** -0.696*** -0.696*** -0.0662 -0.0550 -0.0575 -0.409*** -0.395*** -0.406*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0648) (0.0644) (0.0646) (0.0742) (0.0755) (0.0747) 
Market size t-1 -0.163 -0.196 -0.203 -3.333*** -3.159*** -3.182*** -0.340 -0.211 -0.314 
 (0.579) (0.580) (0.579) (0.941) (0.937) (0.939) (0.971) (0.987) (0.978) 
CPI -0.256*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.0960 -0.0236 -0.0420 0.0570 0.0975 0.0674 
 (0.0825) (0.0837) (0.0830) (0.128) (0.129) (0.128) (0.191) (0.192) (0.192) 
GDP per 
capita 
-0.0372 0.684 0.875 3.460** -0.415 -0.0386 -3.801* -7.562*** -4.481* 
 (0.919) (1.088) (1.117) (1.501) (1.652) (1.707) (2.243) (2.650) (2.704) 
Financial 
Freedom 
-0.053*** -0.0567*** -0.0568*** -0.0144 0.00403 -0.000865 0.0544* 0.0768** 0.0570* 
 (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0328) (0.0338) (0.0335) 
Population 
Old 
0.0479 0.139 0.0922 1.463*** 0.970** 1.292*** 0.753 0.412 0.748 
 (0.305) (0.314) (0.307) (0.473) (0.480) (0.476) (0.687) (0.697) (0.688) 
F 51.18 47.76 47.96 16.34 16.48 15.97 26.78 26.81 25.48 
r2 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.0539 0.0609 0.0574 0.109 0.112 0.109 
N 7472 7472 7472 7414 7414 7414 6632 6632 6632 
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 Table 23 shows a negative relationship between retail deposit proportion and market 
concentrations measured by both deposit and loan level in highly financially developed economies. 
Moreover, HHIL3 shows a higher sensitivity than HHID3. As with the panel fixed effect results, time 
deposit proportion shows a negative relationship with HHID3. I do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between time deposit proportion and HHIL3. Similarly, columns (1-3) do not show 
significant impact of market concentration on bank deposit funding in high financially developed 
economies.  
Unlike high financially developed economies, Table 24 shows the negative impact of market 
concentration on bank deposit funding in less financially developed economies. Although columns (8-
9) of Table 24 show negative impact of market concentration on time deposit proportion, I do not find 
a significant result for retail deposit proportion, as shown in columns (4-6). Hence, I find that the impact 
of market concentration on bank deposits is negative irrespective of countries’ financial development 
level. This suggests that higher market concentration creates a moral hazard issue for banks, 
incentivizing banks to attract low-cost deposits and low-cost sources of funds, contributing to banking 
system instability.  
 One of the interesting findings is that employee cost shows a negative impact on bank deposit 
funding and time deposit proportion in high financially developed countries (see columns 1-3 and 7-9 
of Table 23). The coefficients for deposit funding and time deposit proportion are around -1.6 and -1.85 
respectively. On the other hand, the relationship between employee cost and retail deposit proportion is 
positive (see columns 4-6 of Table 23). The relationship between bank deposit funding, time deposit 
proportion and employees’ cost are insignificant in less financially developed economies (see columns 
1-3 and 7-9 of Table 24). Like highly financially developed economies results, less financially developed 
economies banks’ results show positive relationship between employee costs and retail deposit 
proportion. The contradictory relationship for time deposit proportion (negative) and for retail deposit 
proportion (positive) shows the high number of employees helps banks provide better services to their 
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transaction account holders, causing an increase in the retail deposit proportion. The increase of 
transactions accounts holders and their deposits is higher than the time deposit increase, which causes a 
decrease in the time deposit proportion.   
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Table 24 Bank deposit competition and banking market structure: Banking deposit funding and composition for less financially developed 
economies 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors (in parentheses). Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (4-9) show the results for 
bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and time deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed 
and year effects. I use interest cost, HHID3 and HHIL3 as endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variables. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity 
of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit proportion report the 
results for 32 countries and whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 30 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level respectively. 



















Interest Cost -0.750*** -0.828*** -0.822*** 1.126*** 1.140*** 1.126*** 2.553*** 2.439*** 2.433*** 
 (0.172) (0.180) (0.183) (0.260) (0.262) (0.261) (0.351) (0.353) (0.351) 
HHID3  -0.00777***   0.00135   -0.00392**  
  (0.000560)   (0.000881)   (0.00194)  
HHIL3   -0.00703***   0.0000491   -0.00360** 
   (0.000547)   (0.000819)   (0.00151) 
Employee 
Cost t-1 
-0.0122 -0.104 -0.0498 0.577** 0.593*** 0.577** -0.128 -0.161 -0.0972 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.178) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (1.141) (1.139) (1.143) 
Capital t-1 -0.508*** -0.498*** -0.499*** -0.156*** -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.167** -0.159** -0.156** 
 (0.0329) (0.0325) (0.0323) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0764) (0.0760) (0.0760) 
Market Size t-1 0.447 0.199 0.314 -0.837 -0.794 -0.836 3.079* 2.719 3.057* 
 (0.672) (0.668) (0.658) (0.696) (0.698) (0.697) (1.684) (1.685) (1.670) 
CPI 0.151*** -0.140*** -0.115*** -0.0140 0.0366 -0.0121 -0.172* -0.250** -0.278*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0388) (0.0422) (0.0784) (0.0830) (0.0816) (0.0940) (0.0986) (0.103) 
GDP per 
capita 
-7.248*** -5.159*** -4.951*** 3.770** 3.418** 3.754** 17.28*** 16.42*** 16.49*** 
 (1.198) (1.173) (1.220) (1.503) (1.531) (1.553) (3.076) (3.048) (3.065) 
Financial 
Freedom 
0.0715* 0.0777** 0.110*** -0.0391 -0.0402 -0.0394 -0.160** -0.0972 -0.0975 
 (0.0367) (0.0344) (0.0356) (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0479) (0.0722) (0.0790) (0.0794) 
Population 
Old 
7.333*** 5.323*** 6.069*** 4.897*** 5.248*** 4.906*** 6.892*** 7.955*** 7.828*** 
 (0.592) (0.579) (0.596) (0.700) (0.747) (0.725) (1.333) (1.366) (1.372) 
F 87.10 95.39 94.18 8.257 7.779 7.712 13.80 14.22 14.47 
r2 0.301 0.337 0.329 0.0624 0.0625 0.0624 0.191 0.199 0.198 
N 5457 5457 5457 5444 5444 5444 1995 1995 1995 
122 
 
 Bank stability shows a negative relationship between bank deposit funding and time deposit 
proportion in both subgroups, high and less financially developed economies, consistent with the main 
results. Columns (1-3 and 7-9) of Table 23 show a negative impact of equity capital on deposit funding 
and retail deposit proportion. However, I do not find a statistically significant relationship between 
equity capital and retail deposit proportion in high financially developed economies. Table 24 columns 
(1-9) exhibits a negative impact of bank stability on deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions 
in less-financially developed economies. I infer that bank stability creates moral hazard in the banking 
system, consistent with the literature (Agoraki, Delis, & Pasiouras, 2011; Arping, 2019; Hellmann et al., 
2000).  
 Lastly, log of total assets has been used as a control variable in the regression model to control 
for the impact of market size of the firm. The results show a negative impact of market size on retail 
deposit proportion in highly financially developed economies, as shown in columns 4-6 of Table 23. 
The results do not show a significant relationship between bank deposit funding, time deposit proportion 
and market size in highly financially developed economies. On the other hand, Columns (7 and 9) of 
Table 24 show a positive impact of market size on bank deposit funding. However, the results are 
significant at 10 percent. Hence, I do not infer this relationship. No other dependent variables show 
significant elasticity for market size in less financially developed economies (see Table 24). The results 
of highly financially developed economies are consistent with the main results for all countries.  
 There are several macroeconomic factors that influence bank deposit funding and households’ 
saving decisions. One is consumer price inflation; I employ this as a control variable in both high and 
less financially developed economies. The results show a significant negative relationship between 
inflation and bank deposits funding in highly financially developed economies. No other dependent 
variables show a significant relationship with inflation in highly financially developed economies (see 
Table 23). On the other hand, inflation shows a negative relationship with time deposit proportion in 
less financially developed economies, as shown in Table 24. Further, I find contradictory results for 
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deposit funding in less financially developed economies. Column 1 of Table 24 shows a positive 
relationship between deposit funding and inflation. This relationship turns negative when I employ 
market concentration as a control variable (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 24). Thus, I cannot make any 
inference from this result. However, the columns (7-8) of Table 24 show a negative impact of inflation 
on time deposit proportion, which suggests that high inflation increases the households’ cost of living, 
causing decrease in savings in less-financially developed economies.  
The results show a negative relationship between income and time deposit proportion in highly 
financially developed economies. I do not find significant relationship between deposit funding, retail 
deposit proportion and countries’ income level, except for retail deposit proportion in one regression as 
shown in column 4 of Table 23. However, this relationship turns insignificant when I use market 
concentration as control variable. Hence, the relationship between retail deposit proportion and per 
capita income cannot be determined in high financially developed economies. In less financially 
developed economies, the results show negative coefficients of income variable for deposit funding (see 
columns 1-3 of Table 24). This finding is consistent with the literature (Patrick, 1966). Huang and 
Ratnovski (2011) reported that as economic activity increases, it increases the credit demand in the 
country and to fulfil this credit demand, banks generally use wholesale funding, decreasing bank deposit 
funding. This relationship turns positive for retail and time deposit proportions (see columns 4-9 of 
Table 24). This relationship implies that due to limited alternative investment instruments, households 
use deposit products such as transaction and non-transaction deposits to save surplus money as income 
grows.  
 Furthermore, like the main regression model, I employ financial freedom index as a control 
variable in the regression models for high and less financially developed economies. Columns (1-3) of 
Table 23 show a negative impact of financial freedom on bank deposit funding in high financially 
developed economies. This relationship turns positive for time deposit proportion as shown in columns 
(7-9) of Table 23. This negative relationship between financial freedom and bank deposit funding 
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implies that financial freedom increases either economic activity in the country, increases banking assets 
or increases the alternative sources of funding for banks, causing a decrease in bank deposit funding. 
Moreover, it also increases household trust in the banking system, incentivizing households to use time 
deposit products to save money for longer periods. Unlike highly financially developed economies, 
financial freedom shows a positive impact on bank deposit funding in less financially developed 
economies. Financial freedom does not show a significant impact on retail deposit proportion. I find a 
negative relationship between the financial freedom index and time deposit proportion. However, this 
relationship turns insignificant when using market concentrations as control variables (see columns 7-9 
of Table 24). Therefore, I am cautious in drawing inferences from this result. The positive relationship 
between bank deposit funding and the financial freedom index in less financially developed economies 
suggests that banks attract more deposits and other short-term borrowing, increasing bank deposit 
funding.  
 Finally, the proportion of older population has been used as a control variable in both subgroups. 
Columns (4-6) of Table 23 show a positive relationship between older population and retail deposit 
proportion in high financially developed economies. No other dependent variables show significant 
relationship with older population in high financially developed economies. On the other hand, Table 
24 presents a positive elasticity for bank deposit funding, retail and time deposit proportion with the 
older population (see columns 1-9 of Table 24). The results show a higher sensitivity for time deposit 
than the bank deposit funding and retail deposits proportion. This implies that in less financially 
developed economies, due to fewer investment opportunities, households prefer saving their money in 
time deposits in banks.  
 The other control variables such as political stability, regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness, and rule of law have been applied. The relationship among the main explanatory variables 




4.6. Robustness tests 
 I further employ interest on customer deposits to measure the impact of retail deposit interest 
rates on bank deposits funding, retail and time deposit proportions. I hypothesize that the interest cost 
on retail deposits and interest cost on total deposit will cause multicollinearity in the regression model. 
To check this hypothesis, a VIF analysis test has been conducted, but results do not show 
multicollinearity. This allows me to use both the variables in the model. However, due to limited data 
availability for interest cost of customer deposits, I drop countries whose data was not available for the 
entire period. This brings the dataset down to 40 countries.  
 The results show a consistent significant negative relationship between bank deposit funding and 
interest cost on total deposits in the all countries dataset51. Like the main results (Table 22), the retail 
and time deposit proportions exhibit a positive relationship with interest cost on deposits. Interest cost 
on retail deposits shows a negative relationship with bank deposit funding, consistent with the findings 
of interest cost on total deposits. However, I find a negative impact of interest cost of retail deposits on 
retail deposit proportion, contrary to the finding for total deposits. This suggest as interest rates on retail 
and time deposit increase, banks increase other sources of funds, that eventually decreases the proportion 
of retail and time deposits (see results in Appendix 17). I do not find a significant relationship between 
interest cost on retail deposits and time deposit proportion.  
 Both market concentrations viz. HHID3 and HHIL3 show a negative impact on deposit funding. 
Like the main results, HHIL3 exhibits higher elasticity than HHID3. The market concentrations (HHID3 
and HHIL3) do not show a significant relationship with retail and time deposit proportions, whereas in 
the main results for all countries, the results show a negative impact of market concentrations on retail 
deposit proportion. Another important variable, employee cost, shows a negative relationship with bank 
deposit funding in one regression using HHID3 as a control variable. However, the coefficient is 
 
51 All countries- The all countries dataset.  
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significant at 10 percent and no other results show a significant relationship with bank deposit funding. 
Hence, I am cautious to interpret this result. Moreover, a significant positive relationship between 
employee costs and retail deposit proportion has been found, consistent with the main results for all 
countries. The relationship between time deposit proportion and employee costs is insignificant, which 
was negative in the main findings. The other control variables financial freedom index, per capita 
income, CPI, and older population show broadly consistent results.  
 I replicate the model in two subgroups, the high (see Appendix 18) and less financially developed 
economies (see Appendix 19). The results do not show a significant relationship between bank deposit 
funding, retail deposit proportion and interest cost to total deposit in highly financially developed 
economies. However, time deposit proportion has a positive relationship with interest cost to total 
deposits, consistent with the main finding. Interest on retail deposits shows a negative relationship with 
retail deposit proportion. On the other hand, it exhibits positive impact on bank deposit funding (see 
Appendix 18). This contrary relationship suggests that as interest on retail deposits increases, banks 
increase other low-cost sources of funding, which eventually increases bank deposit funding but 
decreases the retail deposit proportion. In the main regression analysis for high financially developed 
economies, interest cost on total deposit shows a negative impact on retail deposit proportion. However, 
when I use interest cost on total and retail deposits, interest cost on total deposit becomes insignificant 
and interest cost on retail deposit shows negative elasticity. This suggests that the negative elasticity of 
interest cost on total deposit for retail deposit proportion in the main analysis is driven by interest cost 
on retail deposit proportion. Hence, it can be inferred that the interest cost on retail deposit and retail 
deposit proportion have negative relationship. On the other hand, time deposit proportion does not show 
a significant relationship with interest cost on retail deposit. 
 Market concentrations show a positive relationship with bank deposit funding in high financially 
developed economies. No other dependent variables show a significant relationship with market 
concentrations. On the other hand, in the main results for high financially developed economies, I find 
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a negative relationship between market concentration and retail deposit proportion, but not with other 
dependent variables. Furthermore, employee cost shows a positive elasticity for retail deposit 
proportion, consistent with the main results for high financially developed economies. The relationship 
between bank deposit funding, time deposit proportion, and employee cost are insignificant, which were 
negative in the main results for highly financially developed economies.  
The other control variables show broadly similar findings except for the financial freedom index. 
The financial freedom index shows a negative relationship with bank deposit funding and time deposit 
proportion. On the other hand, the main results show a positive relationship between financial freedom 
index and time deposit proportion. Due to the contradictory results, I am cautious in making any 
inference from this finding (see results in Appendix 18).  
 The less financially developed economies show a negative elasticity of interest cost on total 
deposit for bank deposit funding. Retail and time deposit proportions show a positive relationship with 
interest cost to total deposits, consistent with the main findings. However, like all countries and highly 
financially developed economies, less financially developed economies show a negative effect of 
interest on retail deposit on deposit funding and retail deposit proportion. Interestingly, interest cost to 
total deposit shows a positive relationship with retail deposit proportion, whereas interest cost to retail 
deposit shows a negative relationship, which is counter intuitive. The results suggest that an increase in 
interest rates on retail deposit incentivizes banks to increase the proportion of other deposits such as 
deposits from banks and non-retail deposits. This reduces the retail deposit proportion in the banks’ 
liabilities management. At the same time, when there is an increase in interest cost to total deposits, 
banks choose retail deposits over other deposits to increase their stability.  
  The less financially developed economies show a negative impact of market concentration on 
deposit funding. This is consistent with the main findings. Unlike the main results, the results do not 
show a significant relationship between HHID3 and time deposit proportion. Moreover, like main results 
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for less financially developed economies, I do not find a statistically significant relationship between 
market concentration and retail deposit proportion.  
 The other important variable, employee cost, exhibits a positive effect on retail deposit 
proportions in all countries, as shown in columns (4-6) of Appendix 17. The economic significance is 
substantial. Similarly, the results for highly financially developed economies are significant for retail 
deposit proportion but not for other dependent variables (see Appendix 18). On the other hand, less 
financially developed economies show positive relationship between retail, time deposit proportions and 
employee cost. Results show a one percent increase in the proportion of employee cost to total assets 
increases the proportion of retail deposit by 0.7 percent and time deposit to total deposit by 4 percent 
(see Appendix 19). I do not find a significant impact of employee cost on bank deposit funding, except 
in one regression, as shown in column 2 of Appendix 19. However, this coefficient is statistically 
significant at 10 percent, and I am cautious in making inferences from this result. The positive elasticity 
of employee cost for retail and time deposit proportion supports the argument of lacking in technological 
improvement in less financially developed economies. Thus, it requires high number of employees to 
provide services to depositors. Another reason for such a relationship is state ownership of banks in less 
financially developed economies, which discourages the reduction of employees in the banking system. 
However, I cannot delve into the relationship between bank ownership and bank deposits, which can be 
an interesting study for future research. The other control variables results are broadly consistent with 
the main results of less-financially developed economies. 
4.6.1 Additional Analysis 
I further hypothesize that higher market concentration with higher interest rates will have a 
positive impact on bank deposit funding and compositions, due to high market power and the high brand 
image. To examine this hypothesis, I have used the interaction term between HHID, HHIL, and interest 
costs. Contrary to main findings, the results show a positive relationship between interaction of market 
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concentrations (HHID and HHIL) and interest cost and bank deposit funding and time deposit 
proportions (see Appendix 20 ). However, the results for retail deposit proportions of interaction terms 
are consistent with the main findings. This contradictory findings for retail deposit proportion and bank 
deposit funding suggest that in a highly concentrated market, banks increase the other sources of funding 
such as short-term, interbank borrowings, and bank deposits to reduce the cost of funding, arises due to 
high interest rates. The other results are broadly consistent with the main findings.           
4.7. Conclusion and policy implications  
 To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first studying the impact of deposit competition 
on deposit funding and composition. I show how deposit competition and market structure affects banks’ 
behaviour in attracting deposits especially retail deposits, and time deposits. This behaviour has also 
been investigated as per financial development level of the countries. 
 The results suggest that an increase in interest cost to total deposit incentivizes banks to decrease 
their deposit funding to other sources of funding. However, this relationship varies according to deposit 
products. Retail and time deposits proportions are positively affected by the increase in interest cost to 
deposits in all countries. This relationship also varies according to countries’ financial development. In 
high financially developed economies, the increase of interest cost causes a reduction in retail deposit 
proportion. This suggests that as interest cost increases banks from highly financially developed 
economies increase funding from other sources, reducing the proportion of retail deposits. On the other 
hand, time deposit proportion shows a positive relationship with interest irrespective of countries’ 
financial development level, which is consistent with the literature.  
I further employ interest on retail deposits to measure the impact on bank deposits. The results 
show that interest on retail deposits negatively affects deposit funding and retail deposit proportion in 
all and the less financially developed economies. This suggest that as interest on retail deposits increases 
banks choose cost-effective sources of funding that causes a reduction in bank deposit funding and retail 
130 
 
deposit proportion in all and the less financially developed economies. Interestingly, in highly 
financially developed economies, on one hand, the interest cost of retail deposit shows a negative effect 
on retail deposit proportion; on the other hand, it shows a positive effect on bank deposits funding. This 
indicates that an increase in retail deposit rates encourage banks to use sources of funds other than 
customer deposits, causing a reduction in retail deposit proportion and increases in bank deposit funding.  
 Market structure shows a negative elasticity for bank deposit funding, retail, and time deposit 
proportions in all countries. Whereas, highly financially developed economies’ results show negative 
impact on retail and time deposit proportions. Similarly, less financially developed economies’ deposit 
funding and time deposit proportion are also negatively affected by market concentration. This negative 
relationship suggests moral hazard in the banking system. The higher is market concentration, the lower 
is deposit funding. Moreover, I find a negative impact of bank stability on deposit funding in all three 
datasets, suggesting a moral hazard issue.  
 There are various studies related to deposit competition, deposit pricing and bank stability 
(Arping, 2019; Schlueter, Sievers, & Hartmann-Wendels, 2015; Vazquez & Federico, 2015), banks’ 
funding cost (Allen et al., 2015; Deans & Stewart, 2012; Li, Loutskina, & Strahan, 2019; Wilkins et al., 
2016) and bank risk (Craig & Dinger, 2013), yet there is limited research on how deposit competition 
affects banks’ funding composition. This paper contributes to banking and bank deposit literature by 
studying the impact of deposit competition and market structure on deposit funding and composition, 
retail and time deposit proportions. It also contributes to the financial development literature by 
conducting this study according to countries’ financial development level.  
Does this study have any policy implications? On one hand, banking regulatory authorities focus 
on the stability of the banking system, on the other hand, competition control authorities monitor 
competition in the banking system. Despite a large literature on banking competition and stability, the 
relationship is still inconclusive. However, the findings support the argument that deposit competition 
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creates moral hazard in the banking system, by encouraging them to obtain low cost sources of funding. 
Hence, this study promotes banking regulators and competition control authorities to work in 
collaboration to make the banking system stable by monitoring market structure. It will also assist banks 
in fulfilling the Basel-III guidelines related to Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR), which will make the banking system more robust.  
Five clear suggestions come forward from this study: (i) while using interest rates as a tool to 
attract deposits, banks should be careful about their overall funding composition. (ii) this study suggests 
that in addition to NSFR, banking regulatory authority should make guidelines related to bank deposit 
funding and competition. (iii) Regulatory authorities should monitor market concentration in the 
banking system, as failing to do so creates a moral hazard issue in the banking system (iv) In less 
financially developed economies, banks can opt for technological advances, which will decrease banks’ 
costs and improve profitability. (v) Regulatory authorities generally recommend increasing the equity 
capital for the stability of the banking. However, it should be used cautiously, since it encourages banks 
to opt for low cost funding strategies, which makes the banking system fragile.  
Certainly, more research is needed in this area. A study that assesses the impact of different 
interest rates on deposit products will give better insight about the deposit funding and composition for 
the banks. The effect of deposit competition on bank deposit composition also varies according to the 
types of banks such as global and domestic banks, which can be an interesting study. Another important 
study can be identifying the relationship between bank deposit funding, composition and banking 




In this thesis, three key questions have been investigated regarding the determinants of bank 
deposits, bank deposits funding and composition, retail and time deposit proportions in a cross-
country set up. The first essay examines the role of human capital development on the usage of 
banking system in terms of bank deposits. The second essay aims to understand the role of financial 
markets development on bank deposits funding and composition. The third study focuses on the 
effects of deposit competition on bank deposits funding and composition. All three studies have 
been conducted in various settings such as in high and less financially developed economies and 
in high and lower and upper middle-income countries. Since, all three studies have been 
investigated in cross-country set up, several macroeconomic variables have been employed as 
control variables.  
The studies are related to economic development literature including financial markets, 
human capital development, and economic growth. The financial inclusion52 literature suggests 
that income, education, and accessibility to financial institutions among others are key 
determinants that encourage households to use the formal financial system (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Klapper, 2013). Income, education, and health are interrelated. For example, a high income allows 
households to have nutritious food and access to the healthcare system. Similarly, once a country’s 
income grows, government can spend on development of the healthcare and the education systems. 
The better health facilities and education system contribute to economic growth, hence, these three 
factors create a virtuous circle and encourage households to use the formal financial system. Banks 
 




being a first point of contact, households first open their bank account and start savings for various 
reasons such as retirement, bequest, and home. Thus, in the first essay, the role of healthcare 
system and education on bank deposits has been investigated. The results show that the 
government expenditure on healthcare system increases countries’ bank deposits. However, the 
impact of healthcare system is greater in highly financially included countries than the less 
financially included. Moreover, findings suggest that the impact of the healthcare system on bank 
deposits will be more in high income countries and the countries with good governance. I find a 
positive impact of education on bank deposits in high income, bank driven, and highly financially 
included economies. This confirms the argument that to get the higher impact of education on bank 
deposits, better governance, income, and access to the financial system are needed.  
Once the importance of human capital development for the growth of bank deposits has been 
established, one can investigate the impact of development of financial institutions on bank 
deposits. In this direction, the second essay focuses on the role of financial markets on bank 
deposits funding and composition. The general intuition is that development of the financial 
markets competes with the banking system. Hence, a negative relationship between financial 
market and bank deposits is expected.  
Contrarily, the financial system architecture literature suggests that financial markets and the 
banking system compete in emerging and fragmented markets, whereas they complement each 
other in integrated markets (Song & Thakor, 2010), although that study was based on a bank 
lending view. In contrast, this essay assesses the impact of financial market development on the 
banking system from banks’ funding perspective. The results show a negative relationship between 
financial markets and bank deposits in all countries and less financially developed economies. On 
the contrary, in highly financially developed economies, I find a positive relationship between 
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financial market development and bank deposits. Hence, I infer that banks and financial markets 
compete in general. However, this relationship varies with countries’ financial development level. 
In highly financially developed and integrated economies, they complement each other, consistent 
with the arguments of Boot and Thakor (1997).  
Financial development in a country further creates competition within its banking system. 
This competition affects the market power of banks in attracting deposits, which eventually 
determines bank deposit funding and composition. Hence, the third essay focuses on the impact of 
deposit competition on bank deposits funding and composition. This essay follows the Craig and 
Dinger (2013) approach to measure deposit competition, using deposit rates offered by banks to 
assess competition within the banking system. However, the data related to offered deposit rates 
are not available across countries. Therefore, interest expense relative to interest-bearing liabilities 
has been used as a proxy for deposit competition. I further employ interest cost of total retail 
deposits as a proxy for the interest rates offered to households for deposits.  
The findings suggest a negative relationship between bank deposit funding and deposit 
competition. On the contrary, deposit competition helps attracting retail deposits and customers’ 
time deposits in less financially developed economies. In highly financially developed economies, 
as interest cost increases, banks use other cheaper sources of funds such as deposits and borrowing 
from other banks to meet their loan demand, causing a decrease in retail deposit proportion. This 
negative relationship between bank deposit funding, composition and deposit competition in 
highly financially developed economies is due to the country’s financial development. This allows 
banks to access other sources of funds and assist in decreasing interest costs. I further examine the 
effect of market concentration on bank deposit funding and composition. The results show a 
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negative impact of concentration on bank deposit funding and retail deposit proportion, suggesting 
a moral hazard issue. 
5.1. Contributions of the thesis 
The thesis has many contributions to the literature on bank deposits, liquidity management, 
and bank stability. There are very few studies that have used total deposits, deposit funding, and 
composition as dependent variables. Deposit funding and composition have been used as an 
explanatory variable in the bank stability and risk management literature (Khan et al., 2017; 
Vazquez & Federico, 2015). Moreover, Schlueter et al. (2015) have examined the impact of non-
maturing deposits (transaction accounts) on asset-liability management (ALM) and deposit 
pricing. They argued that transaction accounts pose a major problem to the banks’ ALM because 
of their stochastic cash flow pattern. Further, deposit funding has been used as an explanatory 
variable for determining the cost (Tortosa-Ausina, 2002), profit (Akhavein et al., 1997; Maudos et 
al., 2002) and technical efficiency of banks (Fujii, Managi, & Matousek, 2014; Miller & Noulas, 
1996). Although bank deposit funding and composition have been used as important explanatory 
variables in banking literature, the literature is by and large silent on identifying the factors that 
determines bank deposit funding and composition.  
To the best of my knowledge, the early research on bank deposit composition goes back to 
the paper of Carson (1959). He examined the relationship between bank size, deposit composition 
and bank earnings. Later, Bond (1971) investigated the effects of bank earnings on bank deposit 
composition in the United States banking market. There are a few studies focusing on bank deposit 
variability, which dates back to 1960-70 (Dewald & Dreese, 1970; Kane & Malkiel, 1965; 
Kaufman, 1972; Meyer, Nazma, & Cuevas, 1990; Rangarajan, 1966), but, this research was 
conducted in different economic environment, with changes since then.  
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The aftermath of GFC 2007-09 and implementation of Basel-III guidelines have highlighted 
the importance of bank deposits in the banking system (Khan et al., 2017), which has renewed 
academicians’ interest in bank deposits. Recently, Streit et al. (2016) studied deposit volatility with 
respect to bank size, deposit composition, and types of customers among others, in the German 
banking system. In a theoretical paper, Arping (2019) has shown how capital regulation affects 
bank deposits. He showed that as banks’ equity capital increases, they reduce their deposit bases 
and eventually decrease the cost of funding. In more recent research, economists have shown the 
importance of bank deposits for stability and increasing the lending capacity of banks (Hakenes & 
Schliephake, 2019; Li et al., 2019). However, most studies are country specific. There are very 
limited cross-country studies on the bank deposit funding and composition. The thesis aims to fill 
this gap by conducting a panel study including several countries53. It not only examines the 
determinants of bank deposits in developed economies, but also provides an insight into 
developing economies’ banking systems.  
Apart from its academic contribution, the thesis postulates many policy implications, such 
as that governments and regulators should focus on improving countries’ healthcare and education 
systems as these factors not only improve human capital, but also increase bank deposits. 
Moreover, the study suggests integration of financial markets and the banking system because both 
systems complement each other and hence co-evolve. Generally, regulators encourage competition 
within the banking system. However, high deposit competition encourages banks to obtain low 
cost fund such as interbank borrowing, bank deposits, and short-term borrowing, causing reduction 
in retail deposit proportion. Moreover, deposit rates are among the major factors attracting time 
deposits in less-financially developed economies. On the other hand, the increase in deposit cost 
 
53 First essay consists 70 countries, whereas second and third essay consist 88 and 75 countries respectively.  
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inspires banks to increase the proportion of low-cost funding, which makes the banking system 
less stable. Hence, regulators and banks should use interest rates cautiously. Moreover, academics 
and regulators generally recommend increasing equity capital to improve bank stability. However, 
the results show a negative relationship between bank deposits and equity capital suggesting a 
moral hazard issue.  
5.2. Limitations and recommendations for future research 
Every study has some limitations and this thesis is not an exception. In the first essay, I 
identify the relationship between human capital development and bank deposits in a panel study 
of 70 countries. I drop a few countries from the analysis, due to limited data availability. The data 
of primary and secondary enrolment for the selected countries is not available for the entire 
analysis period, therefore, an education index has been employed as a main variable to measure 
the education level. Moreover, I also believe that studying the impact of human capital 
development on different deposit products will give better insight. Similarly, in the second and 
third essays, deposit funding, retail, and time deposit proportions have been used as dependent 
variables. However, studying the impact of financial markets development and deposit competition 
on deposit products such as checking, savings, and time deposits can give better insights. In the 
second and third essays, I have included data for commercial banks only and dropped others such 
as cooperative, regional, and Islamic banks. In some countries, these institutions play a major role 
in the financial system.  
In second essay, financial markets indices and the sub-indices have been employed as 
explanatory variables. These indices have regard to both stock and debt asset classes across 
domestic and international markets. Hence, it is difficult to find the impact of stock and debt market 
separately. A future study on these lines would not be a bad idea. In the third essay, due to limited 
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data availability of deposit interest rates according to deposit products, the interest cost of average 
interest-bearing liabilities has been used as an explanatory variable for deposit competition.  
In a cross-country banking study, it is common to have an endogeneity issue and finding a 
suitable instrument is the one of the biggest challenges. This problem has been addressed by using 
the lagged level of endogenous variables as instrument variables. However, the lagged levels of 
endogenous variables are considered weak instruments.   
5.3. Summary 
This thesis has explored the determinants of bank deposits. In this regard, I examine the 
impact of human capital, financial market development, and deposit competition on bank deposits. 
The first two essays are country-based studies: (i) exploring the relationship between human 
capital development and bank deposits, and (ii) relationship between financial market development 
and bank deposits, whereas the third essay “Effects of deposit competition on bank deposits” is a 
bank level study in a cross-country set up. The thesis provides insights into how these factors 
influence bank deposits in developed (financially and/or economically) and developing 
(financially and/or economically) countries.  
The results show that the development of healthcare system improve bank deposits in both 
developed and developing economies. To derive the benefits of education, a basic financial system 
structure is needed. A positive impact of education on bank deposits in highly financially 
developed economies has been found. However, it has been observed that this is not the case for 
less financially developed economies. The second essay results show that in less financially 
developed economies, the banking system and financial markets are fragmented, hence, they 
compete. On the other hand, in high financially developed economies, both complement each other 
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and coevolve. Moreover, the results show that high deposit competition encourages banks to obtain 
low-cost funds, causing reduction in deposit funding. However, in less financially developed 
economies, the increase in interest rates cause surge in the proportion of retail and time deposits. 
On the contrary, in highly financially developed economies, an increase in interest costs cause a 
decline in the retail deposit proportion.  
The thesis proposes some policy implications such as a focus on human capital development 
and financial market integration to increase the bank deposits in the banking system. Since the 
banking and financial systems of countries are different from each other in many ways, regulators 
and banks should consider the differences among financial structure and economic environment 
of the countries before making rules and regulations. At last, the thesis highlights the limitation of 
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  List of countries 






East Asia & Pacific 3 4 2 9 
Europe & Central Asia 25 2 3 30 





Middle East & North 
Africa 
6 2 1 9 










3 3 6 
Grand Total 40 15 15 70 
 
Countries Name Period covered 
Argentina 2005 2015 
Australia 2005 2015 
Austria 2005 2015 
Bangladesh 2005 2015 
Belgium 2005 2015 
Brazil 2005 2015 
Bulgaria 2005 2013 
Canada 2005 2015 
Chile 2005 2015 
Colombia 2005 2015 
Croatia 2005 2015 
Cyprus 2005 2015 
Czech Republic 2005 2015 
Denmark 2005 2012 
Ecuador 2005 2012 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2005 2015 
Estonia 2005 2012 
Finland 2005 2012 
France 2005 2015 
Georgia 2005 2012 
Germany 2005 2015 
Ghana 2005 2013 
Greece 2005 2015 
Hungary 2005 2015 
Iceland 2005 2012 
India 2005 2015 
Indonesia 2005 2015 
Ireland 2005 2015 
Israel 2005 2015 
Italy 2005 2015 
Jamaica 2005 2015 
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Countries Name Period covered 
Japan 2005 2015 
Jordan 2005 2015 
Kenya 2005 2015 
Kuwait 2005 2013 
Latvia 2005 2012 
Malaysia 2005 2015 
Mauritius 2005 2015 
Mexico 2005 2015 
Mongolia 2005 2012 
Morocco 2005 2015 
Namibia 2005 2015 
Netherlands 2005 2015 
Nigeria 2005 2015 
Norway 2005 2015 
Oman 2005 2015 
Pakistan 2005 2015 
Panama 2005 2015 
Peru 2005 2015 
Philippines 2005 2015 
Poland 2005 2015 
Portugal 2005 2015 
Qatar 2005 2015 
Romania 2005 2015 
Russian Federation 2005 2015 
Saudi Arabia 2005 2015 
Singapore 2005 2015 
Slovenia 2005 2015 
South Africa 2005 2015 
Spain 2005 2015 
Sri Lanka 2005 2015 
Sweden 2005 2012 
Switzerland 2005 2015 
Thailand 2005 2015 
Trinidad and Tobago 2005 2012 
Ukraine 2005 2015 
United Arab Emirates 2008 2015 
United Kingdom 2005 2014 
United States 2005 2015 




 Human capital development: bank deposits (panel fixed effects method) 
The table presents the results for 70 countries for the period of 2005-2015 using panel fixed effect method. Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, whereas 
columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit value of the country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, education index, and economic freedom 
index. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. The robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC 0.248***    0.274***    
 (0.0769)    (0.0792)    
PPCCGDP (%)  0.195**    0.397***   
  (0.0820)    (0.103)   
GE   0.0586    0.0985**  
   (0.0553)    (0.0412)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.452***    0.525*** 
    (0.0959)    (0.0976) 
Education index 0.412 0.386 0.651 0.209 0.973 0.528 1.249 0.712 
 (0.627) (0.636) (0.641) (0.601) (0.698) (0.659) (0.754) (0.690) 
OOPSUSD 0.116 0.131* 0.0897 0.0854 0.00921 0.0697 -0.0150 -0.0240 
 (0.0803) (0.0685) (0.0806) (0.0822) (0.137) (0.0978) (0.134) (0.135) 
Inflation 0.00100 0.00128 0.000961 0.00160 -0.000961 -0.000116 -0.00101 -0.000249 
 (0.00291) (0.00263) (0.00287) (0.00292) (0.00433) (0.00366) (0.00425) (0.00416) 
Bank Z -0.0129** -0.0118** -0.0118** -0.0106** -0.0179*** -0.0163*** -0.0169** -0.0153** 
 (0.00490) (0.00482) (0.00515) (0.00469) (0.00672) (0.00582) (0.00696) (0.00634) 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
0.0184*** 0.0176*** 0.0175*** 0.0190*** 0.0210*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0218*** 
 (0.00609) (0.00606) (0.00624) (0.00571) (0.00662) (0.00647) (0.00689) (0.00629) 
Income -0.221 -0.429** -0.270 -0.163 0.836*** 0.415** 0.751*** 0.904*** 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.162) (0.164) (0.204) (0.168) (0.208) (0.202) 
Stock traded GDP 0.00174 0.00230 0.00178 0.00350 -0.0000614 0.00126 -0.000539 0.00200 
 (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0148) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0146) (0.0137) 
Constant 4.004*** 4.502*** 4.433*** 2.405 15.53*** 16.32*** 16.08*** 13.66*** 
 (1.390) (1.368) (1.346) (1.477) (1.538) (1.412) (1.535) (1.652) 
F 10.80 10.63 8.696 9.872 29.37 30.19 26.19 32.57 
r2 0.437 0.432 0.412 0.455 0.700 0.725 0.691 0.713 
N 710 710 703 710 710 710 703 710 
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 Human capital development: bank deposits (first difference method) 
The table presents the results for 70 countries for the period of 2005-2015 using first difference method. Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, whereas columns (5-8) show 
the results for total deposit value of the country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, education index, and economic freedom index. In all regression equations, 
I employ firm fixed and year effects. The robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   









D.LDeposit D.LDeposit D.LDeposit D.LDeposit 
D.PPCC 0.298***    0.304***    
 (0.0443)    (0.0455)    
D.PPCCGDP (%)  0.287***    0.325***   
  (0.0466)    (0.0505)   
D.GE   0.120**    0.129***  
   (0.0508)    (0.0483)  
D.GGEGDP (%)    0.308***    0.318*** 
    (0.0762)    (0.0788) 
D.Education index 0.302 0.302 0.195 0.331 0.320 0.314 0.202 0.360 
 (0.476) (0.486) (0.560) (0.597) (0.485) (0.485) (0.569) (0.602) 
D.OOPSUSD 0.0375 0.0411 0.0292 0.0324 0.0254 0.0303 0.0163 0.0199 
 (0.0381) (0.0390) (0.0383) (0.0339) (0.0368) (0.0371) (0.0368) (0.0336) 
D.Inflation 0.00259*** 0.00261*** 0.00217** 0.00272*** 0.00231** 0.00242** 0.00188* 0.00246** 
 (0.000945) (0.000922) (0.000981) (0.000970) (0.000988) (0.000947) (0.00103) (0.00102) 
D.Bank Z -0.00258 -0.00242 -0.00167 -0.00148 -0.00289 -0.00295* -0.00195 -0.00189 
 (0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00185) (0.00185) (0.00181) (0.00178) (0.00195) (0.00193) 
D.Economic 
Freedom Index 
0.00984*** 0.00972*** 0.00935*** 0.00863*** 0.0100*** 0.0101*** 0.00951*** 0.00883*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00290) (0.00296) (0.00260) (0.00283) (0.00286) (0.00293) (0.00261) 
D.Income -0.151 -0.424*** -0.316** -0.179 0.780*** 0.491*** 0.605*** 0.753*** 
 (0.148) (0.150) (0.143) (0.135) (0.148) (0.150) (0.146) (0.132) 
D.Stock traded GDP 0.00335 0.00354 0.00381 0.00331 0.00339 0.00344 0.00384 0.00327 
 (0.00606) (0.00609) (0.00644) (0.00639) (0.00600) (0.00598) (0.00635) (0.00633) 
Constant 0.0311** 0.0269* 0.0338** 0.0350** 0.0477*** 0.0420*** 0.0502*** 0.0515*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0141) 




 Human capital development: bank deposits (bank-based economies-2SLS) 
The table presents the results for 43 countries representative of bank-based economies using 2SLS method for the period of 2005-2015. Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP ratio, 
whereas columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit value of the country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, education index, and economic freedom 
index. I use bank stability, education index, per capital health expenditure as endogenous variables and the instrument variable for the same are lag-level variable of respective variables. In all 
regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. The robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC 0.210***    0.295***    
 (0.0648)    (0.0635)    
PPCCGDP (%)  0.266***    0.287***   
  (0.0696)    (0.0674)   
GE   0.0426*    0.0609***  
   (0.0224)    (0.0214)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.254***    0.333*** 
    (0.0966)    (0.0911) 
Education index 1.600** 1.656** 1.842** 1.515* 1.940** 2.074*** 2.325*** 1.851** 
 (0.802) (0.787) (0.856) (0.806) (0.788) (0.790) (0.873) (0.794) 
Bank Z -0.0221*** -0.0211*** -0.0220*** -0.0186*** -0.0193*** -0.0182** -0.0192** -0.0146** 
 (0.00740) (0.00740) (0.00763) (0.00696) (0.00744) (0.00745) (0.00766) (0.00684) 
OOPSUSD 0.258*** 0.263*** 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.268*** 0.271*** 0.256*** 0.254*** 
 (0.0852) (0.0845) (0.0880) (0.0863) (0.0824) (0.0830) (0.0855) (0.0840) 
Stock traded GDP 0.0211 0.0218 0.0145 0.0123 0.0205 0.0184 0.0101 0.00820 
 (0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0165) 
Inflation -0.00162 -0.00163 -0.00111 -0.000992 -0.00122 -0.00100 -0.000338 -0.000331 
 (0.00218) (0.00217) (0.00229) (0.00222) (0.00217) (0.00220) (0.00233) (0.00227) 
Income -0.791*** -0.561*** -0.608*** -0.541*** 0.224 0.550*** 0.491*** 0.575*** 
 (0.174) (0.160) (0.170) (0.162) (0.169) (0.159) (0.167) (0.159) 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
0.0239*** 0.0234*** 0.0223*** 0.0241*** 0.0210*** 0.0198*** 0.0189*** 0.0210*** 
 (0.00339) (0.00330) (0.00354) (0.00332) (0.00326) (0.00323) (0.00344) (0.00320) 
F 12.41 12.14 10.35 12.71 33.45 32.95 34.58 39.73 
r2 0.410 0.421 0.381 0.430 0.707 0.704 0.690 0.714 
N 385 385 380 385 385 385 380 385 
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 Human capital development: bank deposits (market-based economies-2SLS) 
The table presents the results for 27 countries representative of market-based economies using 2SLS method for the period of 2005-2015. Columns (1-4) present the results for deposit to GDP 
ratio, whereas columns (5-8) show the results for total deposit value of the country. All the variables are in natural log form except bank stability, inflation, education index, and economic freedom 
index. I use bank stability, education index, per capital health expenditure as endogenous variables and the instrument variable for the same are lag-level variable of respective variables. In all 
regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. The robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The sign ***, **, and * present the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit to GDP Deposit Deposit Deposit Deposit 
PPCC 0.417***    0.562***    
 (0.0795)    (0.0843)    
PPCCGDP (%)  0.377***    0.384***   
  (0.0890)    (0.0972)   
GE   0.224***    0.245***  
   (0.0796)    (0.0857)  
GGEGDP (%)    0.727***    0.809*** 
    (0.123)    (0.135) 
Education index -0.229 0.435 0.716 0.0885 0.541 1.758** 1.990*** 1.280 
 (0.699) (0.666) (0.684) (0.713) (0.736) (0.734) (0.758) (0.783) 
Bank Z -0.0194 -0.0210 -0.0185 -0.0126 -0.0245 -0.0259 -0.0233 -0.0168 
 (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0129) (0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0177) 
OOPSUSD 0.388*** 0.259** 0.262** 0.127 0.176 -0.0230 -0.0143 -0.163 
 (0.119) (0.125) (0.129) (0.108) (0.133) (0.154) (0.161) (0.134) 
Stock traded GDP 0.0459 0.0367 0.0485 0.0557 0.00822 0.00752 0.0177 0.0253 
 (0.0430) (0.0425) (0.0447) (0.0410) (0.0422) (0.0446) (0.0467) (0.0411) 
Inflation 0.00319 0.00117 0.00117 0.00104 -0.00111 -0.00413 -0.00406 -0.00419 
 (0.00311) (0.00335) (0.00339) (0.00291) (0.00373) (0.00440) (0.00447) (0.00386) 
Income -0.960*** -0.535** -0.756*** -0.231 -0.0784 0.477* 0.238 0.821*** 
 (0.253) (0.238) (0.265) (0.236) (0.248) (0.261) (0.300) (0.260) 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
0.0168** 0.0198*** 0.0186*** 0.0126** 0.0257*** 0.0281*** 0.0272*** 0.0206*** 
 (0.00671) (0.00684) (0.00698) (0.00573) (0.00691) (0.00715) (0.00729) (0.00613) 
F 9.869 10.02 8.020 12.73 39.07 36.33 32.01 41.90 
r2 0.351 0.362 0.328 0.449 0.705 0.676 0.666 0.724 
N 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 
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 Correlation matrix of full dataset 
 
DGDP Deposit Inflation STK PPCC GEGDP GE PPCCGDP OOPUSD EFI Income EI Bank 
Z 
PS GEFF Voice ROL COC 
DGDP 1.00 
                 
Deposit 0.53 1.00 
                
Inflation -0.45 -0.37 1.00 
               
STK 0.51 0.74 -0.29 1.00 
              
PPCC 0.39 0.94 -0.36 0.65 1.00 
             
GEGDP 0.49 0.32 -0.35 0.20 0.44 1.00 
            
GE 0.61 0.46 -0.38 0.47 0.49 0.61 
 
1.00 
          
PPCCGDP 0.52 0.41 -0.41 0.28 0.60 0.81 0.67 1.00 
          
OOPUSD 0.61 0.54 -0.47 0.43 0.58 0.62 0.79 0.68 1.00 
         
EFI 0.55 0.31 -0.40 0.42 0.29 0.24 0.61 0.45 0.66 1.00 
        
Income 0.60 0.54 -0.50 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.87 0.69 0.89 0.71 1.00 
       
EI 0.50 0.42 -0.40 0.31 0.52 0.67 0.68 0.78 0.80 0.61 0.80 1.00 
      
Bank Z 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.12 -0.04 -0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.04 0.15 0.05 -
0.16 
1.00 
     
PS 0.55 0.21 -0.37 0.24 0.27 0.58 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.61 0.75 0.67 -0.03 1.00 
    
GEFF 0.72 0.50 -0.50 0.54 0.49 0.50 0.73 0.64 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.76 0.00 0.75 1.00 
   
Voice 0.48 0.36 -0.33 0.22 0.44 0.54 0.50 0.68 0.68 0.55 0.59 0.68 -0.21 0.59 0.71 1.00 
  
ROL 0.73 0.50 -0.48 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.73 0.66 0.79 0.81 0.84 0.75 0.00 0.78 0.96 0.72 1.00 
 
COC 0.68 0.47 -0.46 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.75 0.65 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.73 0.01 0.77 0.96 0.70 0.96 1.00 
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 List of countries 
Country Name Income Classification Region Financially 
Develop 
Economies 
Australia High income Asia High 
Hong Kong High income Asia High 
Japan High income Asia High 
New Zealand High income Asia High 
Singapore High income Asia High 
Austria High income Asia High 
Belgium High income Asia High 
Croatia High income Asia High 
Cyprus High income Asia High 
Czech Republic High income Asia High 
Denmark High income Asia High 
Estonia High income Asia High 
Finland High income Asia High 
France High income Asia High 
Germany High income Asia High 
Greece High income Asia High 
Hungary High income Asia High 
Ireland High income Asia High 
Italy High income Asia High 
Luxembourg High income Asia High 
Netherlands High income Asia High 
Norway High income Asia High 
Poland High income Asia High 
Portugal High income Asia High 
Slovakia High income Asia High 
Slovenia High income Asia High 
Spain High income Asia High 
Sweden High income Asia High 
Switzerland High income Asia High 
United Kingdom High income Asia High 
Latvia High income Asia Low 
Lithuania High income Asia Low 
United States High income America High 
Uruguay High income America Low 
Bahrain High income Africa High 
Israel High income Africa High 
Malta High income Africa High 
Kuwait High income Africa Low 
Oman High income Africa Low 
Qatar High income Africa Low 
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Country Name Income Classification Region Financially 
Develop 
Economies 
Saudi Arabia High income Africa Low 
United Arab Emirates High income Africa Low 
China Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia High 
India Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia High 
Thailand Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia High 
Indonesia Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Philippines Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Armenia Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Azerbaijan Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Belarus Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Bosnia And Herzegovina Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Bulgaria Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Kazakhstan Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Republic Of Moldova Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Romania Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Russian Federation Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Serbia Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Turkey Lower and Upper Middle Income Asia Low 
Bolivia Lower and Upper Middle Income America High 
El Salvador Lower and Upper Middle Income America High 
Ecuador Lower and Upper Middle Income America Low 
Guatemala Lower and Upper Middle Income America Low 
Guyana Lower and Upper Middle Income America Low 
Mexico Lower and Upper Middle Income America Low 
Peru Lower and Upper Middle Income America Low 
Venezuela Lower and Upper Middle Income America Low 
Jordan Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa High 
Lebanon Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa High 
Algeria Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Egypt Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Tunisia Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Botswana Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa High 
Mauritius Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa High 
Namibia Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa High 
South Africa Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa High 
Angola Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Cameroon Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Cote D'Ivoire Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Ethiopia Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Kenya Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Madagascar Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
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Country Name Income Classification Region Financially 
Develop 
Economies 
Malawi Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Mali Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Niger Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Senegal Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Swaziland Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Uganda Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
Zambia Lower and Upper Middle Income Africa Low 
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 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition for all countries (panel fixed effects method) 
The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors are in parentheses using panel fixed effect methods. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-12) show 
the results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year effects. The deposit funding 
and retail deposit proportion report the results for 88 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 87 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 

































Interest Cost 0.0587 0.0607 0.0602 0.0607 0.518 0.511 0.522 0.520 0.648** 0.653** 0.645** 0.647** 
 (0.0676) (0.0677) (0.0679) (0.0692) (0.606) (0.599) (0.608) (0.610) (0.261) (0.257) (0.262) (0.263) 
Equity 
Capital 
-0.602*** -0.586*** -0.601*** -0.584*** 0.0665 0.0455 0.0976 0.0888 -0.0525 -0.0282 -0.0808 -0.0643 
 (0.155) (0.160) (0.156) (0.155) (0.273) (0.271) (0.272) (0.275) (0.533) (0.538) (0.530) (0.526) 
FMI -6.715*    -9.014    4.741    
 (3.468)    (10.46)    (14.30)    
FMD  -0.836    -15.58*    11.75   
  (3.866)    (8.703)    (13.54)   
FME   -3.496*    1.479    -2.908  
   (1.902)    (3.973)    (6.619)  
FMA    -2.846    -7.325    7.468 
    (7.453)    (13.22)    (11.57) 
Inflation -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.269 -0.266 -0.273 -0.267 -0.202 -0.203 -0.199 -0.206 
 (0.0413) (0.0412) (0.0405) (0.0393) (0.187) (0.180) (0.187) (0.189) (0.304) (0.312) (0.304) (0.306) 
GDP Growth -0.0136 -0.0244 -0.0220 -0.0231 -0.547** -0.519** -0.566** -0.555** -1.101*** -1.128*** -1.085*** -1.099*** 




-0.151 -0.145 -0.146 -0.143 0.0843 0.0546 0.0976 0.0948 0.286 0.309 0.281 0.284 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.267) (0.262) (0.267) (0.266) (0.383) (0.380) (0.382) (0.385) 
Constant 95.66*** 93.20*** 94.28*** 93.72*** 81.77*** 86.08*** 77.14*** 80.24*** 39.25 35.25 42.36 38.71 
 (8.201) (7.840) (7.999) (9.588) (18.61) (17.93) (18.49) (18.76) (26.68) (26.35) (26.18) (26.46) 
F 4.797 4.170 5.370 4.153 1.715 1.669 1.695 1.631 8.567 8.584 8.388 7.987 
r2 0.227 0.219 0.230 0.220 0.0946 0.101 0.0930 0.0941 0.230 0.233 0.231 0.231 




 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition (crisis effect for all countries- 2SLS) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-
12) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and crisis 
effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test 
confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit 
proportion report the results for 88 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 86 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level respectively. 

































Interest cost 0.0108 -0.00494 0.0181 0.00516 0.767* 0.729* 0.762* 0.761* 1.591*** 1.679*** 1.575*** 1.628*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0535) (0.0516) (0.0549) (0.421) (0.409) (0.419) (0.418) (0.387) (0.409) (0.386) (0.407) 
Equity Capital -0.746*** -0.734*** -0.744*** -0.718*** 0.229 0.185 0.238 0.244 -0.0773 -0.0843 -0.0972 -0.191 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115) (0.251) (0.244) (0.252) (0.247) (0.410) (0.413) (0.401) (0.411) 
Crisis -1.235** -1.664*** -1.223** -1.647*** -2.263** -2.000** -2.480** -2.543*** 0.579 2.160** 0.733 2.440** 
 (0.495) (0.489) (0.539) (0.459) (0.978) (0.933) (1.072) (0.980) (1.010) (0.983) (1.065) (1.021) 
FMI -9.437***    -5.975    41.91***    
 (3.147)    (6.515)    (8.012)    
FMD  -2.213    -21.56***    26.42***   
  (3.166)    (6.702)    (8.448)   
FME   -3.930***    -0.716    14.92***  
   (1.463)    (3.300)    (3.966)  
FMA    -7.654    -2.843    22.91*** 
    (4.833)    (8.998)    (8.297) 
Inflation -0.150*** -0.162*** -0.152*** -0.155*** -0.243** -0.239** -0.249** -0.248** -0.0683 -0.0168 -0.0565 -0.0352 
 (0.0330) (0.0340) (0.0345) (0.0335) (0.110) (0.104) (0.112) (0.112) (0.178) (0.179) (0.178) (0.179) 
GDP Growth -0.0846 -0.107* -0.0985* -0.0996* -0.232 -0.177 -0.248* -0.246* -0.527*** -0.482*** -0.458*** -0.430*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0563) (0.0541) (0.0541) (0.142) (0.139) (0.138) (0.139) (0.137) (0.141) (0.132) (0.133) 
EFI -0.140* -0.119 -0.127 -0.113 0.167 0.0814 0.184 0.185 0.190 0.171 0.119 0.0724 
 (0.0802) (0.0768) (0.0794) (0.0796) (0.193) (0.193) (0.194) (0.193) (0.224) (0.221) (0.224) (0.224) 
F 13.52 11.82 14.20 11.82 1.935 2.743 1.914 1.917 14.02 9.992 10.92 9.086 
r2 0.180 0.162 0.181 0.165 0.0486 0.0592 0.0467 0.0475 0.0953 0.0858 0.0899 0.0841 
N 689 689 689 689 681 681 681 681 680 680 680 680 
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 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition (crisis effect for high financially developed countries- 2SLS) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-
12) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and crisis 
effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test 
confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding, retail and time 
deposit proportions report the results for 45 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 

































Interest Cost -0.122 -0.132 -0.103 -0.149 -1.293*** -1.260*** -1.295*** -1.272*** 2.370*** 2.476*** 2.322** 2.646*** 
 (0.138) (0.144) (0.136) (0.141) (0.464) (0.454) (0.443) (0.455) (0.864) (0.958) (0.932) (0.969) 
Equity 
Capital 
-0.990*** -0.959*** -0.974*** -0.976*** 0.271 0.325 0.217 0.205 0.323 0.261 0.134 0.217 
 (0.172) (0.182) (0.173) (0.165) (0.291) (0.292) (0.286) (0.285) (0.580) (0.564) (0.573) (0.560) 
FMI -5.071    12.16    45.95***    
 (4.097)    (8.062)    (13.36)    
FMD  0.785    18.41**    27.75**   
  (5.185)    (8.611)    (12.08)   
FME   -2.187    1.981    10.46*  
   (1.670)    (3.897)    (5.344)  
FMA    -2.986    -0.541    31.48*** 
    (4.978)    (7.524)    (10.37) 
Inflation -0.491** -0.528*** -0.502** -0.504*** 0.266 0.286 0.327 0.352 0.109 0.324 0.309 0.194 
 (0.202) (0.200) (0.201) (0.187) (0.418) (0.410) (0.409) (0.427) (0.479) (0.492) (0.489) (0.512) 
GDP Growth -0.310*** -0.341*** -0.324*** -0.322*** 0.104 0.0802 0.156 0.171 -1.188*** -1.079*** -1.008*** -1.108*** 
 (0.0811) (0.0800) (0.0787) (0.0800) (0.160) (0.168) (0.161) (0.158) (0.225) (0.229) (0.222) (0.233) 
EFI -0.345** -0.316** -0.344** -0.311** 0.546* 0.615** 0.510* 0.491* -0.568* -0.593* -0.672** -0.890*** 
 (0.159) (0.148) (0.155) (0.146) (0.299) (0.305) (0.303) (0.284) (0.303) (0.310) (0.303) (0.299) 
Crisis -1.611*** -1.880*** -1.556*** -1.852*** -0.688 -0.346 -0.353 -0.0674 0.288 2.206 1.128 2.443* 
 (0.473) (0.434) (0.488) (0.393) (1.020) (0.921) (1.080) (0.919) (1.391) (1.349) (1.452) (1.404) 
F 19.63 19.65 19.76 19.14 2.075 2.540 2.016 2.067 10.72 9.490 9.166 9.078 
r2 0.284 0.274 0.285 0.274 -0.00425 0.00188 -0.00302 -0.00463 0.167 0.157 0.163 0.174 
N 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 
169 
 
 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition (crisis effect for less financially developed countries- 2SLS) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns 
(5-12) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportions as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country 
fixed and crisis effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable. The 
Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit 
funding and retail deposit proportion report the results for 43 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 41 countries. The ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 




































Interest Cost 0.0782* 0.0535 0.0893* 0.0873* 0.984* 0.909* 0.999* 1.000* 1.589*** 1.643*** 1.557*** 1.578*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0400) (0.0477) (0.0507) (0.528) (0.497) (0.534) (0.542) (0.418) (0.429) (0.412) (0.421) 
Equity Capital -0.540*** -0.554*** -0.569*** -0.431*** 0.350 0.310 0.305 0.540* -0.418 -0.388 -0.350 -0.631 
 (0.105) (0.112) (0.111) (0.0976) (0.361) (0.346) (0.382) (0.323) (0.493) (0.504) (0.486) (0.534) 
FMI -15.56***    -23.76**    33.82***    
 (5.096)    (9.669)    (9.579)    
FMD  -7.654**    -44.30***    17.25   
  (3.510)    (10.70)    (11.68)   
FME   -7.557***    -10.64*    18.34***  
   (2.602)    (6.076)    (6.590)  
FMA    -23.49**    -39.42*    45.21** 
    (9.173)    (23.91)    (20.16) 
Inflation -0.119*** -0.136*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.176 -0.203* -0.173 -0.170 -0.110 -0.0703 -0.127 -0.107 
 (0.0307) (0.0304) (0.0320) (0.0336) (0.109) (0.105) (0.114) (0.112) (0.189) (0.189) (0.191) (0.191) 
GDP Growth 0.0415 0.0352 0.0245 0.0209 -0.401** -0.299 -0.428** -0.431** -0.194 -0.178 -0.172 -0.132 
 (0.0539) (0.0560) (0.0538) (0.0529) (0.194) (0.187) (0.190) (0.197) (0.170) (0.182) (0.164) (0.168) 
EFI 0.0148 0.0345 0.0392 -0.0301 -0.141 -0.190 -0.0950 -0.228 0.784** 0.748** 0.720** 0.881*** 
 (0.0635) (0.0622) (0.0650) (0.0688) (0.253) (0.264) (0.263) (0.254) (0.308) (0.305) (0.309) (0.337) 
Crisis 0.738 0.626 0.138 0.407 -10.33*** -7.239** -11.28*** -10.75*** 3.051 3.360 4.126 3.006 
 (1.757) (1.832) (1.782) (1.750) (3.365) (3.205) (3.465) (3.368) (3.437) (3.439) (3.309) (3.746) 
F 7.675 6.737 7.232 6.848 4.126 5.084 3.579 4.171 9.871 6.078 6.689 5.960 
r2 0.134 0.121 0.132 0.159 0.148 0.174 0.129 0.132 0.0886 0.0791 0.0883 0.0792 
N 339 339 339 339 331 331 331 331 330 330 330 330 
170 
 
 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition (deposit insurance for all countries- 2SLS) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-
12) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year 
effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test 
confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit 
proportion report the results for 64 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 63 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level respectively. 

































Interest Cost 0.00836 0.0177 0.0136 0.0178 0.696 0.661 0.705 0.703 0.635** 0.672** 0.615** 0.610** 
 (0.0651) (0.0661) (0.0649) (0.0671) (0.488) (0.477) (0.489) (0.490) (0.293) (0.291) (0.294) (0.296) 
Equity 
Capital 
-0.864*** -0.857*** -0.868*** -0.845*** -0.0985 -0.111 -0.0820 -0.0863 -0.309 -0.289 -0.324 -0.344 
 (0.136) (0.138) (0.137) (0.138) (0.280) (0.274) (0.283) (0.272) (0.454) (0.459) (0.447) (0.445) 
FMI -6.139*    -4.388    18.41*    
 (3.601)    (8.409)    (11.13)    
FMD  0.558    -13.56*    24.16***   
  (3.364)    (7.155)    (9.131)   
FME   -2.617    3.238    2.202  
   (1.673)    (3.318)    (6.039)  
FMA    -7.339    -4.267    6.554 
    (5.126)    (9.206)    (7.780) 
Deposit 
Insurance 
0.00623*** 0.00634*** 0.00629*** 0.00628*** 0.00443 0.00425 0.00452 0.00445 0.0175*** 0.0178*** 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 
 (0.00128) (0.00129) (0.00127) (0.00128) (0.00290) (0.00290) (0.00290) (0.00289) (0.00471) (0.00467) (0.00472) (0.00472) 
Inflation -0.125*** -0.131*** -0.126*** -0.123*** -0.178* -0.180* -0.188* -0.178* -0.145 -0.125 -0.134 -0.137 
 (0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0351) (0.0343) (0.0973) (0.0940) (0.0990) (0.0974) (0.188) (0.190) (0.186) (0.187) 
GDP Growth 0.00265 -0.0145 -0.00656 0.00305 -0.0231 0.00496 -0.0424 -0.0251 -0.942*** -0.963*** -0.899*** -0.905*** 
 (0.0577) (0.0552) (0.0561) (0.0582) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.182) (0.183) (0.178) (0.179) 
EFI -0.235*** -0.225*** -0.226*** -0.227*** 0.259 0.207 0.264 0.265 0.0273 0.0984 0.00475 0.00786 
 (0.0836) (0.0804) (0.0843) (0.0820) (0.174) (0.176) (0.174) (0.174) (0.192) (0.191) (0.190) (0.191) 
F 8.595 8.388 9.230 8.466 2.000 2.270 1.903 1.912 17.80 17.96 17.48 17.16 
r2 0.230 0.232 0.235 0.234 0.0777 0.0916 0.0740 0.0758 0.291 0.292 0.293 0.294 
N 608 608 608 608 600 600 600 600 599 599 599 599 
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 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition (deposit insurance in highly financially developed countries- 
2SLS) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-
12) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year 
effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test 
confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding, retail and time 
deposit proportions report the results for 37 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 

































Interest Cost 0.328 0.364 0.350 0.327 -0.596 -0.856* -0.771 -0.905* 2.052* 1.646 1.646 1.729* 
 (0.255) (0.246) (0.256) (0.237) (0.558) (0.508) (0.516) (0.506) (1.082) (1.016) (1.091) (1.009) 
Equity 
Capital 
-1.081*** -1.069*** -1.074*** -1.091*** 0.368 0.374 0.282 0.309 0.480 0.477 0.347 0.468 
 (0.181) (0.184) (0.179) (0.171) (0.284) (0.277) (0.277) (0.271) (0.591) (0.585) (0.579) (0.575) 
FMI -2.120    26.29**    39.36**    
 (4.490)    (12.57)    (16.56)    
FMD  1.114    21.76**    29.62**   
  (5.754)    (10.47)    (13.68)   
FME   -0.271    6.384    4.938  
   (1.900)    (4.385)    (7.743)  
FMA    -3.683    7.368    27.35*** 
    (4.997)    (7.306)    (9.249) 
Deposit 
Insurance 
0.00188 0.00200 0.00196 0.00172 -0.00496 -0.00539 -0.00585 -0.00553 -0.00182 -0.00255 -0.00328 -0.00159 
 (0.00177) (0.00177) (0.00176) (0.00174) (0.00423) (0.00419) (0.00399) (0.00403) (0.00742) (0.00725) (0.00712) (0.00723) 
Inflation -0.417* -0.430* -0.426* -0.397* -0.365 -0.296 -0.260 -0.294 -0.444 -0.333 -0.268 -0.471 
 (0.243) (0.238) (0.242) (0.235) (0.396) (0.387) (0.383) (0.386) (0.498) (0.478) (0.488) (0.491) 
GDP Growth -0.0939 -0.102 -0.0991 -0.0822 -0.305* -0.308* -0.237 -0.276 -1.619*** -1.615*** -1.522*** -1.650*** 
 (0.0960) (0.0908) (0.0945) (0.103) (0.182) (0.183) (0.187) (0.182) (0.274) (0.277) (0.278) (0.279) 
EFI -0.491*** -0.482*** -0.489*** -0.472*** 0.774*** 0.879*** 0.751*** 0.710*** -0.739*** -0.600** -0.778*** -0.912*** 
 (0.163) (0.158) (0.162) (0.150) (0.261) (0.284) (0.259) (0.255) (0.280) (0.301) (0.280) (0.285) 
F 9.345 9.561 9.630 9.233 1.718 1.692 1.543 1.622 8.574 8.802 8.879 8.940 
r2 0.318 0.319 0.318 0.318 0.0847 0.0806 0.0828 0.0678 0.315 0.325 0.320 0.346 




 Financial markets development: deposit funding and composition (deposit insurance in less financially developed countries- 
2SLS) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-4) present the result for deposit funding, whereas columns (5-
12) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail and time deposit proportion as dependent variables. In all regression equations, I employ country fixed and year 
effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, and financial market indices as endogenous variable and their lagged level variables as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright test 
confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit 
proportion report the results for 27 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 26 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent level respectively. 









































Interest Cost -0.0490 -0.0475 -0.0310 -0.0575 0.682 0.623 0.739 0.612 0.420 0.439 0.435 0.408 
 (0.0534) (0.0538) (0.0548) (0.0551) (0.576) (0.550) (0.592) (0.586) (0.312) (0.309) (0.313) (0.312) 
Equity Capital -0.536*** -0.560*** -0.591*** -0.370*** -0.282 -0.316 -0.427 0.482 -0.958* -0.983* -1.015* -0.732 
 (0.148) (0.160) (0.160) (0.134) (0.452) (0.471) (0.518) (0.429) (0.582) (0.588) (0.592) (0.610) 
FMI -12.84**    -45.48***    -10.10    
 (5.587)    (12.26)    (11.60)    
FMD  -3.888    -38.96***    4.900   
  (3.786)    (9.105)    (10.47)   
FME   -7.067**    -7.181    -10.06  
   (3.054)    (5.403)    (7.191)  
FMA    -23.46**    -100.0***    -28.76 
    (10.66)    (24.33)    (19.73) 
Deposit 
Insurance 
0.00888*** 0.00856*** 0.00895*** 0.00955*** 0.00966** 0.00821** 0.00873** 0.0134*** 0.0256*** 0.0255*** 0.0260*** 0.0264*** 
 (0.00168) (0.00176) (0.00167) (0.00171) (0.00426) (0.00399) (0.00412) (0.00451) (0.00533) (0.00530) (0.00531) (0.00531) 
Inflation -0.0766** -0.0914*** -0.0753** -0.0656* -0.132 -0.176* -0.172 -0.0718 -0.152 -0.163 -0.137 -0.131 
 (0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0353) (0.0335) (0.101) (0.102) (0.107) (0.111) (0.204) (0.205) (0.205) (0.209) 
GDP Growth 0.101 0.0792 0.0925 0.0922 0.0859 0.0892 -0.0110 0.0741 -0.536** -0.582*** -0.516** -0.545** 
 (0.0641) (0.0618) (0.0623) (0.0589) (0.176) (0.170) (0.174) (0.189) (0.225) (0.226) (0.225) (0.220) 
EFI -0.00603 0.000932 0.0164 -0.0614 -0.0803 -0.0967 -0.00470 -0.370 0.856*** 0.868*** 0.891*** 0.770*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0660) (0.0690) (0.0701) (0.234) (0.240) (0.240) (0.245) (0.269) (0.268) (0.270) (0.283) 
F 4.172 3.831 4.236 4.688 3.491 3.576 3.002 3.170 10.74 9.901 10.10 9.602 
r2 0.194 0.192 0.191 0.225 0.207 0.245 0.184 0.189 0.301 0.301 0.298 0.302 
N 339 339 339 339 331 331 331 331 330 330 330 330 
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 Correlation matrix of full dataset 
 
DF RDP TDP IC Capital FMI FMD FMKE FMA Inflation GDPG EFI DI Crisis RQ GEFF 
DF 1.00 
               
RDP 0.29 1.00 
              
TDP 0.05 0.02 1.00 
             
IC -0.10 -0.08 0.26 1.00 
            
Capital -0.29 0.11 0.11 0.07 1.00 
           
FMI -0.22 -0.27 0.11 -0.13 -0.25 1.00 
          
FMD -0.17 -0.27 0.08 -0.18 -0.27 0.95 1.00 
         
FMKE -0.16 -0.21 0.12 -0.07 -0.18 0.84 0.72 1.00 
        
FMA -0.24 -0.24 0.11 -0.08 -0.21 0.84 0.75 0.47 1.00 
       
Inflation 0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.30 0.21 -0.39 -0.38 -0.28 -0.36 1.00 
      
GDPG 0.10 0.18 0.01 0.07 0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.21 -0.20 0.32 1.00 
     
EFI -0.25 -0.15 0.20 -0.13 -0.17 0.61 0.62 0.34 0.65 -0.48 -0.30 1.00 
    
DI -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 1.00 
   
Crisis -0.15 -0.28 -0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.27 -0.15 -0.31 0.24 -0.04 1.00 
  
RQ -0.27 -0.23 0.16 -0.14 -0.27 0.71 0.70 0.49 0.69 -0.54 -0.39 0.88 -0.01 0.34 1.00 
 




 List of countries and number of banks according to financial development level 
 
Country Name Number of Banks Financially Developed Economies Region 
Bahrain 6 High Africa 
Botswana 4 High Africa 
Israel 9 High Africa 
Jordan 10 High Africa 
Malta 4 High Africa 
Mauritius 8 High Africa 
Namibia 5 High Africa 
South Africa 8 High Africa 
Bolivia 6 High America 
El Salvador 6 High America 
United States of America 214 High America 
Australia 9 High Asia 
Austria 35 High Asia 
Belgium 12 High Asia 
China 10 High Asia 
Croatia 18 High Asia 
Cyprus 5 High Asia 
Czech Republic 12 High Asia 
Denmark 27 High Asia 
Estonia 3 High Asia 
Finland 4 High Asia 
France 60 High Asia 
Germany 71 High Asia 
Greece 6 High Asia 
Hong Kong 22 High Asia 
Hungary 10 High Asia 
India 43 High Asia 
Ireland 4 High Asia 
Italy 41 High Asia 
Luxembourg 28 High Asia 
Netherlands 12 High Asia 
New Zealand 5 High Asia 
Norway 6 High Asia 
Poland 13 High Asia 
Portugal 7 High Asia 
Singapore 7 High Asia 
Slovakia 6 High Asia 
Slovenia 10 High Asia 
Spain 13 High Asia 
Sweden 11 High Asia 
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Country Name Number of Banks Financially Developed Economies Region 
Switzerland 77 High Asia 
Thailand 14 High Asia 
United Kingdom 54 High Asia 
Cameroon 5 Low Africa 
Cote D'Ivoire 4 Low Africa 
Ethiopia 6 Low Africa 
Kenya 17 Low Africa 
Kuwait 3 Low Africa 
Malawi 3 Low Africa 
Mali 3 Low Africa 
Oman 5 Low Africa 
Qatar 5 Low Africa 
Saudi Arabia 8 Low Africa 
Senegal 5 Low Africa 
Swaziland 4 Low Africa 
Tunisia 10 Low Africa 
Zambia 6 Low Africa 
Ecuador 12 Low America 
Guyana 2 Low America 
Peru 8 Low America 
Uruguay 10 Low America 
Armenia 9 Low Asia 
Azerbaijan 8 Low Asia 
Belarus 6 Low Asia 
Bosnia And Herzegovina 10 Low Asia 
Bulgaria 9 Low Asia 
Indonesia 37 Low Asia 
Kazakhstan 10 Low Asia 
Latvia 11 Low Asia 
Lithuania 6 Low Asia 
Philippines 15 Low Asia 
Republic of Moldova 8 Low Asia 
Romania 11 Low Asia 
Russian Federation 414 Low Asia 
Turkey 13 Low Asia 





 Bank deposit competition and banking market structure: bank deposit funding and composition (all countries) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (4-
9) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables for all countries. In all regression 
equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. I use interest cost, HHID3 and HHIL3 as endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable. The Stock-Wright 
test confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit 
proportion report the results for 49 countries, whereas time deposit proportion presents the result for 48 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level respectively. 



















Interest cost on total 
deposit 
-0.391*** -0.435*** -0.478*** 1.416*** 1.422*** 1.421*** 3.700*** 3.696*** 3.715*** 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.154) (0.434) (0.434) (0.433) (0.484) (0.487) (0.489) 
Interest cost on retail 
deposit 
-0.330*** -0.321*** -0.315*** -0.367*** -0.368*** -0.368*** 0.0801 0.0806 0.0776 
 (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.195) (0.196) (0.195) 
HHID3  -0.00209***   0.000257   -0.0000945  
  (0.000494)   (0.000699)   (0.00104)  
HHIL3   -0.00317***   0.000186   0.000298 
   (0.000530)   (0.000759)   (0.00106) 
Employee costt-1 -0.362 -0.397* -0.375 0.724*** 0.728*** 0.725*** 1.747 1.740 1.764 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.231) (0.276) (0.277) (0.276) (1.155) (1.159) (1.150) 
Equity capital t-1 -0.478*** -0.480*** -0.479*** -0.0936** -0.0933** -0.0935** -0.126 -0.126 -0.128 
 (0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0344) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0816) (0.0818) (0.0823) 
Market Size t-1 -0.318 -0.382 -0.296 -0.290 -0.283 -0.292 2.230 2.223 2.228 
 (0.686) (0.687) (0.680) (0.700) (0.703) (0.700) (1.567) (1.567) (1.564) 
CPI 0.129*** 0.0383 -0.0155 -0.199** -0.188* -0.191* -0.271*** -0.273*** -0.263** 
 (0.0387) (0.0445) (0.0466) (0.0988) (0.105) (0.107) (0.0980) (0.101) (0.104) 
GDP per capita -3.993*** -5.573*** -6.608*** 0.933 1.127 1.086 -13.03*** -13.13*** -12.74*** 
 (0.815) (0.833) (0.884) (1.336) (1.370) (1.420) (2.171) (2.556) (2.600) 
Financial Freedom -0.0373* -0.0131 -0.00167 -0.0934*** -0.0964*** -0.0955*** -0.0317 -0.0302 -0.0359 
 (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0328) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0414) (0.0465) (0.0455) 
Population Old 2.619*** 2.061*** 1.973*** -0.467 -0.399 -0.429 -0.441 -0.442 -0.452 
 (0.297) (0.304) (0.301) (0.447) (0.469) (0.459) (0.689) (0.691) (0.687) 
F 73.50 71.81 74.01 14.82 13.96 13.95 10.11 9.510 9.565 
r2 0.319 0.325 0.327 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.143 0.143 0.143 
N 6101 6101 6101 6101 6101 6101 3495 3495 3495 
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 Bank deposit competition and banking market structure: bank deposit funding and composition (interest on retail deposits- highly 
financially developed economies) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (4-
9) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables for high financially developed 
economies. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, employee cost, market size, HHID3 and HHIL3 as endogenous 
variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable, except for market concentration (HHID3 and HHIL3). For market concentration, I employ Financial Institution Access 
Index as an instrument. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification 
issue. The deposit funding, retail and time deposit proportions presents the result for 31 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level 
respectively. 



















Interest cost on total deposit -0.195 -0.217 -0.214 0.199 0.217 0.216 4.363*** 4.342*** 4.335*** 
 (0.249) (0.245) (0.247) (0.361) (0.360) (0.361) (0.537) (0.535) (0.537) 
Interest cost on retail deposit 0.402*** 0.413*** 0.405*** -0.533*** -0.543*** -0.536*** -0.0278 -0.0234 -0.0270 
 (0.139) (0.138) (0.139) (0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.203) (0.202) (0.203) 
HHID3  0.00159**   -0.00134   0.000986  
  (0.000627)   (0.000915)   (0.00133)  
HHIL3   0.00127*   -0.00118   0.00124 
   (0.000698)   (0.00103)   (0.00147) 
Employee cost t-1 0.165 0.168 0.131 5.009*** 5.006*** 5.040*** 0.0801 0.114 0.0828 
 (0.603) (0.609) (0.607) (1.200) (1.194) (1.197) (1.728) (1.722) (1.722) 
Equity capital t-1 -0.646*** -0.635*** -0.641*** 0.173* 0.164* 0.169* -0.205 -0.202 -0.203 
 (0.0647) (0.0649) (0.0646) (0.0987) (0.0985) (0.0985) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) 
Market Size t-1 0.240 0.354 0.258 -3.711** -3.808** -3.729** 1.907 1.964 1.918 
 (0.712) (0.702) (0.704) (1.529) (1.519) (1.517) (2.311) (2.283) (2.278) 
CPI -0.268*** -0.233** -0.266*** 0.243 0.214 0.242 -0.112 -0.0995 -0.117 
 (0.0948) (0.0973) (0.0951) (0.158) (0.160) (0.158) (0.204) (0.205) (0.204) 
GDP per capita -5.149*** -3.247*** -3.614*** 0.730 -0.871 -0.702 -17.07*** -15.88*** -15.57*** 
 (0.959) (1.162) (1.212) (1.801) (2.065) (2.156) (2.855) (3.528) (3.719) 
Financial Freedom -0.0583*** -0.0939*** -0.0761*** -0.0124 0.0176 0.00426 -0.101* -0.120* -0.118** 
 (0.0215) (0.0249) (0.0230) (0.0387) (0.0431) (0.0410) (0.0554) (0.0638) (0.0598) 
Population Old -0.138 0.250 0.0433 1.151* 0.825 0.982 -1.229 -1.088 -1.141 
 (0.382) (0.405) (0.391) (0.614) (0.659) (0.637) (0.897) (0.926) (0.906) 
F 18.78 17.68 17.78 5.570 5.330 5.278 10.52 10.37 10.65 
r2 0.150 0.154 0.153 0.0860 0.0875 0.0864 0.0820 0.0843 0.0846 
N 2871 2871 2871 2871 2871 2871 2591 2591 2591 
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 Bank deposit competition and banking market structure: bank deposit funding and composition (interest on retail deposits- less 
financially developed economies) 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns (4-
9) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail deposit to total retail deposit as dependent variables for less financially developed 
economies. In all regression equations, I employ firm fixed and year effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, employee cost, market size, HHID3 and HHIL3 as endogenous 
variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable, except for market concentration (HHID3 and HHIL3). For market concentration, I employ Financial Institution Access 
Index as an instrument. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has over-identification 
issue. The deposit funding and retail deposit proportion show results for 18 countries and time deposit proportion consists 17 countries. The ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 



















Interest cost on total deposit -0.415** -0.519** -0.558*** 1.731*** 1.748*** 1.720*** 3.845*** 3.739*** 3.744*** 
 (0.181) (0.202) (0.214) (0.597) (0.600) (0.591) (0.566) (0.561) (0.547) 
Interest cost on retail deposit -0.353*** -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.377*** -0.381*** -0.375*** 0.372 0.354 0.347 
 (0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0356) (0.0357) (0.0353) (0.539) (0.536) (0.536) 
HHID3  -0.00579***   0.000961   -0.00202  
  (0.000787)   (0.00118)   (0.00196)  
HHIL3   -0.00598***   -0.000450   -0.00184 
   (0.000701)   (0.00116)   (0.00179) 
Employee cost t-1 -0.390 -0.460* -0.420 0.696** 0.708** 0.694** 4.034*** 3.884*** 3.926*** 
 (0.264) (0.263) (0.261) (0.279) (0.280) (0.279) (1.458) (1.442) (1.431) 
Equity capital t-1 -0.461*** -0.460*** -0.460*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** 0.0192 0.0280 0.0288 
 (0.0396) (0.0394) (0.0390) (0.0389) (0.0388) (0.0389) (0.0973) (0.0965) (0.0975) 
Market Size t-1 -0.176 -0.355 -0.203 1.037 1.067 1.035 2.900 2.774 2.980* 
 (0.913) (0.913) (0.897) (0.812) (0.817) (0.813) (1.771) (1.779) (1.759) 
CPI 0.114*** -0.129** -0.177*** -0.152 -0.111 -0.174 -0.421*** -0.458*** -0.475*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0551) (0.0562) (0.122) (0.131) (0.137) (0.122) (0.125) (0.135) 
GDP per capita -1.796 -2.797 -4.192** -0.647 -0.480 -0.827 4.648 3.197 3.302 
 (1.998) (2.005) (1.986) (2.730) (2.674) (2.673) (3.931) (4.538) (4.446) 
Financial Freedom -0.0175 -0.0233 0.0153 -0.0292 -0.0283 -0.0268 -0.124 -0.107 -0.104 
 (0.0457) (0.0441) (0.0450) (0.0725) (0.0726) (0.0732) (0.0828) (0.0863) (0.0884) 
Population Old 5.117*** 3.950*** 4.224*** 1.282 1.476 1.215 -0.665 -0.119 -0.0778 
 (0.695) (0.655) (0.672) (0.912) (0.913) (0.907) (1.288) (1.317) (1.387) 
F 72.86 74.63 76.05 17.35 16.51 16.24 10.56 10.99 10.39 
r2 0.407 0.430 0.430 0.237 0.237 0.236 0.321 0.327 0.327 




 Interaction- High income countries, Interest cost, HHID, and HHIL 
The table reports coefficient and robust standard errors obtained through 2SLS are in parentheses. Columns (1-3) present the result for bank deposit funding, whereas columns 
(4-9) show the results for bank deposit composition using retail deposit to total deposit and retail deposit to total retail deposit as dependent. In all regression equations, I employ 
firm fixed and year effects. I use interest cost, equity capital, employee cost, market size, HHID3, HHIL3, and the interaction between HHID, HHIL and interest cost as 
endogenous variable and their lag-level variable as instrument variable, except for market concentration (HHID3 and HHIL3). For market concentration, I employ Financial 
Institution Access Index as an instrument. The Stock-Wright test confirms the validity of instruments. Moreover, Hansen-J test suggest that none of the regressions results has 
over-identification issue. The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 DF DF DF RDP RDP RDP  TDP TDP TDP 
































































































































































































































































































F 178.6701 178.1946 181.3032 125.5946 97.6281 96.4530 31.5661 34.8692 34.6830 
r2 0.5439 0.5576 0.5574 0.4566 0.4348 0.4269 0.1712 0.2636 0.2778 
N 12929.0000 12929.0000 12929.0000 12858.0000 12858.0000 12858.0000 8632.0000 8632.0000 8632.0000 
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MSt-1 HHID HHIL CPI PCI OP FF RQ PS GE ROL 
DF 1.00                                     
RDP 0.62 1.00                                   
TDP -0.41 -0.50 1.00                                 
IC -0.40 -0.22 0.38 1.00                               
ICR -0.48 -0.47 0.33 0.28 1.00                             
It-1 -0.40 -0.25 0.42 0.75 0.26 1.00                           
STA t-1 -0.48 -0.44 0.40 0.23 0.30 0.51 1.00                         
CAP t-1 -0.54 -0.36 0.30 0.03 0.21 0.25 0.45 1.00                       
MS t-1 0.49 0.50 -0.51 -0.30 -0.35 -0.52 -0.67 -0.55 1.00                     
HHID 0.26 0.31 -0.50 -0.20 -0.20 -0.28 -0.32 -0.21 0.34 1.00                   
HHIL 0.23 0.26 -0.50 -0.16 -0.18 -0.25 -0.29 -0.20 0.30 0.98 1.00                 
CPI -0.37 -0.39 0.42 0.54 0.24 0.62 0.46 0.30 -0.53 -0.28 -0.23 1.00               
PCI 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.37 -0.05 -0.43 -0.18 -0.12 0.25 0.11 0.08 -0.54 1.00             
OP -0.20 -0.29 0.01 -0.15 0.06 -0.19 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.23 0.67 1.00           
FF 0.41 0.41 -0.38 -0.48 -0.30 -0.57 -0.46 -0.28 0.52 0.36 0.32 -0.69 0.61 0.28 1.00         
RQ 0.40 0.37 -0.36 -0.50 -0.28 -0.61 -0.47 -0.31 0.56 0.34 0.29 -0.73 0.76 0.42 0.90 1.00       
PS 0.37 0.36 -0.43 -0.43 -0.27 -0.52 -0.43 -0.28 0.47 0.45 0.42 -0.63 0.68 0.40 0.76 0.85 1.00     
GE 0.42 0.39 -0.34 -0.50 -0.28 -0.62 -0.48 -0.31 0.57 0.34 0.29 -0.71 0.74 0.36 0.85 0.97 0.81 1.00   
ROL 0.46 0.44 -0.39 -0.50 -0.31 -0.63 -0.51 -0.34 0.61 0.36 0.31 -0.72 0.71 0.32 0.86 0.96 0.84 0.98 1.00 
 
